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ABSTRACT
A Theory of Free Human Action

Michael

J. Zimmerman, B.A., Yale College
M.A., University of Massachusetts,
Ph.D,, University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Fred Feldman

In this dissertation

of free human action.

parts.

I

attempt to draw up an adequate theory

This project falls naturally into three main

The first concerns the matter of constructing a theory of

events; the second concerns the matter of constructing a theory of

human action based on this theory of events; and the third concerns
the matter of constructing a theory of free human action based on this

theory of human action.
In the first chapter

I

give a detailed exposition and then a

detailed criticism of Roderick Chisholm's latest published theory of
events as it appears in Chapter IV of his book Person and Object

.

I

argue that this theory is defective in certain ways but that none of
its defects is sufficiently serious to warrant abandonment of the

task which Chisholm has set himself, to wit, the construction of a

theory of events which is consistent with the rest of the ontology to

which he subscribes and in which events are taken to be finely-grained
abstract entities.

In the second chapter

I

propose a theory of events

wliich is Chisholmian in both substance and style but which does not

fall prey to the criticisms lodged against the theory discussed in the
V

first chapter.
In the third chapter

I

give a detailed exposition and then a

detailed criticism of Chisholm’s latest published
theory of human
action as it appears in Chapter II of Person and
Object

.

Once again,

I

argue that the theory is defective in certain ways, but
this time

I

contend that it suffers from a serious defect, namely, its
reliance

on the concept of agent-causation.

I

argue that this concept ought

not to figure in the foundation of a theory of human action.

fourth chapter

I

In the

present a theory of human action of my own, one

which does not rest on the concept of agent-causation but rather on
the concepts of intention and volition.

The theory that results,

though Chisholmian in style, is not really Chisholmian in substance

(although actions are of course still taken to be abstract entities),
for it differs from Chisholm's own theory in numerous, sometimes

crucial respects.
I

During the course of the presentation of the theory

seek to resolve some fundamental problems concerning what acting

is, what an action is, what intentional action is, what basic action
is, what omission is, and so on.

then seek to rebut certain of the

I

more prominent criticisms that have been made with respect to accounts
of action similar to my own account.
In the fifth chapter

sions of compatibilism.

I

history, is defective, and

I

concern myself with two leading ver-

show that the first, which enjoys a rich
I

show that the second, which has only re-

cently been proposed, fails to demonstrate the plausibility of compatibilism.

Impressed by the inadequacies of these versions of
VI

compatibilisni,

I

present in the sixth chapter an incompatibilist

theory of free human action.
of agent-causation which

I

At this point

I

call upon the concept

earlier banished; for it is here,

I

believe, that it has a proper, indeed an indispensable,
role to
play.
It is hoped that the theory of free human action presented
in

this dissertation may serve as the basis for the resolution
of cer-

tain prominent puzzles in other areas of philosophy, particularly on-

bological problems, ethical problems (especially those concerning the

question of moral responsibility), and problems concerning legal and
social matters.

But whether and how this hope may be realized is an

issue that must here remain uninvestigated.

vii
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CHAPTER

I

CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF EVENTS

The theory of events that

I

shall propose in Chapter II as

a basis for the theory of action that I shall propose in Chapter IV

owes very much to Roderick Chisholm's latest published theory of

events.

It is appropriate,

therefore, to begin with a discussion of

this theory.
In the past Chisholm has proposed several different analyses

of the concept of an event and related concepts.

I

shall concern my-

self here with that analysis (or portions of it) that appears in

Chapter IV of Person and Object .^
I

My procedure will be as follows.

shall begin, in the first section of this chapter, by giving an ex-

position of Chisholm's theory.
the theory will be made.

During this exposition no criticism of

Such criticism will be undertaken, however,

in the second section, where it will be presented piecemeal.

1.

Exposition of Chisholm's Theory of Events

A conspicuous and most welcome feature of Chisholm's manner of

doing philosophy is that he invariably broaches a topic by introducing
a set of unanalyzed concepts on which his analysis to follow will be

based.

In so doing he is being completely honest with the student of

his philosophy on the matter of which concepts will be used as tools
of analysis and which not; as he himself has remarked on occasion, by
1

2

beginning in this way he is "laying his cards on the
table for all to
see."

It

may sometimes happen that the student is hard
put to it to

understand some of the terms used to express the
unanalyzed concepts
in question,

but it is difficult to see how this problem is
to be

avoided unless some happier term or terms be found.
In his theory of events, as expounded in Person and
Object

,

Chisholm appeals to the following unanalyzed concepts: the concepts
of
a thing, a property and a relation, 2

sity

,

^ re

necessity, physical neces-

acceptance (or belief), undertaking (or endeavor), consideration

(or entertainment),

obtaining (or occurrence), exemplification (or

instantiation), time and place.

He says that he will also avail him-

self of the "locutions of logic," 3 which

I

take to include terms which

express the concepts (among others) of existence, material implication, conjunction, disjunction, and negation (some of which are of

course interanalyzable)

.

Although the number of unanalyzed concepts

to which Chisholm appeals is somewhat large,

it is noteworthy

hov\?

small it is in comparison with the number of unanalyzed concepts to

which almost all other philosophers, who deal with the present topic,
make implicit or explicit appeal.
My presentation of Chisholm’s theory of events will follow for
the most part, but not in every detail, the order of its exposition
in Chapter IV of Person and Object

4
.

We may begin with two defini-

tions which are in fact given right at the end of that chapter.

first is:

The

3

—

^

individual thing =df.
there exists a
such
that ^ is identical with x and it is possible that
there does not exist a
such that ^ is identical

^

with

X.

The second definition is:
^

is ^ person =df.
x is an individual thing which is
necessarily such that it is physically possible that
there be something which it undertakes to bring about,

^

2i

•

where

£

is physically possible if and only if it is not physically

necessary that £ should not occur.
Armed with these definitions we may go on to give an analysis
of the concept of that entity which, along with properties

(and rela-

tions) on the one hand and concrete individuals on the other, forms
the trlpodal foundation of Chisholm’s ontology, namely, the concept of
a state of affairs.^
D- 1

•

:

Chisholm offers the following:

is a state of affairs =df.
it is possible that
there be someone who accepts £.

£

Examples of states of affairs are:
at 3:40 p.m., July 9, 444 B.C.],

on.^

[Socrates walks],

[Socrates walks

[there are round squares], and so

Note that "accepts" in D.I.3 may be replaced by "believes" or

"believes true"

(or, more awkwardly, "believes to occur") without

altering the sense of the definiens.

"Acceptance," of course, is here

taken as a technical term which expresses a relation between a person
and a state of affairs.

That is, the range of "£" in D.I.3 must not

be thought to include, for example, gifts, bribes, or suchlike.

One

may indeed accept gifts or bribes in some sense of "accepts," but not
in

tlie

sense which is at issue here.

It might seem easier or more

appropriate to use "believes" instead of "accepts" in D.I.3; but this

4

is not really so.

For one may believe people, in some sense
of

"believes" which is not at issue here, and hence the range
of

'y

would again have to be understood to have some implicit
technical
limit.

Note also that "accepts" could be replaced by "considers" (or

entertains

)

a term which again expresses a technical concept

— in

which case the sense, but not the accuracy, of the definiens would be
altered
In order to give what he calls a "non-tr ivial" criterion of

identity for states of affairs, Chisholm introduces the concept of
entailment.
D- 1

•

He says:

£ entails ^

=df.

is necessarily such that:
then £ obtains; and
(ii) whoever accepts it accepts £.

:

(i)

£

if it obtains

Chisholm then says: if a state of affairs
of affairs

then

£

£

£ entails £ and £ entails

is identical with a state

£.

It is apparent that

he would also be prepared to endorse, though he in fact does not do
so explicitly, the principle that if

£

£ entails £

and

£ entails £

then

is identical with £.

Chisholm makes five assumptions concerning states of affairs.
The first is:
A. I

.

:

For every £, if £ is a state of affairs, then
exists necessarily.

£

Special note should be made that A.I.l does not assert that every
state of affairs obtains necessarily, but only that every state of

affairs exists necessarily.

Chisholm sometimes puts this by saying

that all states of affairs are "eternal objects," although only

some are "necessary"-- !

.

e.

,

obtain necessarily (an example of such

5

a state of affairs would be

deed, are

[there are no round squares]);
some, in-

"impossible"-i^, necessarily

of such a state of affairs would be

rest are "contingent”

fail to obtain (an example

[there are round squares]); the

(an example would be

[there is snow]).

The second assumption is:

A

^

For any property or relation F, there is a state
of
affairs £ and there is a state of affairs
which
£
are necessarily such that
£ obtains if and only if F
is exemplified and £ obtains if and only if F
~ is no"t
exemplified.

•

;

In connection with this Chisholm also assumes the
following:

For any two properties F and G, there is a conjunctive property ^ which is necessarily such that it is
exemplified by a thing if and only if that thing
exemplifies both F^ and G.

We may say, then, that there are necessary properties (such as being

either round or nonround )
and nonround )

,

,

impossible properties (such as being round

and contingent properties (such as being white ), just
O

as there are necessary, impossible and contingent states of affairs.

The fourth assumption is:
A. I

.

:

For every state of affairs £, there is a state of
affairs £ which is necessarily such that it obtains
if and only if £ does not obtain.

In such a case,

and

£

£ may

be said to contradict each other.

It

should be noted that, for any state of affairs, there are indefinitely many other states of affairs that contradict it.
the example:

Chisholm gives

[Socrates is mortal] is contradicted not only by [Socra-

tes is not mortal] but also by [[Socrates is not mortal] or [two and
two are five]].

But he suggests that we could say the following:

6

D^:

IS a negation of
contradicts q- and
^ =df. (i)
(ii) for every r, if r contradicts
then r is
necessarily such that, if it is true, then
£ is true.

£

TliG

—

*

^

fxfth

cinci

fiiisl sss unip t i o n i s

i

every state of affairs
£ and every state of affairs £, there is a conjunctive state of affairs
r
which is necessarily such that r obtains if
and only
if £ obtains and
£ obtains.

^

Given the concepts of the negation and conjunction
of states of affairs, Chisholm claims, the formulae of the
propositional calculus may
be interpreted as general principles about states
of affairs.

Chisholm

s

next task is to analyze the concept of a proposi-

tion and the concept of an event; for, in his ontology, propositions
and events constitute the two major subspecies of states of affairs.
In order to achieve this analysis, Chisholm calls upon a concept he

analyzed in Chapter

I

of Person and Object and whose analysis runs

thus
D- 1

•

6

£ entails

the property of being
=df.
£ is necessarily such that:
(i) if it obtains, then something has the property
of being
and
(ii) whoever accepts £ believes that something is

:

With this concept Chisholm will seek to analyze what it is for a state
of affairs to obtain or occur at a time.

Consider the state of affairs [Brutus kills Caesar].

Some of

the properties that it entails are had, or exemplified, only by con-

tingent

(

i.e.

,

individual) things.

instance, killing someone

Brutus

,

and so on.

,

Among such properties are, for

being killed by someone

,

being identical to

Now, every such property is exemplified either by

Brutus or by Caesar or by both; moreover, no proper subset of the set

7

{Brutus, Caesar} is such that its members exemplify all
such proper-

This observation leads Chisholm to propose the following
defi-

ties.

nition:
D» I

•

£

:

is concretized by A at
(i)

t

=df.

£ occurs;

for every property
if £ entails F, and if
^ is had only by contingent things, then some
member of A has F at £; and
(iii) there is no proper subset
^ of A which is such
that, for every such
some member of B has F.
(ii)

It should be noted that "A” and

in D.1.7 range over classes or

sets, and also that the undefined terms "member" and "proper subset"

are used.

Chisholm claims, however, that the concept of a class is

eliminable in the manner in which it is analyzed in Principia Mathematica

,

i. e.

,

in terms of properties.

The analysis of the concept of concretization enables Chisholm
to analyze the concepts of occurring at a time and occurring in a

place.
D. 1

.

:

D. 1

.

:

He proposes:

£
£

occurs at time £ =df.
there is a set A such that
is concretized by A at time _t.

£ =df. there is a set A and there
such that —q is concretized by A at t and
Q
all members of A are in place £ at _t ^

£ occurs

in place

is a time

t

i-

.

Chisholm notes that, although we cannot say of every state of affairs
that, if it occurs, it occurs in some place, we can say of every state
of affairs that,

if

it occurs,

it occurs at some time.

Given D.1.8, the analysis of the concept of a proposition is

straightforward.

Chisholm says:

8

I

•

IQ

is a proposition =df.
is a state of affairs; and
(ii) it is impossible that there be a time t and a

£

•

(i)

time _t’ such that p occurs at
occur at p'

Examples of propositions are:
444 B.C.],

hood?

,

and so on.

and does not

[Socrates walks at 3:40 p.m., July 9,

[Socrates never flies],

two are five]

p

\\That

[two and two are four],

[two and

of the concepts of truth and false-

These may be reduced to the concept of obtaining or occurring.

That is, a true proposition is one that obtains or occurs (and hence

always obtains or occurs) and a false proposition is one that does not
(and hence never does).

A true proposition may also be called a fact.

We may now turn to that part of Chisholm'

interests us here

— his

ontology which most

analysis of the concept of an event.

to analyze the concept of an event,
a

s

In order

Chisholm requires the concept of

property's not being such that it "may be rooted outside the times

at which it is had."

To achieve the analysis of this concept he

begins with the following definition:
D. I. 11

is rooted outside times at which it is had =df.
necessarily, for any x and for any period of time
p, X has the property p throughout p only if x
exists at some time before or after p.

p

:

Examples of properties that are rooted outside times at which they are
had are

:

being such that it will move

,

being such that it did move

being such that he is taking his second walk of the day

,

,

and so on.

There are some properties of which it can be said that they may be

rooted outside times at which they are had.

That is, there are some

properties which satisfy the following definition:

9

D. 1

.

12

may be rooted outside times at which it is had =df.
is equivalent to a disjunction of two properties,
one of which is, and the other of which is not, rooted
outside times at which it is had.

:

^

l^^lat

are the meanings of "equivalent" and "disjunction" here?

Else-

where Chisholm has spelled this out for us, by giving the following

expanded version of D.1.12:
D. 1 . 12 a
.

may be rooted outside times at which it is had =df.
There are properties ^ and il such that:
(i) neither ^ nor H is entailed by F^;
(ii) H. is not rooted outside times at which it is
had
(iii) ^ is rooted outside times at which it is had;

:

and
(iv) necessarily, for any x and any period of time _t,
X has the property ^ throughout _t if any only if
either (a) x has the property _H during _t,
or (b) X does not have the property H during

^

but has the property

^

during

_t

(This definition invokes the concept of one property's entailing

another

—a

However, the fol-

concept which Chisholm does not analyze.

lowing would appear adequate from his point of

viev\?:

for any thing, x»
entails [x exemplifies ^]

F entails G =df.

D.1.13:

[x

exemplifies F]

.

Examples of properties which may be rooted outside times at which they
are had are

:

being such that either it moves

being such that either it moves

(11)

(H)

or will move

or did move (^)

,

(iG)

,

and so on.

Finally, according to Chisholm, there are some properties which are
not such that they may be rooted outside times at which they are had.

Examples of such properties are perhaps the following (Chisholm himself gives the first example): being red

,

being such th at it moves,

and so on.

exclusive
Chisholm regards propositions and events as mutually

10

subspecies of states of affairs.

([John v^alks at 9:50 a.m.

1978 A.D.] is a proposition, and hence not an event.)

,

March

9,

He also be-

lieves that events entail properties that only individual things can

exemplify but that are not essential^^ to these things and, moreover,
are such that they may not be rooted outside times at which they are
had.

([John is such that he will walk] is not a proposition and in-

being self-identical

deed entails both a property

— that

is not such

that it may be rooted outside times at which it is had, and also a

property

being such that he will walk

— that

only individual things

can exemplify; but it entails no property that is not such that it

may be rooted outside times at which it is had, that is had only by

contingent things, and that
hence it is not an event.)

is

not essential to such things, and

Moreover, Chisholm takes it that all

events occur at some time and in some place.

([There are pink uni-

corns] entails a property exemplif iable only by contingent things,

not essential to these things, and not such that it may be rooted out-

side times at which it is had

— namely,

the property being pink

it never and nowhere occurs, and hence is not an event.)

For these

reasons Chisholm proposes:
D.l.lA:

is an event =df.
p is a state of affairs which is
such that:
(i) it occurs;
(ii) it is not a proposition; and
(iii) it entails a property F[ which is such that
(a) only individual things can exemplify
(b) it is possible that no individual things

exemplify
(c)

and

F is not such that it may be rooted outside times at which it is had.

remark:
He attaches to this definition the following

but

11
If we may assume that all individual
things have spatiotemporal location, then we may deduce that
every event is
such that it occurs at some place and some
time.^^

Examples of events are:
two and two],

[Socrates walks],

[California subsides],

[John runs],

[Smith adds

[Old Faithful gushes], and so

on.

A striking fact about events is that some of
them may recur.
Socrates walked on several occasions; Old Faithful
gushes every sixtyseven minutes; John goes for a run every morning.

(Perhaps California

will subside only once; however it is not being claimed
that every
event must recur, or even be able to recur, but only that
some are
able to do so.)

Indeed, it is the phenomenon of recurrence that seems

to have led Chisholm to a theory in which events are a
subspecies of

states of affairs; for it is generally agreed that, if events were

particulars, none could recur. 13

Chisholm claims that recurrence may

be straightforwardly characterized by Invoking the concept of con-

cretizatlon.
I

•

15

:

He offers the following two definitions:

A is such that at _t it has concretized £ exactly n
times =df
there are n_ periods of time such that:
(i) no two of them are continuous with each other;
(ii) none is later than _t;
(iii) A concretizes
during each; and
(iv) A does not concretize p at any other time within or prior to p.
.

D» I

»

16

:

is such that at p it has been concretized exactly n
times =df.
(i) consider each set that concretizes p at p or
prior to p;
(ii) for each such set take that number which is the
number of times such that the set at p has concretized p exactly that number of times; and
(ill) the sum of all such numbers is n.

p

12

If

tliese

definitions are adequate, then Chisholm has
accomplished

what Donald Davidson calls (concerning
a similar treatment of recur-

rence in an earlier publication of Chisholm’s)
a "breathtaking"
task.

14

For he has shown us how to count occurrences
of events with-

out requiring there to be such things as
particular occurrences.

For

instance, the sentence "[An incumbent President is
re-elected] has

occurred more than seventeen tines" may now be analyzed
as "There is
a number

n_

such that

^

is greater than seventeen and

[an incumbent

President is re-elected] has been concretized n times."
This completes my presentation of those portions of Chisholm's

theory of events which are germane to the present inquiry.

I

shall

now subject this theory to some criticism.

2.

Criticism of Chisholm's Theory of Events

My first comment concerns the propriety of Chisholm's presenting D.I.l through D.I.12 and D.I.14 through D.I.16 as definitions.

How are we to understand the symbol "=df."?

phrases a and

3,

the claim "a =df.

or at least to imply,

the claim that

3”

Ot

Normally, for any two

is taken to be equivalent to,

means the same as

3

.

But if

this is what Chisholm intends by his use of "=df.," then there is a

problem.

Consider D.1.2, for instance.

implying that "x is

a

Is Chisholm here saying or

person" means the same as

"jc

is an Individual

thing which is necessarily such that it is physically possible that
there be something which it undertakes to bring about"?

If so,

it

might well seem that the concept he is trying to capture is not what

13

we would ordinarily call the concept of

a

person.

For it might seem

that, although it is perhaps in fact, and
perhaps even necessarily,
the case that it is both necessary and
sufficient for one’s being a

person that one be necessarily such that it is
physically possible
that one undertake to bring about something,

being a person than that.
(as

1

there is yet more to

For instance, suppose it were the case

think it probably is the case) that necessarily a thing is
a

person if and only if it is an individual thing which is necessarily
such that it is physically possible for it to believe something, would
it be proper to elevate this criterion to the status of a definition
(v/here a

definition indicates synonymy)?

accept D.1.2, we would be committed
of the relation of synonymy)

(

Surely not; for then, if we

via the symmetry and transitivity

to asserting that

"jc

is an individual

thing which is necessarily such that it is physically possible that

there be something that it undertakes to bring about" means the same
as

"}£

is an individual thing which is necessarily such that it is

physically possible that there be something that it believes," and yet
this is false.

Why then define the phrase ”x is a person" in terms of

the concept of undertaking?

I

can find no good reason for so doing,

and hence it seems to me that there is something odd about Chisholm's

methodology, with regard not only to D.1.2 but also to some of the
other "definitions."
Of course, Chisholm may retort that all his definitions are

stipulative, that the symbol "=df." is supposed to signify synonymy,
and that any disparity that is thereby brought to light between the
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concepts he analyzes and other more mundane
concepts is perfectly in
order.
But if this
what Chisholm is up to, then the question
arises as to just what the connection is between
his special concepts
and the other more mundane ones.

(In the present case,

for instance,

how is his concept of a person related to the
everyday concept of
person?)

If there is no ready answer to this question

seems not to be)

,

a

(and there

then the relevance of the concepts that Chisholm

analyzes. Indeed the relevance of his entire project, to our
attempt
to come to understand,

and to understand the connections between, the

everyday concepts of an event, an action, and so forth, is itself
questionable.
All in all,

1

think it best to interpret Chisholm's project

and his use of ”=df.'' as follows.

concepts.

He i^ concerned with our everyday

In his attempt to come to a full understanding of these

concepts he finds that he must at times introduce technical concepts
into his analysis.

Because these technical concepts are not saddled

with popular connotations, he is in a position to introduce them by

means of stipulative definitions, in which the symbol ”=df.'' is used

primarily to indicate synonymy.

But the "definitions" by means of

which the everyday concepts are analyzed (such as the concepts of a
person and of an event) are not stipulative, and in such cases "=df."
serves a somewhat different function from that of the indication of
synonymy.

What is this function?

clearly, but

I

This is difficult to spell out

think that "=df.," when used in this non-stipulative

fashion, primarily has the function of indicating a necessary equiva-
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lence that Chisholm believes the reader will
find especially enlightening.

'=df.," then,

v^7hen

used non-stipulatively

,

is "weaker"

than when it is used stipulatively
The issue of
and what

I

=df.

s

proper function or functions is tricky,

have just said certainly does not adequately dispel the

mystery that surrounds Chisholm

s

use of that symbol.

However, to

pursue this matter any further here would require that we become in-

volved in the issue of the paradox of analysis, and that is not at all
my purpose.

Therefore,

be noted that

I

I

shall now let the matter lie.

find Chisholm

s

But it should

methodology, though mysterious for

the reasons just given, to be such a powerful philosophical tool that
1

shall employ it myself in much of the rest of this work.

A final

preliminary comment concerns the matter of tense.

Does Chisholm "take tense seriously" in his construction of a theory
of events?
tion:

l>fhat

To answer this question, we must answer the further ques-

does it mean to say that someone takes tense seriously?

Again, an adequate answer to this question lies beyond the purview of
this dissertation, but, briefly, one takes tense seriously if and only
if one uses and understands phrases in such a manner that the meanings

of the phrases are taken to be contingent in part on the tense or

tenses in which the phrases are couched.
taken seriously, the phrase

"_p

For instance, when tense is

occurs" means the same as the phrase

occurs now," and its truth does not imply and is not implied by the
facts that

p

did occur or will occur.

But when tense is not taken

seriously, the truth of the phrase "p occurs" does not imply the fact
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that

£ occurs

now, although it

implied by each of the facts that
£

did occur, does occur now, and will occur.
ence,

then, between tliese

t\^io

There is a marked differ-

treatments of tense.

Note that, when

tense is not taken seriously, it seems to be the usual practice al-

ways to use verbs as if they were in the present tense.

Now, all of

Chisholm's definitions and assumptions are couched in the form of the
present tense, and so the question arises: In his definitions and assumptions, does Chisholm take tense seriously, or does he use verbs

tenselessly?

Although he makes no explicit comment on this matter in

Person and Object

,

it seems best that we regard Chisholm's use of

tense in that book as serious.

I

say this because there is indepen-

dent evidence that in Person and Object Chisholm does take tense

seriously,

and also because three of his assumptions (as we shall

shortly see) are defective, and at least one definition seems defective, if tense is not taken seriously in their formulation; whereas,
if it is taken seriously,

they appear not to be defective.

is therefore of some importance.

1

The issue

Sometimes it seems not to matter

in the statement or evaluation of Chisholm's position whether or not

tense is taken seriously.

when it does,

I

At other times it does seem to matter and,

shall make sure that it is understood how and why it

does
Let us now turn to the definitions and assumptions.

I

have no

real quarrel with D.I.l, except to point out, first, that the term
"is identical with" has not been defined.

logic"?

Is this a "locution of

It would seem that Chisholm takes it to be one;

at any rate.
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I

shall treat it as such.

Secondly, if such things as sets
exist

contingently, then D.I.l is inadequate.
chapter,

I

As will be seen in the next

take it that sets do exist contingently,
at least when

they have a member that exists contingently;
hence, on this assumption, D.I.l is defective.

But this, of course, is not an assumption

to which Chisholm also subscribes

(given his remark concerning the

reducibility of sets to properties) and so, from his
point of view,
D.I.l remains adequate.

As for D.I.2,

I

shall make no remarks here

in addition to those already given at the outset
of this section.

D.I.3 has been attacked by Jaegwon Kim as "singularly
unenlightening.

19
I

stand 'accept'

think he is right.

...

He says that "in order to under-

we would have to knov; the domain of objects

among which the variables

and '^' in 'x accepts

'x'

This strikes me as being correct.

2

'

take values.

Kim goes on to say that it would

be better to take the concept of a state of affairs as primitive and
to regard D.I.3 as an axiom,

lightenment.
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since this definition affords no en-

But at this point

I

withhold my agreement.

demand of a definition that it be enlightening?
ficult question, and, again,
I

I

Should we

This is a very dif-

shall forgo treating it here; and so

must leave Kim's complaint unevaluated.

(Let it be noted, however,

that Chisholm's method allows for a smaller primitive vocabulary than

Kim's alternative

—a

point that

I

take to be in Chisholm's favor.)

The main question regarding D.I.3 to be considered here concerns not
its propriety as a definition but its truth:

Is it in fact the case

that the definiendum and the definiens are necessarily equivalent?
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Now Kxm thinks not; for, although he appears grudgingly
to grant that

acceptability may be a sufficient condition for

tlie

state of affairs (but he has some doubts even here

existence of a

— might

it not be

that sentence- tokens are or may be the objects of belief

he is

seriously doubtful that it is a necessary condition for the existence
of one.

He acknowledges that it may well be true that propositions

may be accepted or believed true, but he claims not to be able to make
sense of the contention that nonpropositional entities such as events

may be accepted.
ing,

He asks: "But what sense can be attached to believ-

disbelieving or suspending belief with respect to, say, [Jones

walks at

_t

]

,

with an unspecified

*_t

'

?"

He proceeds further to

note that, if his point is well taken, doubt must also be cast on the

correctness of Chisholm's analysis of the concept of entailment
(D.I.4) and hence on the identity-criterion for states of affairs.

This is one instance where

tense is crucial.
son and Object

,

If

I

believe that Chisholm's use of

Chisholm does not take tense seriously in Per-

then Kim may have a good point.

Ct

is not absolutely

clear to me that it is impossible to accept a state of affairs such
as

[Jones walks] where the time of Jones's walking is left unspeci-

fied, but
to do so.

I

am inclined, with Kim, to believe that it 1^ impossible
For it seems that, vjhen the time is left unspecified, there
and yet

is nothing specific to which one is disposed to give assent,

such a disposition (all things being equal

condition of belief.

24
)

seems to be a necessary

And if the time is specified

as time

_t

>

say

then it seems reasonable to maintain that the object of belief (or
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disbelief, or suspension of belief) is the proposition
[Jones walks
at

and not the event [Jones walks].

If

this is right (and if

Chisholm does not take tense seriously) then certainly D.I.3,
D.1.4
and the Identity criterion for states of affairs are in
need of

repair
But, as

I

have said,

seriously in Person and Object
ence.

believe that Chisholm does take tense

I

,

and in this case it makes a differ-

The difference is that [Jones walks] is no longer to be thought

of as the state of affairs

[Jones walks at

but as [Jones walks

The latter is surely acceptable, even if

nov/]

.

_t]

with 'V' unspecified,

the former is not; and so it seems, given that Chisholm takes tense

seriously, that Kim's criticism is simply misguided.
But what of the analysis in D.1.4 of the concept of the

entailment of one state of affairs by another?
when understood in

a

Is it correct,

manner which takes tense seriously?

sume that it is, although there is some room for doubt.

I

even

shall as-

After all,

what is it for a state of affairs to be necessarily such that whoever

accepts it also accepts some other state of affairs?
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Kim says in

this regard:
But the second condition [of D.1.4] gives rise to a host of
problems: the main problem is how we are supposed to apply
Is it the case, for example, that
it to particular cases.
whoever accepts 2 and 2 being 4 also accepts 4 being 2 and 2?
How are
VJliat about 2 and 2 being 4 and 2 times 2 being 4?
cognitive
the
who
are
generally,
decide?
More
to
supposed
we
in parpowers,
cognitive
What
consider
here?
should
beings we
them?
to
ascribed
be
powers,
are
to
ticular what logical
Should we consider only 'rational beings' in some idealized
or normative sense of 'rational' or should we also consider
f lesh-and-blood ordinary human beings?^^
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I

must say that

I

sympathize with Kim on this matter, but once again

the extent to which his criticism shows up a defect in
Chisholm's

theory is moot.

Now,

I

think it is clear that the cognitive beings

Chisholm has in mind are ordinary human beings, indeed persons (see
D. 1

.

2)

;

it is not so clear whether Chisholm believes such beings to

have a minimal capacity for rational thinking.

(I

am sure that he

would not wish to rule out the possibility that such beings have some

inconsistent beliefs; and obviously he thinks such beings are capable
of believing a necessarily false proposition.)

ever,

1

cannot say.

More than this, how-

Nevertheless, there seems to be an easy (though

perhaps somewhat lame) response that Chisholm might make.

It is this

D.1.4 is not intended as a criterion by which one might decide in par
ticular cases whether or not one state of affairs entails another; it
is intended simply as an analysis of the concept of such entailment.

(One might make a similar point concerning the identity-criterion

formed from D.1.4; for this criterion concerns an ontological matter
and is not intended as an epistemic criterion for the individuation
of states of affairs.)
1

If Chisholm were to make such a reply to Kim,

think he would be right in so doing.

After all, D.1.4 does not

make use of any terms not included in the original vocabulary or already defined therefrom.
I

think all of A.I.l through A. 1.5 are unobjectionable.

It

should be noted, however, that tense plays an especially Important
role in the interpretation of A.

I. 3

not take tense seriously, then A.

I.

through A.

I. 5.

through A.].

If Chisholm does

are quite inade-
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quate.

Consider A.

If the "obtains" of this assumption is
tense-

I. 4.

less, then it turns out to be very difficult indeed
to find, for any

nonpropositional state of affairs
contradicts p. 28

For instance,

[Socrates does not walk].
the

obtains'

both

p

and

be sure,

Do

even one state of affairs
£ that

let

p

[Socrates walks] and

be

p

p and p contradict one another?

If

of A. 1.4 is tenseless, then the answer is "No."

p may

be

For

obtain, in this tenseless sense of "obtains."

they cannot

To

(in this tenseless sense) obtain at the same

time, but A. 1.4 makes no mention of times.

The search, then, is on

for a plausible candidate for a state of affairs that contradicts

[Socrates walks].

But

I

shall not join this search here, since it

proves to be both frustrating and unwarranted.

For if, as

Chisholm takes tense seriously in Person and Object

,

I

believe,

such that a

phrase of the form "p obtains" means the same as a phrase of the
form "p obtains now," then it turns out that [Socrates walks] and
[Socrates does not walk] do contradict one another; for they cannot

both obtain, that is, both obtain now.

With tense taken seriously,

the adequacy of A. 1.4 seems assured.

Similar remarks apply to A.

I. 3

and A.

I. 5:

if tense is not

taken seriously, they are inadequate; but if it is taken seriously,
they appear to be adequate.

Consider A.

agine a case where two states of affairs,
obtain, but where

only at

p2

p obtains

at and only at

being distinct from

conjunction, p, obtain?

At p^?

^ 2 ^*

for instance, and im-

I. 5,

p

and p, both (tenselessly)

_t^^

and

p obtains

at and

ask: When does their

Surely not, for p does not obtain
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then.

At

_t

Surely not, for £ does not obtain then.

?

2

other than

_t^

and

Surely not, for neither £ nor

At some time

£ obtains

then.

Hence A. 1.5 commits us to saying that
£ obtains but that there is no
time at which it obtains, and yet, as indicated in the
first section
of this chapter,

Chisholm himself denies that this is possible.

Similarly, if "exemplifies” is tenseless in A.

I. 3,

then this assump-

tion commits us to saying that it is possible that a conjunctive

property

^

be exemplified but that there be no time at which it is

exemplified, and again Chisholm does not countenance this possibility.
But all this is in fact obviated by Chisholm's taking tense seriously,

such that, according to A. 1.5, a conjunctive state of affairs

obtains now if and only if its conjuncts obtain now
ing to A. 1.3, a conjunctive property
if its conjuncts are exemplified now

D.1.5 is a little odd.

£

r

and, accord-

,

is exemplified now if and only

.

Its definiendum reads "£ is

a_

nega-

tion of £," but there is evidence that Chisholm regards each state of

affairs to have a unique negation.
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VHiereas the definiens is per-

haps adequate to the definiendum when the latter reads "£ is a

negation of £," it is not adequate to it when it reads "£ is the

negation of £."

We may see why this is so if we let

two are four] and

£ contradicts £

£

be [two and two are five].

But

[two and two are not four].

every

that contradicts £, it is true if

true

be [two and

I

take it that

but is not the negation of £; £*s negation is,

rather,

£

Now,

£

£
£

is certainly such that,
is;

for no such

£

for

can be
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Chisholm has since outlined an analysis of the concept
of
negation which does not fall to this objection.

As might be ex-

pected, this analysis involves the concept of consideration.
it involves the concept of involvement.

—^

^^

Indeed,

Let us say:

involves £ =df
£ is necessarily such that whoever
considers it considers

P.

•

.

We may then say:
D

.

I

.
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£ properly involves £

.

=df

.

not involve £.

£ involves £

and

£

does

Given this, we may say:
i

P explicitly denies £ -df. £ contradicts £
involves only £ and what £ involves.

•

Hence,

[two and two are four]

is explicitly denied by

not four] but not by [two and two are five].
D

.

I

.
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£
£

:

is the negation of

or

£

=df.

and properly

[two and two are

Finally, we may say:

either

£ explicitly denies

£ explicitly denies £.

Note that, given D.I.20, the relation of being-the-negation-of is
symmetrical.

Hence [two and two are four] is the only negation of and

is negated only by

[two and two are not four].

D.I.6 seems to me to pass muster, but D.I.7 is a different
matter.

Chisholm’s claim that the concept of a class or set is elim-

inable in the manner in which it is analyzed in Principia Mathematica
is one that

I

have not been able to verify, and so there is some

problem in evaluating his use of that concept and the associated concepts of a proper subset and membership.

Nevertheless, were Chisholm

to have augmented his primitive vocabulary by including either the

term "set" or the term ''membership” or both,

I

do not think there
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would have been much cause for
complaint, and so this point is of
no
real moment.
More important is the question as to how
tense is used in
D.1.7.

It seems to be taken seriously
in clauses

(i)

and (iii) of the

definiens but not in clause (ii) (at
least with respect to "has"), and
one therefore wonders whether
or not.

tlie

"is" of the definiendum is tenseless

Certainly, when times are specified, as in the
definiendum

and in clause

(n)

of the definiens,

it is the usual practice to take

those verbs associated with the times to be
used tenselessly.
ample, since the time

_t

is mentioned in the definiendum,

For ex-

it seems not

to matter whether it is past, present,
or future; and so it seems that
is,

in this instance,

is used generally to cover "was," "is

and "will be," whichever the case may be.

But this does not accord

the use of tense in clauses (i) and (iii)

taken seriously.

occurs now.

(now),"

,

where it is surely

That is, the "occurs" of clause (i) surely means

If it does not mean this

(and Chisholm is thereby not

taking tense seriously in D.1.7) then there is no way to connect the
time of £'s occurrence in clause (i) with the time of F's exemplification in clause (ill)

;

and yet Chisholm obviously intends these times

to be the same.

Someone might reply on Chisholm's behalf that, although tense
is often not

taken seriously in such phrases as

on, nevertheless it

this is the case,

has

1^

at t" and so

to be taken seriously throughout D.1.7.

then the phrases "£ is concretized by A at

"some member of A has
is now

"jc

JF

_t"

But if

and

at £" must mean the same, respectively, as "£

concretized by A at t" and "some member of A now has F at t."
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In such a case we are faced with two
options:

locution "at

_t"

to be,

in this case,

either to interpret the

synonymous with "now," in which

case the phrases make clear sense (despite some
redundancy) but only
have a limited application

— an

application surely much more limited

than Chisholm intends’ or to interpret the locution
"at

manner that

"_t"

in such a

_t"

is seen to range over all times unrestrictedly,

in

which case, it seems to me, the phrases have no clear sense.
There seems, therefore, to be an inconsistent treatment of
tense in D.1.7, which

regards the

"_t"

I

think is best explained as follows.

of D.1.7 to signify the present moment,

Chisholm

that is, now.

The definition would read properly, and consistently with part of

Chisholm's intention, if the locution "at
both places at which it occurs.

throughout the definition.

were simply deleted from

Tense would then be taken seriously

But it is also part of Chisholm's in-

tention that D.1.7 be a vehicle for arriving at an analysis of the
concept of occurrence at a time (D.1.8), and for this reason he plugs
in the locution "at _t," unaware of the problems regarding the use of

tense to which this locution gives rise.
But if the locution "at

result acceptable?

jt"

is deleted from D.1.7,

is the

Kim claims that acceptance of D.1.7 requires that

we countenance the ascription of properties to nonexistents
asks us to consider the proposition,
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.

He

[Brutus kills in 44 B.C.].

This, he says, entails, amongst other properties, the properties of
(F)

being identical with Brutus

,

(^)

killing in 44 B.C.

identical with Brutus and killing in 44 B.C.

,

and (H) being

Kim says that the unit
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set of Brutus is the obvious candidate
for the concretizer of
£, but

points out that (according to D.I.IO), since
£ is a true proposition,
it occurs now.

Furthermore, if it occurs now, it is concretized
now

(according to D.I.8).
ties entailed by £.

This implies that Brutus now has those properBut Brutus does not exist now.

Hence acceptance

of D.I.7 requires that we countenance the
ascription of properties to

nonexistent objects.
Once again, it may be retorted that Kim's criticism is misguided.
that

For if tense is taken seriously, it seems not to be the case

£ entails

any of F, G or H.

tails £, G and
has

F^,

For, according to D.I.6, if

then whoever accepts

something

(

now ) has

ize £, what does?

If

£

£ appears

that something (now)

does not entail any of F, G or H.

But

the unit set of Brutus does not concret-

For Ghisholm does claim that every state of affairs

that occurs, is concretized by some set; and
that

en-

and something (now) has H; however,

since this is not the case,
the question then arises:

£ accepts

£

£

always occurs.

Note

to entail no properties that are and may be had only

by contingent things.

Thus there seems to be no property,

I^,

that

satisfies the antecedent of clause (ii) of D.I.7; hence that conditional is satisfied no matter what set A is.
(iii) also to be satisfied,

£ must

But in order for clause

the sets that qualify as concretizers of

be restricted to just one in number:

the null set; for the null

set is the only set that satisfies clause (li) and that does not have
a

proper subset

prising result.

tliat

satisfies clause (ii).

And this is not a sur-

The null set, similarly, qualifies as the sole
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concretizer of such necessary truths
as [two and two are four],
[fchree is odd]

or

[three is even]], and so forth; for these
states of

affairs, perhaps even more obviously,
than [Brutus kills in 44 B.C.],

entail no properties exemplif iable
only by contingent things.
The concept of concretization

,

then, seems to be consistent.

Chisholm puts it to use in many of the definitions
that follow.
first of these is D.1.8.

But its employment here, as

I

The

intimated

above, is subject to criticism, and this is
so because it is crucial
that the definiens read "there is a set A such that
by A at time

£

cretized by A."

£

is concretized

and not simply "there is a set A such that

£

is con-

For the whole point of the definition is that the

time of concretization be specified so that sense may be given to the

concept of occurrence at a time

.

But, this being the case, with

D.1.8 we become embroiled in that same inconsistency of treatment of
tense that afflicted D.1.7 (with the locution "at t" preserved).

1

shall not repeat my criticism here.

There is, furthermore, a striking fact about the definiens of
D.1.7 when the locution "at

_t"

is preserved, and that is that it makes

use of the concept of exemplification at a time

.

It is odd that

Chisholm should feel compelled to go to such lengths to explicate the
concept of occurrence at a time in terms of the concept of occurrence
and other concepts, and that he should yet overlook the fact that, in
his explication, he makes use of the concept of exemplification at a
time, a concept which is not analyzed by him and which also does not

feature in his original list of unanalyzed concepts.

I

take it that
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Chisholm's main motivation for appealing
to the unanalyzed concept
of
occurrence (or obtaining) rather than
to the unanalyzed concept
of
,

occurrence at

a

time,

is that he wishes as far as
possible to avoid

presupposing the existence of times.

But then it is obvious that his

approach in Person and Object is inadequate
for his purposes, since
the def miens of D.I.7 appears to make
essential use, in clause (ii)
of the concept of a time.

To show such use inessential Chisholm
would

have to provide an analysis of the concept
of exemplification at a
time in terms of concepts amongst which the
concept of a time is not
to be found.

This is a formidable task,^^ and it is one which Chis-

holm does not even acknowledge, let alone undertake,
in Person and
Obj ect

.

D.1.9 inherits the inadequacies of D.1.7 also.
f inlens

For the de-

of D.1.9 requires that the time of the location of the members

of set A be the same as that of the concretization by A of
£.

Yet

we have seen that the specification of the time of concretization in
D.1.7 results in confusion as to how tense is used in that definition.
One interesting aspect of D.1.9 should be noted, however.

It allows

for the possibility, but does not insist on the necessity,

that a

state of affairs have a spatial location.

For instance,

[Brutus kills

Caesar] took place in Rome, since all the members of {Brutus, Caesar)

were in Rome at the time of Caesar’s assassination.

But [two and two

are four] has no spatial location, since it entails no property had

only by contingent things.

All events

however, will have a spatial

as well as a temporal location at the time of their occurrence, simply

29

by virtue of the fact that they entail some
properties had

only by

individual things and that individual things have a
spatiotemporal
location.

Another respect in which D.1.9 is unsatisfactory is that it
appears not to allow for the "scattered" spatial location of an
event

although that it does not

For instance,

allov\7

for this is not entirely clear.

[someone inhales smog] may now be and probably is occur-

ring in London, New York, and Los Angeles, but not in Lake Moxie,

Maine.

It seems,

then, not to be the case that aMl those who are now

inhaling smog are in one place

— unless

the concept of a place is un-

derstood in such a fashion that a place may be perforated, and even

completely separated from itself, by some intervening places, whilst
yet retaining its identity.

Finally, it should be noted that appeal is made in the de-

finiens of D.1.9 to the concept of existence-in- a-place-at-a-time.
This has not been analyzed by Chisholm; nor does it feature in his
list of unanalyzed concepts.

Granted that we have a working concept of occurrence at a
time (although Chisholm has not of course provided us with such)

the

,

analysis of the concept of a proposition (D.I.IO) seems perfectly adequate.

Some philosophers are reluctant to grant that contingent

propositions concerning the future have a truth-value; to satisfy them
the definiens of D.I.IO need only be modified so that
as being not earlier than

jt.

However,

1

_t'

is stipulated

am not convinced that contin-

gent propositions concerning the future have no truth-value, and

I

am
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prepared to accept D.I.IO as it stands.

am prepared, furthermore,

I

to accept D. I. 11,3^ but D.I.12 and D.I.12.a
are problematic.

Chisholm

claims that there are some properties which are
not such that they may
be rooted outside times at which they are had;
indeed, that there are

such properties is crucial to his analysis of the
concept of an
event.

gave, as tentative examples of such properties,
the follow-

1

ing: _belng red
_that it moves.

(an example given by Chisholm himself) and being
such

(In my preamble to D.1.14

be ing self-identical and being pink

— but

I

also gave the examples of

again, for the reasons that

follow, these examples must be regarded as tentative.)

being red

,

for example, is necessarily equivalent to

(

But note that
i. e.

,

is neces-

sarily coextensive with) the property being red-and-such-that-it-did-

move or being red-and-such- that-it-did-not-move
be rooted outside times at which it is had.

,

and this property may

In similar fashion, ob-

viously, every property may be shown to be a property that is such
that it may be rooted outside times at which it is had.

Hence there

are no properties which are not such that they may be rooted outside
times at which they are had, and Chisholm's analysis of the concept of
an event is in trouble.

Therefore, from Chisholm's point of view, it

would seem best to replace "is equivalent to" by "entails" in the

definiens of D.I.12 (where "entails" is understood as defined in
D.I.13).

This of course would necessitate a corresponding change in

D.I.12. a, but clause (iii) (c) of D.1.14 would be salvaged (at least

with respect to its consistency with earlier definitions).

In the

same spirit, an identity-criterion for properties stronger than
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necessary equivalence, such as mutual entallment

,

would seem in

order
Even with clause (iii) (c) understood to be
amended in accordance with the immediately foregoing remarks, D.1.14
(Chisholm's analysis of the concept of an event) is still
defective.

First of all, it

seems to me simply to be an error to require that
all events occur.

Surely an event may just happen never to occur, just
as it may happen
always to occur.

(In neither case will it be a proposition,

for in

neither case will it be impossible for the event sometimes to
occur
and sometimes not to occur.)

Chisholm seems concerned to rule out

such states of affairs as [there are pink unicorns] as events, but
am not sure why he is so concerned.

If he were to modify clause

of D.1.14 to read "it is physically possible both that

that

£

£ occur

1

(i)

and

fail to occur," such a state of affairs as [there are pink

unicorns] would perhaps be ruled out as an event.
in resorting to such a tactic;

But

I

see no use

for there may yet be states of affairs

which are such that it is physically possible both that they occur
and that they fall to occur and which always occur or never occur.
As an example of an event which happens never to occur, consider the

case of Jones, who happened to be born blind, whose blindness was such
that it was physically possible that corrective surgery enable him to
see, who happened never to undergo such surgery, and who consequently

died blind.
and

Here we have at least two states of affairs,

[Jones undergoes surgery so that he may see]

,

[Jones sees]

which would appear

to be bona fide events but which happened never to occur.

On the
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basis of these considerations

I

would simply strike clause
(1) of

D.1.14 and hence deny the
truth of that passage appended
to it and
cited above, namely:
If we may assume that all
individual things have spatiotemporal location, tlien we may deduce
that every event is
such that It occurs at some place
and some time.

Clause (li) of D.1.14 seems to me
to be unassailable, and
fectly willing to go along with part
(a) of clause (iii).

given part

(a)

of clause

(iii), a state of affairs such as

I

am per(Note that,

[there are

no pink unicorns] is n^t an event, even
if clause (i) is struck; for
It can occur in a universe where
there are no individual things.

This

point holds similarly for all such purely
"negative" states of affairs.)

I

am perfectly willing also to go along with part
(b) of

clause (iii).

(Part

clause (i), but since

(b)
I

of clause (ill) seems not to square with

take it that clause (i) should be struck

anyhow, this is no great matter.)

Part (c) of clause (iii), however,

even when reinterpreted in light of the remarks of the
immediately

foregoing paragraph, is defective.
example.
T
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Consider the property dying

true that if someone dies at

prior to

jt.

Kim gives the following counter-

_t

.

Surely it is necessarily

then he was alive at some time

Hence dying is a property that is (and thus may be)

rooted outside times at which it is had.

And so, for example,

[Socrates dies] is not an event, according to D.1.14.
dies]

^ an

t'

But

[Socrates

event, and hence D.1.14 is defective.

Kim also attempts a counterexample "in the opposite direc—
t

ion

„37

Chisholm wishes to rule out such states of affairs as [the
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assassin of Caesar is self-identical] and [the
assassin of Caesar is
such that he will walk] as events.

property k illing Caesar

,

Yet both, Kim claims, entail
the

which is (we may agree, given an
amended

version of D.I.12) not such that it may be rooted
outside times at
which it is had.
to D.1.14.

Thus both states of affairs are events,
according

But they are

in fact events

(or, at least,

so

Chisholm would claim), and hence D.1.14 is again seen
to be defective
(or, at least, defective from Chisholm's own
point of view).

here

I

think kim is once again a victim of his own misapprehension

of Chisholm s use of tense.

If tense is taken seriously,

[the assassin of Caesar is self-identical] nor

then neither

[the assassin of Caesar

is such that he will v/alk] entails the property killing Caesar
is,

But

the property killing Caesar now

,

that

.

What, finally, of D.I.15 and D.I.16?

Other than that each

inherits the problems regarding tense of D.I.7, there is the following

problem with D.I.15 (and which, again, is inherited by D.I.16).
Chisholm seems to think that, roughly, an event occurs once at every
time and place at which it has been in some sense "completed."
this is Chisholm's insight, it is one with which

I

If

am in agreement.

However, D.I.15, by requiring that no two of the periods of time in

question be continuous, seems to commit Chisholm to the view that

cessation is the mark of completion.

While this does seem to be the

case with certain types of events (such as the event [rain falls].

which occurs once at every time and place at which it ceases to occur)

,

it is not the case with certain other types of events.

Consider,

34

nstance, the event (Jones
walks around the block].

may occur several times
once and then

c ontinue

ij^succe^
to walk around

Such an event

Jones may walk around the
block
the block.

D.1.15 (and hence

D.I.16 also) appears to be
inadequate to this fact.

Chisholm is

aware of this sort of objection,
and his response amounts to this:
[Jones walks around the block), in
this context,
as

is

"better described"

[Jones completes his walking around the
block), and this latter

event occurs once at every time and
place at whicl, It ceases to occur.
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„
But
this response is unsatisfactory.

First of all, it is

false that [Jones walks around the block]
is better described, in any

context, as [Jones completes his walking
around the block].

For this

latter event, it seems to me, is the same event
as [Jones walks around
the block once], and this is certainly
distinct from the event [Jones

walks around the block].

Secondly, while it may be true that [Jones

walks around the block] occurs once at every time and
place at which
[Jones walks around the block once] occurs, and that this
latter event

itself occurs once at every time and place at which it ceases
to occur, pointing this out is hardly helpful to us in our attempt to
come
to understand the expression "Jones walked once around the
block."

With regard to D.1.16, note that there is an apparent quanti-

fication over numbers in the definiens, and yet Chisholm has not introduced the concept of a number prior to this definition.

But per-

haps this omission is not too grave.
In the next chapter

1

shall propose a theory of events which

does not succumb to the criticisms just levelled at Chisholm's theory
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of events and which (I hope)
does not tall pncy to any
new criticises
I think the criticisms
raised In this section are
serious but not

devastating and that a Chlsholmian
theory of events (where events
are
taken to be eternal, non-concrete”
objects) may be defended.
I shall
propose such a theory, retaining. Indeed,
many of Chisholm's Insights.

NOTES

Roderick M. Chisholm, Person and Object (La
Salle Illinoi s
pen Court Publishing Company, 1976).
Henceforth I shall refer to
this book as "P&O."
,

It would seem that Chisholm follov/s current
convention and
regards properties as monadic relations.

^P&O

,

p.

22.

I shall
forbear making detailed references to P&O in the
rest of this chapter.

It may be noted that in D.I.2 the words "to
bring about" are
strictly superfluous. Also, I include D.I.2 in the
present exposition
since the concept of a person is implicit in many
of the definitions
that follow.
(See, for instance, the use of "someone" in D.I.3
whoever" in D.I.4, and so on.)
it IS interesting to note that, of these three concepts,
only
that of a property is left unanalyzed by Chisholm.
One might try
analyzing the concept of a property by appealing to the notion of conception and saying;
^ is a property =df. it is possible that someone conceive F.
But this would simply defer the obscurity of the concept of a prope7ty to that of conception, without anything being gained thereby.
For
the concept of conception is not to be used for any (other) purpose
in what follows.

Chisholm almost always uses gerundial nominallzations to
designate states of affairs or to form complex variables ranging over
states of affairs.
For instance. Instead of my "[Socrates walks]" he
would write "Socrates walking"; and instead of "[^ walks]" he would
write
walking." This practice runs into trouble, I think, when
designations of states of affairs are embedded within designations,
or designations within variables, or variables within variables.
In
what follows I shall adopt the practice of using square brackets to
designate states of affairs or to form complex variables ranging over
states of affairs.
For Instance, an example of a designation of a
state of affairs is "[Socrates walks]." An example of the forming of
a complex variable ranging over states of affairs is "[^ walks]."
(This is of course a variable because it is formed by means of the use
of another variable "^" which in this case ranges over persons.)
An example of a designation embedded within a variable is " [^ accepts

—

—
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underlining when designating
<^""“nguish their designation from
their use
or Lpression
One complxcation
n
with contingent properties as T
11 j
i
things may necessarily fail to
have
them """"For iL^’
instance, no non-concrete object
can be white
Also
there IS a distinction to be
made between necessary properties
and
•>n‘^“nen impossible properties
and properles which things essentially
tlerwhich‘’th-"‘'^‘'‘'’
lack.
(See note 11 below.)
But I
““
Chisholm himself does not dlscuss
cuL It
irin
in the present context.

properties

.or

9

^^^isholm in fact uses the locution
"at (place) p" rather
(place)
but I prefer the latter because
it contrasts
more clearly with the locution "at
(time) t."
^1

lan

.1

.

^

'

® definition (number D3.7) given
by Chisholm in
an earlier unpublished version of P&O.

“chisholm does not attempt

to give an explicit definition of
rn this context, but he seems to have
the fol-

the fterm essential
lowing in mind

F is essential to x =df.
^
12

P&O

,

p.

x is necessarily such that it has

128.

13

Presumably it is claimed that particular events
could not
recur because, first, it is assumed that, if events
were particular,
they would occur when and only when they existed
and, secondly, nothing may pass out of and then back into existence.
As for the first
point: 1 am not clear why one should make such an
assumption, although
it is true that it seems to be one that is
implicit in most of the
par ticularist theories of events that have been proposed.
As for the
second point: I am not sure what to make of the contention
that nothing can pass out of and then back into existence.
Chisholm apparently
subscribes to it, however, and I shall not dispute the matter here.
,

14

Donald Davidson, "Events as Particulars," Nous

,

4

(1970),

p,

31,
I shall have more to say on the concept of undertaking
in
Chapter 111.

16

,

Of course, this is not to say that Chisholm's use of "=df."
is deliberately ambiguous.

38

llsi.ed),

later work, both spoken and written
Chlshota is careful to say that he does

fbnt-

.o

take tense serious-

issue becomes even more important when

Chisholm seeks—
as he has recently done, but as he
does not do in PiO-to analyze
the concept of a time in terms of the
concept of a“ilate of afLirs
In such an enterprise, it is crucial
that tense always be taken
seriously.
(I am grateful to Tom Ryckman for
pointing out to me, both in
conversation and In his paper "Kim on Chisholm's
Reduction of Events

Affairs" (unpublished), just how Importaut Chisholm s use of tense is in P&O.)
tant
19

,
Jaegwon
Kim,

^‘^SAEP, P-

2.

^^SAEP, P-

2.

^^SAEP, P-

2.

^^SAEP, P.

10.

States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions,"
I shall refer to this
article as

2A,

A vague phrase
present purposes.
Ut course the question arises, on this view of Chisholm's
enterprise, whether [Jones walks now] is an event or a proposition.
Again, there is independent evidence (seminar at the University of
Massachusetts in Amherst spring semester, 1978) that Chisholm regards
it as an event; for he believes it may occur at one time and yet not
at another.
One consequence of this position is that, if it now happens to be time _t
[Jones walks now] and [Jones walks at tj^] are distinct states of affairs (the former being an event and the latter a
proposition).
But are they distinct?
This is a difficult issue and
is one I attempt to avoid in Chapter II by not taking tense seriously.

—

.

,

26 ^.
ut course, I am now considering the case where
tinct from £ in D.I.4.
27

SAEP, p.

p.

is dis-

5.

28 ,,.

Kim makes this point in SAEP, pp 10-12, in particular
criticizing Chisholm's analysis of the concept of negation (D.I.5).
But once again, as I shall point out shortly, it seems that Kim's
comments are misguided; for it seems that Chisholm takes tense
seriously in P&O.
.
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29

«

and
30„

,

aeminar at the University of
Massachusetts
/-n / 7 Q
‘'/‘'nt.-, later tmpublished
wrUlngl."°"''"‘*““''
1

xversity ot Massachusetts seminar,
Universit!“ofMa°^^T
32

SAEP, p.

changes, from the
1/31/78.

12.

33.

Chisholm has nevertheless undertaken since

writing P&O
34.,

Chisholm once again appeals to the unanalyzed
concent of exemplification at (or
cept
throughout) a time in D.I.ll and
w 1
.

.

iz a
.

.

.

writing P&O Chisholm has proposed (University
of
Massachusetts seminar, 3/14/78) that properties
are identical just
in case they are necessarily
equivalent, i.e.
just in case, necesariiy whatever exemplifies one exemplifies
the other.
This is a
f acie Implausible position, as
the foregoing remarks serve to
in icate, but Chisholm's defense of
it is characteristically spirited
and challenging.
,

£T^

,

^^SAEP, pp. 13-14.

^^SAEP, pp. 14-15.
38
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See

p.

218, n.

24.

In P&O Chisholm uses the term "abstract" where I have used
the term "non-concrete," but in EP, p. 22, he claims that events
are
abstract entities. For he claims there that an abstract object
is one which is not only non— concrete but is also one which
may be
exemplified by another object. Obviously states of affairs are not
of this sort.
In the rest of this work, however, I shall use the
term abstract
to mean what Chisholm means by "non— concrete.

n^

CHAPTER

II

A CHISHOLMIAN THEORY OF EVENTS
mien presenting his theory of events
in Person and Obi er^

Chisholm makes frequent reference to
the concepts of time and place,
and yet it is a notable feature

of his ontology that he neither ana-

lyzes these concepts in terms of more
primitive concepts nor makes

room for times and places in that group
of entities (consisting of
states of affairs, properties and relations,
and individual things)

which form the foundation of his theory of
being.
will

He says that he

allow himself'^ to speak of times and places, and
yet he neither

eliminates them by analysis nor commits himself to
their existence.
This is clearly an untenable position.

I

sympathize with Chisholm

in his desire not to commit himself to the
existence of times and

places; but, since

I

am not in a position to present a theory of being

in which these entitles do not Irreducibly figure, I
shall here as-

sume that they exist.
set.

A similar point pertains to the concept of a

Perhaps, as Chisholm says (but does not demonstrate), the con-

cept of a set may be analyzed in terms of the concept of a property
and other concepts; but again, since

any such analysis,

I

I

am not in a position to present

shall here assume also that sets constitute a

distinct type of entity.
As a result of these and other considerations

I

shall make

use, in the theory of events that follows, of the following unanalyzed
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concepts: the concepts of a thing, a
property and a relation,^ a set,

existence, existence-in, acceptance,
consideration, occurrence,

metaphysical necessity, physical necessity, exempl
if ication-at
bership, and being-earlier-than.

I

,

mem-

shall also appeal to the "logical”

concepts of negation and material implication, in
terms of which the
concepts of conjunction and disjunction may be conventionally
analyzed.

This list of unanalyzed concepts differs from Chisholm's in

certain ways, of some of which it is important to take note here.
First, the ontology that underlies Chisholm's theory of events,
as noted in Chapter 1,

is trlpodal;

hexapodal.

take it that not only are there such things as

That is,

1

that which underlies mine is

states of affairs, properties (and relations), and individual things,
but there are also times, places, and sets; and

1

do not assume that

any of these types of things is reducible to any other.

1

shall at-

tempt to analyze the concepts of a state of affairs, an individual
thing, a time, and a place; but, following Chisholm,

I

shall not

attempt to analyze the concept of a property (or a relation)
shall also not attempt to analyze the concept of a set.^

,

and

I

Secondly,

I

distinguish two types of existence, namely, existence simpllciter and
exlstence-ln; the latter is a relation that holds between individual
things and places.^

pllciter

;

Everything which exists in a place, exists sim-

but this is not true vice versa

.

Thirdly,

I

take exemplifi-

cation fundamentally to be a triadic relation that holds between
things, properties, and times and not, as Chisholm has it, to be a

dyadic relation that holds between things and properties.

This slight
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change, as will be seen,
allows us to dispense with
complications

concerning tense.
ter, when

I

talking.

do,

Fourthly,

1

shall often talk of necessity
slmplici-

it will always be of metaphysical
necessity that

Whenever that type of necessity with
which

is physical

necessity,

I

I

am concerned

1

hope thereby to avoid

1

certain complications without sacrificing
accuracy.^
do this,

am

shall explicitly acknowledge this fact.

shall not take tense seriously.

I

I

I

am able to

believe, first by assuming that there are
such things as

times and, secondly, by appealing to the
concept of exemplif icationat rather than to the concept of
exemplification simpliciter

for instance, phrases of the form

.

Thus,

occurs” and ”S accepts £" are

not to be thought of as meaning the same,
respectively, as phrases of
the form

£ occurs

now” and

accepts

£

now.”

The former phrase-

forms, rather, have no implications whatsoever regarding
time of oc-

currence and acceptance.
The theory of events whose exposition follows owes much both
to that theory of Chisholm's which was discussed in the
last chapter

and also to some of Chisholm's later work.

forgo

However,

I

shall here

making detailed points of comparison between the theory and

Chisholm's work.

Locutions involving the specification of times may be handled
by appealing to the concept of exemplif ication-at

.

That is, we may

say first of all:
D- II

•

1

•

£ occurs

at

_t

=df.

and then we may go on to say:

£ exemplifies

occurrence at
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D.11.2:

D.II.3:

_S

exists at

^

accepts

at

£

-df.
_t

[x

=df.

exists] occurs at

accepts £] occurs at

and so on for the concepts
of consideration at
(a

t;

(a

t;

time), existing in

place) at (a time), and being a member at
(a time).

And we may

also say:
D.11.4:

X exemplifies F =df
exemplifies F at t.

.

there is a time

t

such that ~
x

Ibe concepts of a state of affairs, an individual
thing, a set
a time, and a place may be analyzed
as follows:

D.II.5:

D.

11.6:

D. 11. 7:

D. II. 8:

is a state of affairs =df.
it is (metaphysically)
possible that there be someone^ who considers £.

£

is an individual thing =df.
there is a thing
in fact) such that x exists in
£.

£

(a place,

is a time =df.
it is possible that there be some
property which is exemplified at t.^

_t

is a place =df.
it is possible that there be some
individual thing that exists in £.

£

It should of course be noted that, while

I

present D.II.5 through

D.II.8 as definitions, none of these definitions warrants the assertion that some or all of the entitles concerned have been somehow

eliminated from the basic ontology presupposed here.

This ontology

remains hexapodal.

Certain assumptions have been implicitly made in the foregoing, such as: whatever accepts or considers something is a person;

whatever is accepted or considered is a state of affairs; whatever
exists in a place is an individual thing; whatever is existed in is a
place; and so on.

foregoing, and

1

Other important assumptions are not implicit in the
shall make them explicitly here:
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A.II.l:

Necessarily, for any thing

A. II. 2:

Necessarily, for any thing x, if x
is a state of affairs
a property or a relation, a tine,
or a place, then, nece^sarily, x exists.

x,

x exists.

’

A. II. 3:

Necessarily, for any thing x, if x is
a set and there is
a thing ^ such that
is a member of x, then
there are
which are members of x and
which are such that x exists if and
only if they“exist.
,

.

.

.

,

A. II. 4:

Necessarily, for any thing x. if x is an
individual thing
then It IS not necessary that x exist.

A. II. 5:

Necessarily, for any thing x, if x occurs,
then ~
x is a
state of affairs.

A. II. 6:

Necessarily, for any thing x, if x necessarily
occurs,
then, necessarily, x necessarily occurs.

A. II. 7:

Necessarily, for any thing x, if x necessarily
occurs,
then it is physically necessary that x
occur.

A. II. 8:

Necessarily, for any thing x, if it is physically
necessary that X occur, then, for any time t, x occurs
at t.

A. II. 9:

Necessarily, for any property or relation F, there are
states of affairs £ and
£ such that, for any time t, £
occurs at £ if and only if
^ is exemplified at t and
occurs at _t if and only if F is not exemplified at t. £

A. II. 10:

Necessarily, for any state of affairs £, there is a state
of affairs £ such that, for any time t,
£ occurs at t if
and only if £ does not occur at t.

A. II. 11:

Necessarily, for any distinct states of affairs
£ and £,
there is a state of affairs
such
that,
for
any
time t,
£
£ occurs at £ if and only if both £ and £ occur at t.

I

shall also assume that the relation of being-earlier-than is both

transitive and asymmetrical.
Some remarks concerning some of these assumptions would be in
order.

First, it will turn out (see D.II.17 below) that A. II

A. II. 8 and A. II. 10

.

6

,

A. II. 7,

jointly imply that whatever (metaphysically) neces-

sarily occurs or fails to occur is a proposition

.

Secondly, we may
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say that

£

and

£

in A.II.IO co ntradict one
another.

A similar assump-

tion concerning contradictory properties
or relations (where
"exemplifies" replaces "occurs") may also be
drawn up.
Thirdly, we may say
that r in A.Il.ll is a conjunction of
£ and £. Again, a similar as-

sumption concerning conjunctive properties
or relations may be drawn
up.

In the same spirit,

too, assumptions concerning disjunctive
and

conditional states of affairs and disjunctive
and conditional properties or relations may be drawn up, but

I

shall forgo that task here.

With regard to the matter of one state of affairs
being the

negation of another, we may,
sis fairly closely.
D. II. 9:

think, follow Chisholm's latest analy-

That is, we may say:

£ involves ^
considers

D.II.IO:

I

-df.
Necessarily, for any time
at ^ also considers
at t.

p properly involves
involve £.

D.II.ll

p explicitly denies £

properly involves only

D.

11.12:

£

is

£

or

=df.

£ involves £

and

_t,

whoever

£ does

not

=df.
£ contradicts £ and also
and
what £ involves.
£

the negation of £ =df.^^either
£ explicitly
£ explicitly denies £.

denies

Note that, given D.II.12, the relation of being-the-negation-of is
symmetrical.

Examples of mutual negations are:

[Socrates does not walk];
not four]; and so on.

[Socrates walks] and

[two and two are four] and

[two and two are

The matter of one property (or relation) being

the negation of another may be similarly treated.
By analyzing the concept of the entailment of one state of af-

fairs by another in a Chisholmian fashion, we may characterize the

concept of the conjunction of states of affairs.

An analysis of the
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concept of the entailment of
one property or relation by
another provides similarly for the
characterization of the concept of
con-

^

junction of properties or relations.

I

propose first of all:

£ strictly implies ^ =df. Necessarily,
if £ occurs at
then £ occurs at t.

for any time

t

We may then say, with respect
to states of affairs:
p. II 14
.

:

£ entails £

=df.

£ strictly Implies £; and
(ii) necessarily, for any time
£, whoever accepts that
occurs at _t accepts that
£ occurs at t.H
(i)

p

And with respect to properties or
relations we may say:
P^ .

II 15
.

.

entails G =df.
for any thing x and any time t,
emplifies p at t] entails [jc exemplifies G at t].

p

[x
~ ex-

We may then say:

PiJPcJp:

£

is the conjunction of
(i) £ entails £;
(ii) £ entails £;

(iii)
(iv)

£

and

£

=df.

£ does
£ does

not entail £;
not entail £;
(v) for any state of affairs
£,
there is a state of affairs
(a) £ entails u, and
(b) either £ entails
£ or £
(vi) for any state of affairs s,
and £, then £ entails r.l^

An example of such conjunction is:

if £ entails s,
u such that

then

entails £; and
if £ entails both

£

[[John is tall] and [Mary is

short]] is the conjunction of [John is tall] and [Mary is short].

Similar examples may be concocted.

(Whenever a state of affairs r

is the conjunction of states of affairs

more revealing name for

£

£

and £, an acceptable and

other than 'V' is

''

[£ and £].")

In like

manner the matters of one property of relation being the conjunction
of other properties or relations, one state of affairs being the dis-

junction of other states of affairs, and so on, may be treated.
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The concepts of entailment
analyzed in D.II.14 and
D.II.15

also allow us to give
identity-criteria for states of
affairs and
properties (or relations). These
are
A. II. 12:

Necessarily, for any state of affair
s £ and any state
of
affairs
£ is identical with £ if and only if
entails
£
and
£
£ entails £.

A. II. 13:

Necessarily, for any property or relation
F and any propty or relation G, F is identical
with G if and only if
^ entails ^ and ^ entails F.

And while on the subject, we
may give identity-criteria for
the rest
of our basic ontological
types.
These are:
A. II. 14:

Necessarily, for any individual thing x
and any individual thing £, X IS identical with
if and only if
£
necessarily, for any place
£, x exists in £ if and ’only
It £ exists in £.-*-'

A. 11.15:

Necessarily, for any set A and any set
A is identical
with B if and only if, necessarily, for
any thing x, “
x
IS a member of A if and only if x
is a member of bT

A. 11.16:

Necessarily, for any time _t and any time t'
t is
identical with _t' if and only if, necessarily7
for any
thing X, X exists at _t if and only if x exists
at t'.
,

A. 11.17:

Necessarily for any place
is
£ and any place £'
identical with £* if and only if, necessarily, £
for any
thing 2£, X exists in
£ if and only if x exists in £*
,

,

.

With this groundwork out of the way, we may now focus
our at
tention more sharply on the particular problems that concern
us here
how to characterize events and how to count them.
about events?
sitions.
tion,

and

I

What are we to say

share Chisholm's intuition that events are not propo

Accordingly, we require a definition of the term "proposiI

propose that we accept the following:
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M

is a proposition =df.
£ is a state of affairs; and
(ii) it is impossible
that there

R

-

(i)

i;

such that

£

occurs at

t

be a tlmo ^
and do^s^f

^

Ir

also share Chisholm’s intuition
that such -’contrived"
states of
affairs as [Jones is such
that Smith walks], [[John
is tall]
I

or

[Mary is short]],

[John has walked a week ago],
and so forth, ought

not to be ranked as events.

Providing a definition adequate
to the

ruling out of all such
contrived states of affairs but
adequate also
to the ruling in of all
events properly so called is,
however, a
fairly formidable task.
Some preliminary definitions
are required.
I

think the thing to notice about
events-what distinguishes

them from other sorts of states
of affairs— is that they
"directly

concern," in some sense, "straightforward"
properties of individual
things.

For instance,

[Socrates walks] "directly concerns"
the

"straightforward" property walking

,

whereas [Socrates is such that

Plato walks] does not "directly
concern" any such "straightforwardproperty.

It

seems to me that the way to capture
these two notions

of "direct concern" and
"straightforwardness" is as follows.

First

of all we need an analysis of the
concept of a simple property, a

property which is neither negative, nor
conjunctive, nor disjunctive,
nor conditional.

Unfortunately, we therefore require all of the

following:
F involves G =df.
involves [G is

_t]

D.

11.19:

for any time £,

^ properly involves ^
involve

F.

[F is

exemplified at

exemplified at t].
=df
.

£ involves

G and ~
G does not
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D. 11.20:

F Is negative -df.
there Is a property G such
that“
(i) F properly involves
G; and
(ii) necessarily, for
any time _t, F is exemplified
at
if and only if g is
not exemplified at _t.

~t

D. 11.21:
(i) F properly involves
both G and H; and
(ii) necessarily, for any
time t, F is exemplified at
an on y if both
^ and Ii are exemplified at t.

t

D.II.22:

distinct properties —
G
such that:
(i) F properly involves
both G and H; and
necessarily, for any time _t,
^ is exemplified at t
1
an only if either
is exemplified at t.
^ or

and

D. 11.23:

F IS

conditional =df.
there are distinct properties G
—
such that:
(i) F properly involves both
G and H; and
(ii) necessarily, for any time
_t, F is exemplified at t
~
if and only if either
(a) G is exemplified at t only
if H is exemplified

and

at

(b)

or
is exemplified at

at

only if “
G is exemplified

^

t.

We may then say:
F is simple =df.
F is neither negative, nor conjunctive,
nor disjunctive, nor conditional.

Simplicity is not the only mark of "straightforward" properties, however.

Such properties must also not be such that it is pos-

sible that everything may exemplify them.

That is, they must not be

unlversalizable, where:
P- ’

If >25

:

F is unlversalizable =df.

time

_t

,

it is possible that, for some
jt has
^ at

everything that exists at

Moreover, such properties must not be had

(

i

.

e.

,

exemplified) essen-

tially by whatever has them, where:
is essential =df
necessarily, for any thing x and any
if x exists at ^ and has F^ at
then there is no
_t'
such that x exists at t' and does not have F at t'.
.

time
time
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Finally, "straightforward"
properties

r„„st not have
certain
types of implication
regarding past or futnre
exemplifications.
In
order to clarify
„,,at types of Implications
are acceptable in
this
respect and what types
are not, we require first
of all the following

F is a reflection of
G =df.
(i) F is distinct from
G; and
(xi) necessarily, for any

thing x and any time t
if x
exemplifies F at t, then there
is a time t^’dif^
tinct from t such that x
exemplifies G at~t'.

And we may say

r

j:f^icti::

^

^

1

Now, we cannot simply claim
that all "straightforward"
properties are

not reflective, for there are
a few special properties,
such as those
of dziaa. ffafsl'ing a book,
and so forth, that are intuitively

"straightforward" and are also reflective.
these special properties?

It seems to me

What can be said about
that any such property is

exemplified by a thing, x, if and only
if it is necessarily the case
that there was a time at which x
did not exemplify it.

And so

I

pro-

pose

_

.

:

IS emergent =df.
necessarily, for any thing x and any
_t, if X exemplifies F at
then there is a

time

earlier than
I

jt

time t'
such that x does not exemplify F at t'.~

think that we now have all the equipment we
need to charac-

terize the concept of a "straightforward"
property.

Such a property

IS simple, nonuniversalizable,
nonessential, and either nonref lective

or emergent.
ty?

I

VJhat

of an event's "directly concerning" such a proper-

believe the following analysis of the concept of an
event ade-

quately captures this notion:
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is an event =df.
n is
^
£ is not a prop^ition; and
(ii) there is a property
F such that
(a) necessarily, for any
state of affairs
q, n entails £ if and only if
entails LLuere
^
[there is somesome
thing which is F],
(b) necessarily, for any
thing x and any time t
if
^^exemplifies F at t, then
is an

£

.

(i)

=

£

Ldivldth

for any time _t, it is
possible that nothing ex^
emplifies F at _t, and
(d) there is a property
G such that
(ot)
entails G,
G is simple,
(3 )
(Y) ^ is not universalizable
(5 )
^ is not essential, and
(^) either —
G is nuL
not refleeiit/o/^ia*teiiecciveor it
is emergent.
(c)

Let us run D.I1.30 through a few
test cases.
the case where

£

is

[two and two are four].

Is this an event?

xt IS a proposition, and thus
ruled out by clause

What,
I

then, of the case where

£

is

Gonsider, first,

(i)

No,

of D.II.30.

[Jones is such that Smith walks]?

believe there is no candidate for the
property G in this case.

(In

particular any otherwise likely-looking candidate
will fail either
clause (il) (d) (y)— as does being such that
Smith walks
(ii) (d)

(6)— as

— or

clause

do being Jones and being an individual thing
.)

£, in this case, is not an event.

So too with the case where

[Jones is such that he has walked].

Hence

£

is

(Any otherwise likely-looking

candidate for G in this case will fail either clause (ii)
do ^eing Jones and being an individual thing
as does being such that he has walked

— or

(d)

(6)— as

clause (il)(d)(e)

.

Some states of affairs, nevertheless, are events, according to

D.II.30.

Consider the state of affairs [Socrates dies].

which satisfies what is required of

F^

One property

in this case is being such that
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Now, F entails

(

beln.

H.„e w„

suol.

diiaa, which Is simple, nonunlversallzable,
nonessentlal
,

gent;

thus what is required of
G Is satisfied.

and emer-

Hence [Socrates dies]

is an event.

Or consider the state of
affairs [Smith washes his car].
candidate for F In this case Is
belnR such that he is Smith

“SMHS_hi^i[ar.
i ng his car

;

One

One candidate for G Is (being
such that he Isl wash-

for this property Is entailed
by F and is simple, nonuni-

versallzable, nonessential, and nonref
lective.

Hence [Smith washes

his car] is an event.
But D.II.30 also rules out certain
states of affairs as events

that some may consider to be events
and rules in certain states of af-

fairs as events that some may consider
not to be events.

For instance,

the requirement that G be nonessential
rules out [Jones is Jones] as an

event, and this seems right;^^ but it also
appears to rule out [there
are horses] as an event.
It IS.

Is the latter an event?

But if it is, D.1I.30 could,

1

I

am not sure that

think, be modified so that it

rules [there are horses] in while still ruling
[Jones is Jones] out.
But

1

shall not undertake such modification here.^^

D II 30 also rules
.

.

in as events such conjunctive states of affairs
as [[Smith washes his
car] and

[two and two are four]].

I

am not sure that this is not an

event, but, if it is not, D.II.30 could,

I

think, be modified so as to

rule it out.

Once again, however,

tion here.

Or finally, it might be objected that D.II.30 takes no

I

shall not undertake such modifica-

account of the phenomenon of change or transition, and that this is
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essential to a state of affairs' being
an event.
may be protested that, according
to D.II.30,
event, but that since, to put

when Socrates is sitting,
event.

I

testation.

For instance, it

(Socrates sits] is an

very loosely, nothing (much)
happens

it

[Socrates sits] should aot be
said to be an

have some sympathy with the intuition
underlying this proIt

is generally recognized

of "event," all events Involve
change.

that, in some prominent sense

Some Insist that this is the

only proper use of the teimj^® others
allow for

a

broader use.^^

side with the latter, and D.I1.30 is
testimony to this.

However,

I

I

think the concept of an event which
essentially Involves change is an

Important one, and

1

believe that an analysis of this concept
could be

given in terms of D.II.30.

But

I

shall not undertake this analysis

here.^°
Assuming that what has just been said succeeds
in capturing
the identifying characteristics of an event,
we may now turn our at-

tention to the second main question that concerns
us here, and that
has to do with the counting of events.

concept of recurrence?
or any number of times?

How are we to explicate the

What is it for an event to occur once, twice,
In this connection,

cept of concretlzation can prove useful.

I

think Chisholm's con-

Let us say first of all, the

following
D. II

.

31

:

entails ^ =df.
Necessarily, for any person ~
S and any
times _t and _t
(i) if £ occurs at _t, then
is exemplified at t; and
(ii) if ^ accepts [£ occurs at
at
then ^ accepts
is exemplified at t] at t'.
'

:

,

Let us also say:
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^

is a proper subset of
A =df.
every member of B
a member of
Ui) some member of A is not a member A- and
of B.
(1)

n these definitions,
we may move on to an analysis
of the concept
of concretization

I

.

propose:

a concretizes
at t =df.
(i) A is a set;
(ii)
occurs at t;
(ill) for every property F,
If £ entails F and It is
not
possible that something other than
an individual
hing exemplify
then some member of A has F at

—
—
and
there is no proper subset B of
A such that for
every property F which
p entails and which ’it is not
possible for something other than
an individual
thing to exemplify, some member
of B has F at t.^l

_t;

(iv)

A fringe benefit of the foregoing
analysis of the concept of

concretization is that we are now in a
position to analyze the concept
of a state of affairs’

taking place.

Chisholm's proposal,

suggest the following:

D. 11

.

34
:

I

£ takes place

Again, sticking closely to

at p in p.
there is a set
P„ -df.
^
A such that:
(i) A concretizes
p at t; and
(ii) for every place
p, if £ is identical with p
or
or p is identical with
p^ then some member
of A exists in
p at t.
.

,

•

^

,

,

It follows from the foregoing
definitions that every event is such

that, if ever and whenever it occurs, it
takes place in some place or

places.

In connection with this it is appropriate
to discuss the

question of whether or not it is possible for a state
of affairs of
the form [p and not p] ever to occur.

that it will not.

The easy answer is of course

For, given A. II. 10 and D.II.9 through D. 11.12

above, it follows that such a state of affairs cannot possibly
occur;
that is,

p cannot occur while not-p

occurs.

But the question then
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arises: Wliat about a state of
affairs such as |[snow falls]
and [snow
does not fall]]? Is It not
possible for it to snow In Boston
while
it is not snowing in Los
Angeles?

Must we then conclude that [snow

does not fall] is not Che negation
of, and Indeed does not even
contradict, [snow falls]?
I think we can and
should avoid concluding
this.

Note that [snow does not fall] is not
an event, since it could

occur in a universe where there are no
individual things.

[Snow does

not fall] cannot then (by D.II.34)
take place in any place or
places;
in particular,

it cannot take place in Los Angeles,
and hence the

plausibility of the contention that [[snow falls]
and [snow does not
fall]] can occur is undermined.

Certainly [[snow falls in Boston]

and [snow does not fall in Los Angeles]] can
occur; but this is not
of the form

[p^

and not-p]

.

It will be recalled that the major criticism
made in Chapter I

against Chisholm's account of recurrence was that he
maintained that

cessation is the mark of completion.

It was pointed out in that chap-

ter that, although this holds true in some cases, it does
not hold

true in all cases.

There are, in other words, certain events that

can occur more than once in succession.
[Jones walks around the block],

Examples of such events are

[Smith swims a lap], and so forth.

Now, it seems to me that every event which can happen more than once
in succession involves a "measure" of some sort;

block, a lap, a mile, or whatever.

the measure may be a

Moreover, measures may be divided;

one can walk halfway around the block, swim half a lap, run half a

mile, and so forth.

That is, the occurrence of a measure-event
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entails the occurrence of otlier
events which

be called fractions

.nay

of It.

And it seems to me that
the distinguishing mark
concerning the
completion of measure-events is
that such events are completed
when
and only when all their
fractions have occurred.
However, fractions
are such chat they occur in
succession.
In view of all this. I
propose the following:

D.I1.35:

is just prior to _t' =df
is earlier than _t'
and
(ii) there is no time _t* such

^

(i)

;

and

D.II.36

_t-

that
is earlier than t'.

_t

is earlier than t*
~

occurs just prior to r =df.
there are times
-1
and also times _t'
t
such that:
—
n
(i) £ occurs at _tj
and
and at t
(ii) £ occurs at _t
and
j
and at t
(ill) none of the _t^ is identical
with any~o?’the t'^; and
^
Uv; _t^^ IS just prior to _t'^. ^

£

.

,

,

’

.

.

.

;

'

.

,

,

And then we may say:
D.I1.37;

£

is a fractioii of
£ -df. £ and £ are events such that:
(i) for any time _t,
occurs at

_t] entails,
[£
for some
time £ earlier than or identical with
t, [q occurs
“
at £' ]
and
(ii) there is an event
£ such that
(a) for any time _t,
[£ occurs at £] entails, for some
time _t' earlier than or identical with t, [r
~
occurs at £'
and
(b) if £ occurs, then either
£ occurs just prior to
£ or £ occurs just prior to £.
]

D.I1.38:

£

,

is a measure-event =df.

there are events

that
(i)

(ii)

£
£

lap],

and

£

such

is a fraction of £; and
is a fraction of £.

An example of a measure-event is, as already said,
lap].

£

[Smith swims a

Examples of fractions of this event are [Smith swims half a
[Smith swims a third of a lap], and so on.

9o

The two types of completion may now be accounted for in one
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formula
D-

11.39:

A completes
£ at t =df. A is t
a time such tliacTelther “
(i)(a) £ is not a measure-event,
(b)

„ an
event, and

j,

t

and
time t' such that
is just prior to t',

tliere is a

^

(oi)

(3) A

concretizes £ at I, ’and
A does not concretize
or
£ at ~t
(,ii;(a)
£ is a measure-event, and
(b) for any event
a, if ^ is a fraction of „,
then there is a time
such that
a)
is earlier than or
identical with t, and
~
A concretizes
(.3) I’
£ at t'.
(y)

'

•
'

We may then say:
D. 11.40:

£ occurs exactly £

sets which complete

times at

£

t

=df.

there are exactly n

at t.

Furthermore:
D. 11.41:

£ occurs exactly £

times at ~
t in
£
there are exactly
sets A
; Y;
£
such
h
that. for
any set A, if A is identical
with An ,~or
or A
is identical with Aj^
then
(i) A completes
£ at £, and
(ii) for any place
£, if £ is identical with £n
or
or £ is identical with v,
then’some
member of A exists in
£ at ^t.
,

,

.

^

.

More generally, we may also say:
D.

11.42

A completes
£ times _tj^,

£ exactly £

times =df.
there are exactly
such that A completes
£ at t-,
and A completes
£ at t
.

.

.

,

_t^

,

.

.

.

,

.

And finally:

occurs exactly £ times =df
there are k sets A-.
Aj^ such that:
(i) for any set A, if A is identical
with A^ or
A is identical with Aj^, then there is a
number m such that A completes
m times;
£ exactly ~
and
(ff) H is the sum of all such numbers.

R

.

,

•

•

.

,

,

•

.

.

,

According to the theory of events just outlined, events
are,
in the vernacular of the current literature,
"finely-grained” abstract
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The contention that
events are finely-grained
la controversial, as is the
contention that they are
abstract,
1 think that
there are definite
advantages to he gained fro.
asserting the truth
of both these contentions,
but this is a .atter
that I shall leave
aside here.« There have,
of course, been rival
theories proposed
In the literature.
Some philosophers contend
that events are

coarsely-grained, concrete entitles. ^6
finely-grained, concrete entitles.

gome contend that they
are
None, so far as

I

know, con-

tends that they are coarsely-grained,
abstract entitles.

Some, of
course, contend that there are
no such things as events
at all.^S
But these are all alternatives
that I shall not Investigate
here.

There is one point, however,
concerning the finely-grained

nature of events that should be
taken into account here.”

j

„ould

Imagine that. If „e have any
preanalytic intuitions at all concerning
the individuation of events, we
would favor a theory according to

which events are coarsely-grained
rather than finely-grained.

And

perhaps It does appear, at first
glance, that a theory where events
are finely-grained multiplies

number of events unacceptably.

For

instance, suppose Jones slanders Smith
viciously and with venom.

How

many events occur here?

tlie

According to the theory, several events oc-

cur, among which are [someone is
slandered],

[Jones slanders Smith viciously],

[Jones slanders Smith],

[Jones slanders Smith with venom],

[Jones slanders Smith viciously and
with venom], and so forth.

are all distinct events, given A. II.
12 above.)

only one event is involved here.

I

(These

Some may object that

disagree, however, and

I

know of
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no argument

„Mch successfully

cefuues

coute.uiou,

Buf, u „,ay be
urged, surely it Is obvious
that, when Jones slanders
Smith (whether
It be viciously and with
venom or not) Just one
slandering eecurs;
,.,y

and yet the present theory has
it otherwise.
sent theory does

^

But, in fact,

have it otherwise; and,
although

several events occur when Jones
slanders Smith,

slandering occurs (at that time and
place).
slandering?

It is reasonable

1

1

the pre-

contend that

agree that only one

After all, what is a

to say that a slandering
is an occur-

rence of the event [someone is
slandered].

And, according to D.I1.41,

this event occurs exactly
once at the time and place at
which Jones

slanders Smith.

It seems to me that

the principle implicit in
this

response may be extended to all
similar cases

(j^,

a murder is an

occurrence of the event [someone is
murdered], a theft is an occurrence of the event [something is
stolen], and so on), and hence it
seems to me that the theory of events
presented here is not counter-

intuitive after all, at least in the
respect just discussed.
With this my presentation of the theory
of events that

I

shall

presuppose in that theory of human action
to be given in Chapter IV
IS complete.

I

shall now turn to a consideration of Chisholm's

latest published theory of human action.

This theory will serve as an

introduction to the treatment of actions as
abstract entities.

NOTES

to

Henceforth

this book as

I

shall refer

tempted to analyze the'^conLpt
^of r'tiL"'in''such^f
that I shall not consider
here.
HowJveJ ^it‘'sh‘'*'l‘r‘'J
Chisholm has not yet atte.npted any
^ such kducfion
eauction with respect to the
concept of a place.

See

note'f ^o^ih^p^e^ru"^
4t

definitions given with respect to
the con
thing, a time, and a place
(see D
u
rf^’
enlightening, but I do
not regard
egard this
this°a?
as sufficient reason to dispense
with them
Comnare
Compare
my discussion of D.I.3 in the
last chapter.
cpnict

f

ii%%r"

f

“

5,

s noted in Chapter
1, Chisholm appears tacitly to appeal
to
some such concept in his statement
of D.I.9.

In this connection,

see note 25 to Chapter

I.

7„

analysis of the concept of a person, the
reader is
referred to Chapter VI, definition D.VI.18.
8

D.1I.5 should obviate the problems that
Kim found with D.I.3
when the latter is given a tenseless reading.
One can surely consider
(or entertain) a nonpropositional
state of affairs even if one cannot
accept It.
(I am of course assuming here
that consideration is a relation that holds only between persons and
states of affairs.) Also
I take
It is possible that” to be definable
in terms of "it is necessary that in the conventional manner.
An alternative definition is:
X is a time =Fdf. there is a thing
such that either
is earlier than _t* or _t' is earlier than t.
lOp
Compare D.1.17 through D.I.20.
11

Again, 1 believe this definition obviates the problems that
Kim cited on a tenseless reading of D.I.4.
See note 8 above.
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by

Chlsh!i"on 2/7/7r?n

aZZlT""!

"

«be

Massachusetts In Amherst, spring
197^

blgh-velocUy!“ibat«nic partlcjes

'

’

14

P'°“ems with

i?"sr “

use the term "Individual thins
^
also that, as I use rtf
"2ist"?n'"
exist in a place.
I

“'“''®'^sity of

“

® remembered tliat,
as

iadividual thing and
individual things may

This is the same definition
as D.I.IO.

15 ^,

[Jones is Jones] were not ruled
out as

m

walks] wouW°quaUfrarevL?ff'''^''^

o..„,
given.

Then clause (ii) (d)(6) of D.II.30
would be altered to read-

G iTessenria^

.'""®

'

’

1

G and

‘"''® following manner.
D II 30 wonl‘d'\"'°‘’^f‘'^“°!;
D.1I.30
would be restricted to an analysis
of nonconjunctive events
stipulated that a conjunctive event Is a
conjuftfe
State
rtateff^f
of affairs all of whose conjuncts
are themselves either conjunctive events or nonconjunctive events.
And then it would be said
at an event is either a nonconjunctive
event or a conjunctive event.

18

_AvSjl> Judith Jarvis Thompson in Acts and Other Events
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1977) (henceforth 1 shall refer
to^this book as ^."); Chisholm in
"Events and Propositions,"
Nous , 4 (1970).
,

’

— 'g Jaegwon Kim in several articles, among which are
Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept
of Event," The Journal
(1973) (henceforth I shall refer to this article as
CNSCE ), Events as Property Exemplifications," in
Myles Brand and
Douglas Walton, ed.. Action Theory (Dordrecht,
Holland/Boston, U.S.A
D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1976) (henceforth I shall refer to this
article as EPE"), and "Causation, Emphasis, and Events,"
Midwes t
S^ tudies
i n P hilosophy
II (1977) (henceforth I shall refer to this
^^bicle as CEE ); also, Chisholm in P&O.
-

,,

’

.

,

The analysis could be made in the following manner.
An
analysis of the concept of a state of affairs' entailing
change in
terms of a property would be given; and then a subclause
(C) would
be added to clause (ii)(d) of D.II.30 to the effect that
entails
£
change in terms of G.

•
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avoided

are
22

This is perhaps a rather restrictive
-inilwaio
^-Lysis of tho concent
rtf of p
.-i

of O 110 st^^p*

•

•

I

suua.ul::
23 _

o

OLi

it IS
.

inis treatment of measure-events
and their franMr.T-,
discussion with Eva Bodanszky and Tom
Ryckman.

1.

^

‘’“""’"t and a sum are analyzable in ?err„f"iL""'
concept of a set in accordance with
the current methodology of
set-theory.
I shall not give this
analysis here.

25

^^equate discussion of this issue would
require the exnoevaluation of alternative theories of
events a proiect
il iich would
be inappropriate in the present
context.
However, I dn
^
three major advantages of the ’present
thenr
events ^L^inel'- grained does
y
away with the need to employ the cumbersome apparatus that is involved
with talking about events
beinr
contemporary discussions of tSs lllle.
sL D^^ld
d““’-::»
/ctlons, Reasons
Causes," in Alan R. White,
?hfpn
ed
T"’ of Action (Oxford: and
IhUosophy
Oxford
University Press, 1968)
Z;’
The Logical Form of Action
Sentences," in Nicholas Reseller, ed., Th^
‘‘"‘‘.'^‘“on (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
ess, °i966f^"lh
^Isl
lybb).
The Individuation of Events," in Nicholas
Reseller
ed
s_ays in Honor of Carl G. Hemp
el (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.l’
(henceforth I shall refer to this article as
a
Ik ), and
Events as Particulars," Nous 4 (1970) (henceforth
I shall
refer to this article as "EP"); Alvin
I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Ac(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970),
pp. 1-10 (henceforth I
s la
re er to this book as " THA ")
Bruce Aune Reason and Action (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.
D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1977),
12-19*
pp
Edward Wierenga, Th ree Theories of Events
(unpublished), pp. 85-103Roderick M. Chisholm, "States of Affairs Again,"
Nous 5 (1971) (henceforth^^I shall refer to this article as
"SAA"), p. 188; and Fred Dretske.
Referring to Events," Midwest Studies In Philosophy II
(1977).)
The second advantage is that the assertion that
events are abstract
entities promotes ontological simplicity; at least, this
is so with
the theory just presented.
The third advantage is that, events being
abstract entities, the concept of recurrence may be interpreted
literally.
(For a discussion of this issue, see Davidson, EP, and
Chisholm, SAA.)
sirnnn
•

I

L

r
r

^

^

,

;

,

:

.

,

,

26 ,.

k- g-

27,.
^- 8

,

Davidson, IE and EP.

Myles Brand, "Particulars, Events, and Actions," in
Myles Brand and Douglas Walton, ed
Action Theory (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976); Goldman,
-

>

.

,
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THA; Kim, CNSCE, EPE, and
CEE; and Thomson,
28 „
Terence Morgan, "The Case
Against
^ Events
Pin-i
i
^
^ilosophlcal
Review 87 (1978).

"

The

.

29

The objection that follows,
and my response
r^esponse to it, are
drawn from Chisholm, P&O, p. 129

CHAPTER

III

CHISHOLM'S THEORY OF HUMAN
ACTION

l

Exposition of Ch itlin's Theory
of Human Acrinn

-

In the past Chisholm has
proposed several different
theories

of human action. Just as he
has proposed several different
theories of

events.
I

In

this chapter

took in Chapter

I.

In

shall pursue a course similar
to that which

1

the first section

1

shall concern myself with

an exposition of Chisholm's
latest published theory of human
action as
it appears in Chapter II,

sections

through

4

9 of

Person and Obiecr

.^^

This account of action has been
criticized in part by Alan Donagan.^

Chisholm has replied to this criticism,^
and
self with portions of his reply.
ter

I

m

I

shall also concern my-

the second section of this chap-

shall turn to a criticism of Chisholm's
theory thus expounded.
So far in this dissertation

I

have used the term "theory"

rather uncritically, but it is time to ask what
sort of thing we
should take a theory to be and what sort of
information we should

reasonably expect a theory to provide.
what sort of an account?

I

A theory is an account, but

think that the most critical requirement

that an account must meet in order to qualify as
a theory is that it
be systematic.

Certain assumptions should be explicitly made and by

means of these certain information derived.

The information may come

in the form of definitions or in the form of theorems.

Moreover,

there should be a general coherence, a general unity of purpose
64
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ifost in

tllP

Tr'r'riiiT-tf-

T-P
If

T*-

xt

IS reasonably to
be said

to be a theory.

Any great degree of
dissipation will disqoallfy
it as snch.
Whereas the accounts of events
presented in the preceding
two
chapters may, I think, reasonably
be called theories
of events (according to the rough criteria
just mentioned), it is
open to question
whether Chisholm's account of
human action, as it appears
in Person

qualifies as

a

theory of human action.

For his discussion

of such action seems to suffer,
not from logical, but from
structural
incoherence.
Despite Che presence of assumptions,
definitions and
theorems, there seems at first to
be no general unity of
purpose in
his discussion.
For Instance, a particularly
glaring omlsslon-a

conspicuous lacuna in an otherwise
painstaking piece of work— is

Chisholm's failure to say what he takes
an action to be.

One would

have thought an analysis of the concept
of an action essential to any

^

fi^

theory of action (although, it is true,
Chisholm is far from

being alone among so-called action-theorists
in omitting to provide
such an analysis).

However, Chisholm does seek to remedy this
defect

in his reply to Donagan.

Moreover, despite outv/ard appearances,

there is perhaps a fair degree of structural
coherence in Chisholm's

account after all.

For, by means of his account, he seeks to give

answers to some fairly basic questions concerning
human action, among

which are the following.
something?

What is it deliberately to omit undertaking

What is it to do one thing by doing another?

What is it

to undertake something for the purpose of
bringing about something?

What is it to bring about something for the purpose of bringing
about
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somethiiiP?

iq
IS tIt to act^ intentionally?

Wliaft

^^SiCcllXv?

Tlipcip

action-theory.

What is it to act

'ir*o o 1 1
are
all questions that lie
at the foundation of
•

In view of the fact that.

In his reply to Donagan,

Chisholm also seeks to
answer the question of what
an action is, It
would seem less than
charitable to refuse to call
his account
of

human action a theory.

But let the reader be
forewarned that the

account of human action whose
exposition follows is stark,
unremitting
in Its complexity,
and its structural coherence
is elusive.
Chisholm tells

us"^

that he will base his theory
of action,

that is, of human action, on
the undefined locution "S
undertakes at
t

to contribute causally to
the occurrence of

whenever

I

say "action-

I

(Henceforth,

shall mean human action.)

More often than

not, when appealing to the
concept expressed by this locution,
he sup-

presses all mention of the time of
undertaking.

Chisholm also pro-

vides us with four other locutions
which he uses to express the same
concept.

These are: "S endeavors at

occurrence of

_S

and

^

to contribute causally to the

acts with the intention of contributing
causally

to the occurrence of

£,

_t

undertakes £.

"s acts with the intention of bringing
about
"

The last version of course assures us
that

the concept being invoked is not a new
one; Chisholm has already ap-

pealed to It in his theory of events (see
definition D.I.2).
there is a problem regarding Chisholm’s use
of tense here.

However,
It seems

that, when he suppresses mention of times,
he is taking tense seriously.

For instance, it seems that he takes "S undertakes £"
to mean

the same as

^ now undertakes £."

But often he does mention times
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explicitly, and when he does so
it see.s that he
does
,ahe tense
setlonsly.
Pot instance, '.S nndettahes
^ at t" ptesn^ahly should not
be taken to .ean the sa^e
as "S now undertakes
£ at t"; for the latter
is a phrase which has
no clear sense, at
least when t is
distinct fro™
now (as Chishol™ surely
allows for).^ But whereas
this Inconsistent
treatn,ent of tense raised
problems in our evaluation
of Chisholm’s
theory of events, no such
problems arise, I believe,
with respect to
eory of action. As will
soon be seen, concern with
the mention
of times may almost always
be profitably dispensed
with in evaluating
Chisholm's theory of action.

^

Chisholm initially makes seven
assumptions concerning the concept of undertaking.
These are:

AiIILlI-

[1 undertakes £]

A. III.

[S

undertakes £] does not imply
[£ occurs].

A. III.

[_S

undertakes £] does imply
[£ exists].

A. III.

does not imply

[S

desires £]

[^undertakes £ and £ entails
£ and S believes [£ entails £] and ^ is rational] does not imply
undertakes
[^

A. III. 5:

[^undertakes £ and ^ believes [by bringing about
p he
will bring about
and ^ is rational] does
[£ and £]
imply [^ undertakes
[£ and £] ]
]

.

A. III. 6:

[^ undertakes £] does not imply
takes £]
]

A. III.

[S

considers

[S

—

under-

.

undertakes £] does imply [it is directly within S's
power to know [^ undertakes
~
£]
]

Chisholm calls A. III.

4

the principle of the nondivisiveness of inten-

tion and A. III. 5 the principle of the
diffusiveness of intention.

locution

it is directly within

s

power" which is employed in

The
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A.III.7 is defined elsewhere
by Chlsholn.;

I

shall not consider
it in

detail here.
There is one other concept that
Chisholm introduces
unanalyzed
into his theory of
action-that of causal contribution.
Chisholm in
fact uses the term
"causal contribution" and its
cognates in two

quite distinct ways, although
he is often not that careful
in distinguishing these.
The first way is to use it to
designate a relation
that holds between events
and events.
It is v^hen used in this
way
that the term expresses an
unanalyzed concept, often called the
concept of event-causation.
The second way is to use it to
designate a

relation that holds between persons
and events.

When used in this way

the term expresses a concept
that is often called the concept of

agent-causation.

Chisholm analyzes this concept in D.III.4
below.

All that Chisholm does by way of
Initial characterization of the concept of event-causal contribution is
to say the following.
and roughly, an event

r

First,

may be said to be a sufficient causal condi-

tion of another event
^ just in case it is physically necessary that,
if

£

occurs, then

£ occurs.^

ly to another event

£ only

if

Secondly, an event

£

£ contributes causal-

is part of an event r that occurs and

IS a sufficient causal condition of
£.

As an example of such causal

contribution Chisholm cites the familiar case of the presence
of oxygen in a room contributing causally to a fire.

Because the logic of intentional action that Chisholm pro-

poses is complex,

discussing it.

I

shall make use of abbreviative symbolism when

Chisholm himself does not use such symbolism in Person
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reply to Donap.an.
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In his paper, Donagan
complains that Chisholm's
theory of

action, as propounded in
Person and Objec t, "unacceptably
multiplies
actions
that is, according to Donagan,
acceptance of Chisholm's
ac
count commits one to the
view that there are many more
actions than
;

It

is in fact reasonable to
believe there are.

Donagan asks us to

consider a case where a person
seeks to step over a puddle,
misjudges
Ills stride, and
steps into the puddle, thereby
getting his feet wet.
In this connection, Donagan
says:
^ analysis, an action is a
state
oj''aftalrr'aj"?
fairs, at least three distinct
actions can be distineuished

o?der?rst“‘'
‘"’’f
strlL
ide insufficiently
i„f

-

l®‘’8thenlng his stride

(in

lengthening his
to clear the puddle;
(3) ^ stepping into
le puddle; and
(4) ^ getting his foot wet.
Here, since (1)
oes not entail (2), although
(2) entails (1), (1) and (2) are
states of affairs.
And since in none of the pairs
f orme
y the set (2), (3) and (4) does either member
entail
e other, (2), (3) and
(4) are each distinct from the others.
(2)

S

In this passage Donagan correctly
ascribes, by implication at least,
to Chisholm the view that mutual
entailment is a criterion of identity

for states of affairs.

Donagan is therefore quite right in saying

that, according to Chisholm, all of
(1) through (4) are distinct

states of affairs.

Indeed, all of (1) through (4) are distinct events

according to Chisholm.

Now, the charge that events are unacceptably

multiplied according to the criterion of identity based
on mutual
entailment is one that was addressed and dismissed in the last
chapter.
a

But what is puzzling about Donagan 's passage is that it
imputes

view to Chisholm that Chisholm never espouses in Person and Object.

For,

to repeat,

in that book Chisholm never says what he takes an
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action to bo.

Howovor
ever,

In this regard with the

in
m

hiso v-^
reply to Donagan, Chisholm
obliges us
i

i

foUowiag characterization:

We could say
that a person's action on
a given occa
Sion IS that conjunctive state
of affSTJ which conslstrh)
of the person's undertaking
whatever it was that he did uaalong with (b) the various
things
that'^hl
a
that his undertaking
brought about-the events or
states of
affairs which are such that the
agent's undertaking con“ocurrence of those events or
states
oraffaLs?13^
.

.

.

By this Chisholm seems to mean
the following:

Damn:

Zp -df.

(aq)(3rp

.

.

.

(3rp(Uq

& c[Uq], r, i . . . s
^ C[Uq] , r
& i(3r) (C[Uq] ,

P = [|Uq]
r 1).l^

This definition is certainly
problematic, but

I

&

r,
1

r

&

shall postpone all

criticism of Chisholm's theory of action
until the next section of
this chapter.
Ihe next concept to be analyzed is
that of deliberately omit-

ting to undertake something

£

(or, simply, of deliberately omitting
£,

as Chisholm sometimes, and perhaps
misleadingly, puts it).

Chisholm

proposes

—

•

I

II 2
.

;

^ deliberately omits undertaking £ at t =df.
(i) ^ considers undertaking
£ at _t; and
(ii) ^ does not undertake
at
t.
£

We may symbolize this as follows:
Op =df.

G[Up] & -Up.

Chisholm next moves on to an analysis of the concept of agentcausal contribution, for whose advocacy he is well-known.
to analyze this concept in two stages.

First he proposes:

He attempts
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S

does something at
(i)
(li

H
t
undertakes

(il)

^ which contributes causallv

^

""

q

affairs which is
that is:

at tl

deliberately^nltl

S

Sp =df.

t

^

elthe?

[S

rnn^r^K..*q at

t

and n

delibe7ately^omits

(aq)(C[Uq],p v (Oq

& p =

aJ

[Oq])).

He then proposes:
-DrlllcA:

S

contributes causally at
(1
l^does something at

^
t

)

to

£ >df. either:
that contributes causally
to

(fi)

there is a ^ such that
(a) S undertakes
^ at t, and
(b)
undertakes
is £; or
(iii) there is an jc^ such that
(a)
does something at t that
contributes causally^
Ito £, and
(b) [S does something that
contributes causally
to

that is:

Ap =df.

Sp v

(aq)(Uq & [Uq] = p) v (3r) (Sr
& [Sr] = p)

(Chisholm sometimes uses the phrase
"S brings about £- instead of
"S
contributes causally to £.”) D.III.4
is a formidable definition.

Clause (1) would appear relatively
straightforward, but to get a
grasp on the rationale that underlies
clauses (ii) and (iii) we should

consider four principles which Chisholm
calls "theorems of agency."
They follow, he says, from his ontology
of events and his analysis of
the concept of agent-causal contribution.
T. III. 1:

If

^ contributes causally
where "—3

Ap -9

T.III.2:

Tp

to £,

then

£

occurs.

symbolizes strict implication:

)

If

^ does something that contributes causally to £, then
contributes
causally to
^
does something that contributes causally to £]
Sp
( f -e.
a
A[Spj.)
,

T. III. 3:

.

"

The theorems are:

—

If ^ contributes causally to
£, then there exists a
such that ^ undertakes £.
Ap
(f
(3q)Uq.)
.

—

£
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If

undertakes p, then
undertakes
( I-e.
Up —i A[Up].)

^

[S

.

~S

^nn^riK
ntributes causally
to
.

,

T.m.l

is a theorem,

since ll is confined
by all classes of
0-III.4.
It is confirmed by clause
of that definition
( 1 )
by virtue
Of the fact that it is
confirmed by D.III.3; and
it is confirmed by
D.III.3 by virtue of the
fact that (j, contributes
causally to
implies that i occurs.
That it is confirmed by
clauses (ii) and (lii)
is easily seen.
As for T.III 2
jthic
this follows directly
from clause
of
)
D.I1I.4.
However, it seems to me that
T.III
is not a
theorem.
For if s contributes
causally to j, simply by virtue
of the
fact that
£ is [S deliberately omits r J then there is
no
that S
i

.

£

,

undertakes.
armor, and

But
I

I

do not consider this a vital
chink in Chisholm's

shall not pursue the matter.

Finally, T.III. 4 follows

directly from clause (ii) of D.III.4.
Chisholm also notes that the following
are not theorems of
agency
If

^

undertakes

then

p occurs

If S contributes causally
to p,
( i-e. ,
Ap
3 Up);

—

If

^ undertakes

(i-e-

>

Up

—J

p, then
U[Up]).

S_

(

i

.

e

then

undertakes

,

•

—

i

Tp);

undertakes ^
p

~S
[S
“

The two most important theorems are
T.III.

Up

undertakes ^
p]

and T.III. 4.

2

it

is because Chisholm wants to be
able to affirm these that he includes

clauses (lil) and (ii), respectively,
in D.III.4.

And Chisholm

wants to be able to affirm these
for the following reason.

The con-

cept of agent-causal contribution
is invoked in part to salvage the
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concept of the agent's
moral responsibility
for his actions
even when
those actions are not
caused by any events.
But the concept of
agentcausal contribution would
not be adequate to
this task were it not
stipulated that an agent’s
contributing causally to
an event is itself something to which
the agent contributes
causally.
I shall expand on this in the next
section.

Given the following definition:
j)

is a necessary causal
condition of

q

=df

n

.

a

physically necessar;,

logically
logicair"’necessary that, if
at t or prior to t,

occurc:

q

£ occurs

^

-t’

Chisholm says that he wishes
also to assume the following:
Ariliwl:

If a state of affairs

causaurtr^f

occurs and S contributes
causally
condition of £, then S contributes

£

He makes this assumption
because it enables him to say
that an agent

may contribute causally to
subsequent free

(1^.

un-event-caused)

actions both of other agents and
of himself.
Chisholm also makes the following
observation.

The lower-

case schematic letters in the
definitions, assumptions and theorems
so far formulated in this
chapter are to be replaced by expressions

designating a ctions

.

He gives as examples: "His raising
his arm,"

"His stealing the money," and
"His breaking his promise."

But he

also makes the following remark:

would assume, however, that what is
intended by most such
action expressions could be paraphrased
(doubtless sometimes
cum ersomely) into our undertaking”
vocabulary without
u ing terms that themselves
designate actions.
.

.

.

Chisholm next moves on to a consideration
of an expression
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which he calls
"fundamental to the theory of
agency." The expression
concerns the notorious
"by"-relacion, and Chisiiolm
suggests the following

(ii)

that is:

^contributes causally at
^ to
that

p;

and

event which is [S contributes
causally
^ at
£] also contributes causally to

Rp,q

t

to
°

Ap & C[Ap],q.

Chisholm explicitly rejects
the following definition:
Rp,q =df.
and for good reason.
y

(

Ap & Cp,q
He correctly remarks that,
for example, when we

we ever do say) that by
contributing causally to his hand's

being extended out of the
car window the driver contributed
causally
to his signalling, we do
not imply that the driver’s
hand's being extended out the car window
contributed causally to his signalling.
But Chisholm does contend
that when we say this we do imply
that the

driver’s contributing causally to
his hand's being extended out the
car window contributed causally
to his signalling.
of course, controversial.

This statement is

It is worth remarking here,

though, that

despite Chisholm's assertion that the
"by"-relation is fundamental to
the theory of agency, he does not
appeal to it in what follows.
So far none of the concepts analyzed
in this chapter goes any

way towards providing an analysis of
the concept of intentional action
In order to provide such an analysis,
Chisholm begins with the follow-

ing definition:
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^^^lLLL_7:

that is:

^ undertakes

p and does <=;n
n
about a =df.
uudertakL
(11) 1[S undertakes j,]
contributes

Pp,q =df.

\

U[p

&

causall^'LV^

[C[Up],q]].

Chlshol. so™eti„.es rephrases
the deflniendu™ as "S
undertakes ^ as a
means to (bringing about)
a," and he assumes;

-

Uq!)
He also notes that

(S

andertakes £.

undertakes £ for the purpose
of bringing about

£l implies neither that

£ occurs nor

that

£

occurs.

To underscore
the attractiveness of D.III.7,
Chisholm contrasts it with a
simpler,
but erroneous definition,
to wit:

Pp,q =df.

U[p 6 [Cp,q]].

This definition Is defective,
Chisholm says, simply because,
for some
and
£
£, one may undertake £ for the purpose of
bringing about
£ and
yet £ may precede £.
(For Instance, let
£ be [the cabin at the foot
of the hill is destroyed) and

the hill].)

£

be [the boulder rolls straight
down

Chisholm explicitly rejects the possibility
that £ both

succeed and contribute causally to
D. III. 7. a is

to be rejected.

^

and hence, by this light,

This problem does not arise with

D.III.7, however; indeed, Chisholm
believes that D.III.7 successfully

accounts for such otherwise anomalous cases
in addition to the more

straightforward cases.
Chisholm contends that the locution

£

contributes causally to

for the purpose of bringing about £" is
"readily reducible" to the

terms he has already presented, and in a footnote
he proposes the

following definition:
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^

contributes causally to
n -df.
-Hf
about ^
there is an

^n

t-u^
purpose of bringing^
such that:
P^^rpose of bringing about
ILJ^ [fS undertakes r] contributes causally to
^]

£

]

(ii)

that is:

;

undertakes £] contributes causally
to £;

Qp,q =df.

(ar)(Pr,

[r

&

[C[Ur],q]]

&

C[Ur],p).

This definition, he believes,
provides a correct analysis of
such
statements as "Smith blew up the
palace for the purpose of bringing
about the death of tlie king."
In this connection Chisholm
notes the

following theorem:
contributes causally to
1|
£ for the purpose of bringing
about
implies that £ occurs but not that
q occurs.
Qp»q —3 Tp but Qp,q
Tq.)
At this point Chisholm feels that
he is in a position to deal

with the following objection to his
theory.

The objection is that

his theory requires that whenever a
person contributes causally to an
event, he contributes causally to his
contributing causally to that

event

(

1. e.

,

the theory requires the truth of "Ap

—

A[Ap]"); but

this is true, so the objection runs, only
on those special occasions

when a person causes himself to do something, such
as when he leaves
a reminder on the table in order to bring it
about that he will do a

certain thing the next day.

Chisholm's reply is that the objection

confuses

^

with

doing something for the purpose of contributing causally to

^

s

s

contributing causally to his contributing causally to
£

his contributing causally to
(3ci)Qq,[Ap]

causally to

).

£

£

(

i.e.

,

it confuses "A[Ap]" with

He acknowledges that from the fact that

it does not follow that

^

S

contributes

does something for the purpose

of contributing causally to his contributing causally to £.

But this
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point has no bearing
on the troth of
"Ap

^

A(Ap]."
Continuing with his
discussion of .eans and ends.
Chishol.
oeehs to analyze the
concept of an end
in itself.
But this is periP-al to our present concern,
and 1 shall not discuss his
treatment
issue here.
I qIi^ii
all move on. ratlier.
to Chisholm's attempt
Po distinguish
between undertaking
something as a preliminary step
towards a certain goal
and making an attempt
(i^. taking a final
ds) that goal.

He notes that a person
who makes an attempt

to kill someone
will

(usually) have already
undertaken several preliminary steps towards
that goal, such as buying
a gun. loading it.
ng It. and so on.
He also notes, however,
that one may undertake
something as a preliminary
step towards a goal which
one does not
plan personally to attain;
for instance, one may
undertake preliminary
steps towards bringing
about the death of a
politician with a view to
someone else's making the
attempt on his life.
Por this reason, and
first and only time, the
question of which agent does
what

becomes important.

I
£

Chisholm proposes:

as a preliminary step towards
bringing about
undertakes £ and does so for the
purpose of
ringing it about that someone
bring about

£

df.

S

£;

that is:

sJp,q =df.

sPp,

[(3s')s'Aqj.

Note that it is consistent
with this definition that "s" and
"s'"

designate the same agent.
Hence

A final step is one that is not
preliminary.
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^

makes an attempt to bring about
£ =df.
^ undertakes £; and

(i)

“^'^'’‘’8

that is;

Kp =df.

^ preliminary step

Up & ~(aq)Jq,p.

Chisholm makes six observations concerning
the concept of

making an attempt when analyzed as in

D. 111. 10.

First, making an at-

tempt to bring about a state of affairs
does not imply failure to

bring about that state of affairs.

Secondly, undertaking a prelimin-

ary step towards bringing about a state
of affairs
£ itself constitutes making an attempt to bring about, not
£, but another state of

affairs
[(aq)(Kq

£ which
&

is a means to £.

Pq,p)]].)

£

[Jr,p]

implies [[~Kp] &

Thirdly, attempts (so defined) may be either

"half-hearted” or confident.
to bring about

(That is,

Fourthly, making an attempt at a time

t

does not rule out the possibility of making an
at-

tempt at a later time

_t'

to bring about the negation of £.

For in-

stance, a person may make an attempt to assassinate
someone (by

planting a bomb, for example), then come to regret his action
and
attempt to "undo” what he has done before it is too late.

Fifthly,

making an attempt to bring about a state of affairs is compatible
with

undertaking a preliminary step towards that same state of affairs.

As

Chisholm says, the would-be assassin may fire a pistol with one hand
while reaching for more ammunition with the other.
a

Finally, there is

distinction between, for example, the d£ dicto statement "The as-

sailant made an attempt to bring about the death of the king" and the
he re statement "The king was such that the assailant made an attempt
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to bring about
his
Uis death.

"

r\

One might be justified
in nff.affirming the
a ter while denying
the former.
•

_

The analysis of the
concepi of making an
aften,pf allows
Chisholm to attempt an
analysis of the concept
of intentional
action.
It
might at first seem
that the following
would suffice:
LiTl.

^brings about
£ Intentionally =df
U; _S undertakes £; and
(11)

that Is:

[S

Ip .<jf.

undertakes £] contributes
causally to £;
Up ^ C(UpJ,p,

But the (iefiniens of
D.ni.ll manages to capture
only the concept of
successful, and not o f
intentional, action; for the
success may well
be unintentional.
Chisholm gives two examples
of such successful
but

unintentional action.

The first is a case of
what he calls "inad-

vertent success":
home with the in^ent orkUui/r-""fr“®
£pute, he accidentally runs
over and killca^
be none otL“\har^L=“«e"’dervi^^:i^!?f^'"^"

—

^

The second Is a case of
what Chisholm calls "happy
failure":

everything he believes
necessary
ilceLa^rforihe
for the complete execution
of his plan and
failure.
In shiotliig
at hirvlctir'^r*"^
then, In
the i^rsfo^tM
escape, the intended victim is
killed by
an unexpected stroke of
^
lightning. 18

Chisholm believes that what is
wrong with

D. III. 11 is

that it fails

to account for the fact
that an agent acts intentionally
provided

that he brings about something
in the wav he intended

.

He believes

that what this amounts to is
a requirement that the agent
be, not just

successful to some degree, but completely
successful in his endeavor
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to bring about

the Intended state
of affairs.

Aua
And so,
so
to capture
t
the
concept of a genuinely
intentional action
ccion, Chlshol
Chisholm proposes the
following definition:
ll.a:

^

is completely successful

bring

abLt £

(")

Ip =df.

Chisholm notes that
reason.

khas

j
endeavor
at

J:

to

hiih- -diL\e\^^?*rihr -p:-

ringing about
that Is:

“

nr,

Kp 4

£ contributes causally

(q)(Pq,p

D. 111.11. a

Of

to £;

cq,p).

™ay appear too rigid for
the following

Suppose that, according to
one plan of action

(e^,

that of

death by shooting), the assassin
succeeded in achieving everything
he
undertook for the purpose of
bringing about the death of
his victim,
but that he also acted upon
an alternative plan (e^,
that of death
by bombing) as a precaution
in case of failure to
execute the primary
plan of action.
Suppose this secondary plan Itself
failed.
Then not
rythln a that the assassin undertook
for the purpose of bringing

—

death of his victim was successfully
accomplished.

Chisholm

acknowledges the truth of this point,
but he notes that its sting is
diminished if one recognizes the
fact that everything that the assasSin undertook for the purpose
of bringing about the death of his

victim by shooting was indeed
accomplished.
As an addendum to his theory
of action Chisholm presents two

final definitions.

analyzed.

In the first the concept of a basic action
is

He proposes:
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brings about
as a basic act at t =df.
[S undertakes
p] contributes causally at t to n*
—
Hy
and
(ii) there is no
such
that ^ undertakes a at t for
p
~
the purpose of bringing about

^

(-L)

p;

that is:

Bp =df.

C[Up],p

^

~(3q)Pq,p.

In connection witL D.III.12
Chisholm notes that the following
is
a theorem:

Up

B[Up].

of direct action,

The second concept to be analyzed
Is that
that of the bringing about of a
state of

affairs without the benefit of causal
intermediaries.

Chisholm sug-

gests
D. III. 13:

brings about p directly at t =df.
^ contributes causally at p to p; and
(ii) there is no
p such that
(a) p contributes causally at
p to p; and
(b) p contributes causally to
p;

^

(!)

that is:

Dp =df.

Ap & ~(aq)(Aq & Cq,p).

In connection with D. III. 13, Chisholm
claims the truth of the following:
A. III. 10

;

Up

—i

D[Up].

This completes my exposition of Chisholm's latest
published

theory of action.

Before moving on to a criticism of it, let us

briefly take stock of what it is that Chisholm has given us; for
my

exposition of his theory, in accordance with his own presentation of
it,

has been rather austere.

following:

(1)

what an action is (D.III.l);

mission to undertake
is
(5)

(D.III.4);

Chisholm has sought to tell us the

(4)

is

(D.III.2);

(3) what

(2)

what a deliberate om-

agent-causal contribution

what doing one thing by doing another is (D.III.6);

what undertaking one thing for the purpose of bringing about
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another is (C.m.7);

(6)

s„oui one i„i„g io. iUe
pur-

pose of bringing about another
is (D.III.8);
tempt is (D.III.IO);
(9)

is

(8)

what acting intentionally
is

what acting basically is
(D. III. 13).

(7) what

(D. III. 12);

making an at(D. Ill, ll.a)

and (10) what acting
directly

He has also provided us
with several subsidiary defi-

nitions together with various
assumptions and theorems.

All of the

questions touched on have both an
intrinsic interest and a direct
bearing on other pressing problems
in philosophy, particularly
In
moral philosophy.
It is Important, therefore,
to attempt to assess
how successful Chisholm has been
in his treatment of these
issues.

2^ Criticism of Chis holm's Theory of Human
I

Ar.finn

find it very difficult to evaluate
Chisholm's theory of ac-

tion, partly because it is very rich
and his presentation of it pithy,

but mostly because
of undertaking.

1

have trouble dealing with the unanalyzed
concept

Now, it is always a difficult matter to
question the

comprehensibility of those concepts which serve as
the basis of a
philosophical theory, for the philosopher who advances
the theory is
always at liberty to say, "Well,
in the present case,

1

feel

1

^

understand them."

Nevertheless,

must raise some doubts concerning both

.^on^prehensiblllty of the concept of undertaking and also its
to serve as part of the basis of a theory of action.

In attempting to come to grips with the concept of undertaking
it is worth consulting some papers written by Chisholm prior to his

completing Chapter 11 of Person and Object

.

In those earlier papers
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Where he discusees the topic of actlon^O
chlshol™ does not take
the
concept of undertaking as primitive.
Instead he appeals to a
locution
which may be symbolized as "Mp.q"
and read as "S makes
£ happen in
the endeavor to make

<i

happen."

(The concept has been
expressed in

various ways by Chisholm in his
various papers, but this reading
will
do. 1)
Concerning this undefined locution,
Chisholm says that it

"expresses the concept of agency, for
it refers to the person as
cause"
and using it as his primitive
locution, Chisholm offers the
following definition:
;

D- III. 14

:

Up =df.

(aq)Mq,p.

This earlier work of Chisholm's is very
revealing.
P£.^_son

makes

£ happen

I

suspect

and Object Chisholm does away with the
locution "S
in the endeavor to make

£ happen" simply because

he

feels that he has found a way to do without
it; that is, he feels that
he has found a way in which to base his
theory solely on the concept
of undertaking and the other concepts already
introduced, and hence he

dispenses with the introduction of the earlier locution
whose only use
would be to allow for the analysis, in turn, of the concept
of undertaking.

But the earlier locution is revealing in its obvious invoca-

tion of the concept of agent-causal contribution.

Now, formally, in

his earlier works Chisholm analyzes the concept of agent-causal
con-

tribution in terms of his undefined locution thus:
D. III. 4.

:

Ap =df.

(aq)Mp,q.

But it is obvious that one cannot understand, or be expected to under-

stand, the locution without first understanding the concept of agent-
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causal contribution.

Similarly, any understanding of
the concept of

undertaking relies on an
understanding of the concept of
agent-causal
contribution, and indeed this is
manifest even in Person and
Ohi eci
when Chisholm proposes
that ”S undertakes £- be understood
to mean
the same as "S undertakes
(at t) to contribute causally
to the occur-

rence of

For this reason

I

find the analysis of the
concept of

agent-causal contribution (given in D.III.4)
bothersome.

D.III.4 has

certain formal problems which will be
duly noted below, but by far
Its most puzzling aspect is that
it should be presented as
a defini-

tion at all, since it is peculiarly
unenlightening.

In this it per-

haps resembles D.I.3 (in which the
concept of a state of affairs is
analyzed).

But its anomalous nature is aggravated
by the fact that

Chisholm clearly intends it to be informative;
for he presents it for
the express purpose of rebutting the
contention that there is an

unbridgeable gap" between "event-causation" and
"agent-causation,
I

.,23

do not see how it begins to bridge this gap.
But the somewhat covert inclusion of the concept
of agent-

causal contribution in the concept of undertaking
does not in and
of itself constitute good grounds for criticism
of either concept.

Nevertheless,

I

do question the propriety of drawing up a theory of

action in which the concept of agent-causal contribution figures irreducibly (conceptually, if not formally).
cisms in this regard.

I

have two main criti-

The first is that, with the concept of agent-

causal contribution presupposed, it appears impossible to give an

informative account of what it is to do something, and yet such an
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account

su.ely aesl.a.le in

e,.n

pneseni eoniexi.

u

—

is snnpnis-

ded in the last
section) that to act is
to undertake a
state of affairs;
re
one would
perhaps expect him to say
rather that to act
et IS
is to
t
make
•

,

happen,

i^.

being something about.

1

^,

something

,, eontribnte
causally

to a state of
affairs.

Either way. however,
whichever thesis Is
asserted, the account
does not afford much
enlightenment as to what
involved in acting.
For the concept of
undertaking is taken as
primitive by Chisholm, and,
as has just
been
ueen snown,
j
shown an
n
a
understanding
of It seems to rely
on an understanding of
the concept of agentsal contribution.
And so. unless one
understands either of these
concepts, it seems that one
is In no position to
understand Chisholm's
thesis that to act Is to
undertake a state of affairs.
This point
applies also

^

dldly admits that one is
hardly likely to understand
the concept of

agenpausal contribution unless
Is.

2''

one already understands what
acting

But surely this is a
situation to be avoided, if at all
pos-

sible, when presenting a theory
of action.

My second criticism concerning
Chisholm's implicit invocation
of the concept of agent-causal
contribution right at the outset of the

presentation of his theory is that
his reliance on this concept constitutes a misapplication of the
very insight which led him to introduce the concept in the first
place.

It seems that Chisholm first

latched on to the concept of
agent-causal contribution when seeking a

solution to the well-known problem
that the ascription of moral
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o^

W.th the sepposlttoe
that aetet^lnlst. is ttee
a„a with the sup-

PosUioa that inaete™i„ia„
U.at^ either

Uete™i„is„

is ttae,

aah .et it see.s te
he the ease

is true or indeterminism
is troe.^S

-olm's solution, very
roughly, is that a person
may be morally
-sponsible lor his aetions
beeause he contributes
causally to them.
^en first presenting this
solution, Chisholm likened
the agent to a
prime mover unmoverl"^^ r,r^A
and characterized
agent-causal contribution
thus
t

nothiig?-or''L''Le--cr
auses us
27

happen.

^^^tain events to happen, and
to cause those events
to

Chisholm would now declare
this to be a little Inaccurate.
pointed out in the first
section of this chapter, he

As was

would not now

say chat

nothing or no one" causes a
person to contribute causally
certain events, but rather
that the person himself
contributes
causally to his own causal
contributions.
This is required, according
to Chisholm, because the
problem of the ascription of moral
responsibility being consistent with
the truth of indeterminism
would arise
once again if there were no
cause at all (1^, neither an
eventcause nor an agent-cause) of a
person's contributing causally to
an
event.

Hence, a necessary condition of
a person's being morally

responsible for an event is that he
contribute causally both to it
and to his causal contributions.
It IS not clear whether or
not, when he first introduced the

concept of agent-causal contribution,
Chisholm thought that an agent's
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con.r.bu.ing causally
lo an evenl „as „ol
only „ecessacy
sufficient foe his being
.oeally eesponsible foe
u.

also

„

He did
then he „ould have
had the soef of ceifeeion
he „as looking
foe! a
crxteelon by which one
.ighf distinguish those
events foe which one
xs moeally eesponslble
feo. those foe which one
is not.
Be

that as
it ™ay. Chlshol.
ceetainly does itot now believe
that an agent's con-

tributing causally to an
event is sufficient foe
his being morally
responsible for it.
For he now contends, as
we have seen, that,

ihHHiXSr one acts, one contributes
causally to an event; and
yet
(reasonably enough) he does
not accept that, whenevee
one acts, one
incurs ..oral eesponslblllty
foe an event.

Indeed, in Person and Oh-

ject he Implicitly accepts
the view that an agent
sponslble foe an event

j>

only If

j,

S is

moeally ee-

is within S's power, and
that

Within S's powee only if there
is a ^ which

S

£

is

is free to undertake.

Moreover, he says that it is
not the case that everything
one undertakes one is free to undertake. ^8
But, this being the case,
there has
clearly been a shift in emphasis
over the years in Chisholm's use
of
the concept of agent-causal
contribution. Originally invoked to
handle the thorny problem of
how it can be that one sometimes
is and
sometimes is not morally responsible
for one's actions (and other
events), the concept of agent-causal
contribution is now used by

Chisholm to characterize all action,
whether or not moral responsibility Is Incurred as a result of
the action.

Not only does this neces-

sxtate a new account of how it is
that one can be morally responsible
for some but not all of one's actions,
it also serves to complicate
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Chisholm's account of
action it-.
in general without
any concomitant
gains.
It seems to me tliat
there i
genuine benefit to be
derived from applying the concept of aeeni rra
P
agent-causal contribution
to an analysis of
free
action (see Chapter VI
below '»• k u app ying
it to an analysis
of all
action, free and unfree,
seems to me to serve
no purpose.
When used
thus it has no explanatory
power, and it robs
one of a useful tool
in
the attempt to distinguish
free from unfree
action, a distinction
upon which an adequate
account of how moral
responsibility is possible
would appear contingent.
-r

<-

i

.

Insofar, then, as the concept
of undertaking is
conceptually.
If not formally, reliant
on the concept of
agent-causal contribution.
It seems to me that the
very basis upon which
Chisholm founds his
theory of action is unfortunate,
for the reasons just
outlined. Moreover, I also have trouble
simply understam^ the
concept of undertaking, even when it is
analyzed in terms of 'making
j,
happen in the
endeavor to make
^ happen." Part of this is of course due to the
fact that

I

believe the concept of agent-causal
contribution has no

place in the analysis of the
concept of action in general.

But

I

am

also unsure how to construe
the intentional aspect of the locution

which is conveyed by the phrase
"in the endeavor."

Clearly, the

concept expressed by the locution
Is an Intentional one, both because

Chisholm explicitly says chat It
is (and the locution is, after all,
an invention of his) and also
because, in an earlier paper, Chisholm

expresses the same concept by means
of a locution in which "in intending

replaces

in the endeavor.

Nevertheless, Chisholm says that
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is no .'aci oi „iii..

^

pen in the endeavor
to .ake
^ happen/'^O

volxtionai light that

I

am intuitively moved
to try to Interpret

^he locution "S
undertakes £" and the use
to which Chisholm
puts it.
Be that as it may,
when it comes to the
comparing of intuitions little constructive can
be said, and so 1 shall
now pass on to a blow-

by-blow criticism of Chisholm’s
theory of action as expounded
in the
preceding section, with the concept
of undertaking tucked
safely away
and immune to all further
questioning.
Of course,

the refusal to engage in
further discussion of the

concept of undertaking constitutes
a sort of pretense on my
part.
For,

If this concept is suspect,

then so are all the definitions
and

theorems that Chisholm has given
us in his theory of action,
since
the concept of undertaking
plays a role in all of these.

Neverthe-

less, it is worth suppressing
suspicions concerning this concept in

order to unearth any further merits
or demerits of these definitions
and theorems.

Indeed, this is the course that

I

shall pursue in

general throughout this section: if
the analysis of a concept has been
found to be suspect, all suspicions
concerning it will be suppressed

when moving on to a consideration of
the next concept.
this method of pretense is, of course,

The point of

to try as far as possible to

distill all that is insightful as well as all
that is misleading from

Chisholm

s

theory of action

— in

short, to separate the wheat from the

chaf f
I

start, then, with assumptions A.III.l through A. III.

7.

The
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first three assumptions seem to me
innocuous, even given my lack of
a
clear understanding of the concept of
undertaking.
A. III. 4 and
A. III. 5 are,

I

think, controversial, but

I

would not know on what to

base a judgment as to their truth or
falsity.
be true.

As for A. III.

7,

A. III. 6

would seem to

shall leave this aside entirely, since

I

I

do not wish at this point to discuss
the concept of being directly
''^ithin

one’s power.
Wliat

of the concept of event-causal contribution?

1

think the

concept is familiar enough, although some comment
should be made con-

cerning Chisholm's brief characterization of it.
if an event

an event

r_

£ contributes causally
of which

£

Chisholm says that

to an event £, then there occurs

is a part and which is such that it is physical-

ly necessary that, if it occurs, then

£

occurs.

Now, Chisholm is

not alone in asserting this, 32 but it is questionable whether he is

right to assert it, and indeed he appears to make some remarks that
are inconsistent with this assertion.
that an event

£

At one point

Chisholm claims

may contribute causally to an event £, even if there

occurs no sufficient causal condition of £, provided that
tributes causally to an event
of £.

£,

£ which

£

con-

is a necessary causal condition

He has in mind the following sort of case.

It might be that

[Smith buys some balls], contributes causally to a necessary causal

condition £,

[there are balls available], of £,

hand]; and yet, if

condition of £.

£ occurs

[Jones hits a back-

freely, there occurs no sufficient causal

Nevertheless, Chisholm says, in such a case

contribute causally to £.

I

£

does

am inclined to deny this contention (but
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perhaps

a„ 3ln.ply Pherehy
appealing to a concept
slightly diifenent
from that to which
Chisholm appeals).
I would rather say
that j,
"provides an opportunity" for
^’s occurrence in such a
case (and I
all not attempt here to
analyze the concept of the
provision of
opportunity) rather than that
£ contributes causally to
I

Even if

I

am right in this, however,

is still reason to doubt

contributes causally to

I

^ believe

that there

that it is necessarily the
case that, if

^

then there occurs an event
r which is a

sufficient causal condition of

^ and_ofjd^ ^

is a part

.

It is the

matter of £*s being a part of a
sufficient causal condition of
£,
rather than the matter of there
occurring a sufficient causal condition of £, that I find troublesome.
Perhaps the issue rests on the
proper analysis of the relevant
concept of a part.

But if, as seems

to be suggested by certain
remarks that he makes,

Chisholm considers

£

to be a part of

IS a conjunct,

£

just in case

£

is a conjunctive event of which

£

then, given his own characterization
of the conjunction

of states of affairs

(see A. 1. 5 in Chapter I)~according to
which a

conjunctive state of affairs occurs when and
only when all its conjuncts occur— the contention that, whenever
an event

causally to an event £, there occurs an event
ficient for

£

and of which

sider the following case.

£

is

[a

£

£

£ contributes

which is causally suf-

is a part, is certainly false.

Suppose

£

is

For con-

[Smith throws a baseball] and

window breaks], and suppose that
£ contributed causally to £.

But suppose also that Jones was standing next
to the window in ques-

tion and that he had it in his power to intercept the
ball in its
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flight towards the window,
but that he si„.ply
chose uot to do so.
Now. let us say that
occurred at t^ and
^ occurred at ^3. and that
Jones's interception, had
It taken place, would
have occurred at t
^
Then, even though
£ contributed causally to
it is not the case
that there occurred an
r. of which
was a part, and which
therefore
(given the above characterization
of the concept of a
part) occurred
at t^. such that it
was physically necessary
that, if r occurred.
then i would occur.
For Jones could have
intercepted the ball at
In which case the
window would not have broken
at ^3.
This implies'’
(and Chisholm accepts the
implication) that it was
physically possible, even given r's occurrence
at —
t
Tw
u
i
that Jones
should
intercept
the ball at t^ and hence
that the window should not
break at t
Yet.
.

.

to repeat,

the ball

since Jones did not intercept the
ball. Smith's throwing

^

contribute causally to the window's
breaking.

However,

despite the fact that Chisholm's brief
characterization of the concept of event-causal contribution
seems to be wanting for the reasons Just given. It Is. as
I

I

have said, a familiar enough concept
and

shall not question the propriety
of Chisholm's employment of It.
Let us now turn to a consideration
of D.III.l, in which

Chxsholm analyzes the concept of an action.

First, a rough distinc-

tion should be made, one which Chisholm
appears not to make.

It

should be noted that the term "action"
is ambiguous in English— a fact

which has seldom been appreciated by
action-theorists.

In English we

use the word "action" to designate that which
is done or brought

about, but we also use it to designate the process
of doing or bring-
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Ing about somethlug.

shall call that which is brought
about a

I

deed, and that which Is the
bringing about of a deed a doing

An

.

example of a doing is my raising
my hand; what is brought
about in
this case, i^, the deed, is
my hand's rising.
Now, bearing this
rough distinction between doings
and deeds in mind, we should
ask
what concept it is, the concept of
a doing or the concept of
a deed,
that Chisholm tries to analyze by
means of D.lII.l.

almost certainly the former.

i

think it is

Be that as it may, D.IlI.l
is seriously

defective, for the reason that Chisholm
himself gives when he proposes A. 1.5; a conjunctive state of
affairs occurs when and only when
all Its conjuncts occur.
[1 undertakes

,

£

Now suppose that, for some effect

does not occur when

r

of

undertakes £] occurs; then,

according to A. 1.5, there occurs no conjunctive
state of affairs
[

[^ undertakes

c[]

and ^]

.

It would seem,

then,

that according to

D.lII.l, if an action occurs at all, it occurs
only while an undertaking occurs.

But this is surely a consequence unanticipated
and

unintended by Chisholm.
If we overlook this problem with D.lII.l,
another strange fea-

ture of it emerges, and that is that it is clearly
supposed by Chis-

holm to be the case that one's actions
ly.

(

i.e

,

doings) last indefinite-

For there are indefinitely many events to which an undertaking

may contribute causally.

But surely our common understanding of the

concept of a doing, rough as it may be, is such that we regard a

doing as an event which, when it occurs, has both a definite beginning
and a definite end.

For instance, if

I

raise my hand and then let it
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drop, then my raising my
hand has •:>ui.t;a.y
surely ceased r,.
to occur.
But Chisholm, apparently, would
disagree
Siee.
Now It ado not wish
Now,
to deny that it

...

is possible that
certain actions

(i^,

doings) should continue
to
occur perhaps long after
the agent himself has
departed from this
world -on this point see
Section 5 of the next
chapter.
But I do deny
that one must wait until
it has been established
that an undertaking
has ceased to have causal
consequences (can this ever be
established?)
before it may properly be
said that an action (i^,
a doing) has
ceased to occur— a claim which
Chisholm apparently wishes to
make.

Moving on to D.III.2, we find
that this definition is also
defective.
First, note that the definiens
appeals to the concept of
consideration at a time rather than
to the concept of consideration
s impliciter

.

Once again, Chisholm's inconsistent
treatment of tense

IS in evidence;

but, as mentioned above, this
point seems not to be

that important in the present
context.
ly,

Secondly, and more important-

note that there is an explicit
time-reference in the definiens as

Chisholm presents it which is only implicit
in its abbreviated translation.

To make this reference explicit the
translation should read:

top =df.

tG[Up] & ~tUp.

But it seems to me a mistake to stipulate

that the time of consideration be identical
with the time of omission.

Surely the failure to undertake
£, if it is to count as the deliberate omission to undertake
£, should be subsequent to any consideration
of £.

For undertaking, or the omission to undertake, if
deliberate,

must await the outcome of deliberation; it cannot occur at
a time when
the deliberation is still ongoing and Incomplete.

To account for
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this,
^

tha definition might be
modified to read:

fCIUpJ)

tive;

. -tup.

S

the deflniens could be
true and the definlendum
false.

falls to undertake

at

£

t

case we would surely not accuse
take

(dt')(f

£

at

<

at

j,

t

'

is earlier than t,

,

because he Is dead at
S of

Consld er

t;

in such a

deliberately omitting to under-

_t.

If Chisholm were to Insist
on sticking with D.III.2 in
Its

original form, another problem
becomes apparent.
[Smith runs on Tuesday) and
suppose that at

Tuesday) Smith considers undertaking

t

Suppose £ is

(which Is earlier than

but does not yet undertake It,

£

even though he In fact does later
undertake to run on Tuesday and,

when Tuesday arrives, does run.
ately omit to undertake

£

Certainly Smith does not deliber-

on Tuesday, and It seems very odd to
ac-

cuse him of doing so at £.

But according to D.II1.2, such an
accusa-

tlon is warranted.
It seems to me that Chisholm fails
to take due note of an

expression which he himself employs:
omission which is committed

.

a

deliberate ommission is an

But surely consideration of the under-

taking of a state of affairs is not sufficient
to transform a mere

failure to undertake it into the commission of
an omission to undertake it.

D.III.2.
(where ~p

I

:

suggest that what Chisholm should have said is:
Op =df.

t

But. If rendered thus,
It would clearly be
defec-

a case where S considers
undertaking

and

tOp =df.

U[~p],

signifies the negation of £)

.

Here the commission of an

omission is clearly seen, since there is something that

S

undertakes.
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(Possibly the .osl appropriate
deflnlens Is one of the
uf'IUpJ]; (at'Hf < t i t'Gp)
. tut~p]; (at'Ht'
< t &

t'cfupj) s

or one of several other
alternatives.

Perhaps also, to eliminate the possibility
of an Irrational person's
nndertahin, both
^ and
the negation of
the deflnlens should read:
U(~p| & -Up, or some
variation on this.
But I shall not enter into
these matters here.)

There are two basic parts to
D.III.

does something at

t

^

,

the definition of "S

which contributes causally to

two disjuncts in the definiens.
["[S undertakes

3

these are

tL

With regard to the first
disjunct

at t] contributes causally
to £”)

I shall only
point out that it reads as if a
proposition, and not an event, con-

tributes causally to a state of
affairs, and this is clearly contrary
to Chisholm's Intention.

thing like

(Presumably, Chisholm wants to say
some-

undertakes

contributes causally at

^

to

al-

though there are problems with this
also in that (1) Chisholm has not

provided any analysis of the concept
of event-causal contribution at
a time,

and (2) relativizlng event-causal
contribution to just one

time IS in fact inadequate.
(

is

_S

deliberately omits
£ at
[S

With regard to the second disjunct,
_t

deliberately omits £]"),

for event-causal contribution.

and
I

£

is that state of affairs which

must say that

I

For, on Chisholm's analysis of the

concept of deliberate omission, the disjunct
"Oq
expanded, reads "G[UqJ

&

find in it no role

& p =

[Oq]," when

~Uq & p = [C[Uq] & [-Uq]]"; and on my defi-

nition it reads, when expanded, "U[-q]

& p =

[U[~q]]."

In neither

case is there any mention of event-causal contribution;
and yet the
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defi„ie„Cu„, reads: -S does

seething

at

^

which conttlbutes

to

suspect that Chlsholt, includes
the second disjunct in
the
deflniens of D.III.3 staply
because he wants to be able
to say that
[
p] implies [A(Op]J.
For he makes the following
contention (although
this was not mentioned In
the preceding section):
when "Sp" is defined as in D.III.3, it follows
from D.III.4 that S contributes
causally to his own deliberate
omissions and their results.
There
are two claims here: first,
that [Op] implies [A[Op]J,
and, second,
I

that,

for

anyn, [C[Op],q] topUes

(Aq).

To take the first claim

first: Chisholm's definitions
do not in fact Justify his
saying this.
It

is true that,

according to D.III.3,

(Op)

Implies [S[Op]J and that,

according to D.III.4, [S[OpJ] implies
[A[S[Op]]J; nevertheless, these

definitions do not permit the Inference
of [A[Op]) from [Op].
ever, If "Op" were defined as
be the case that [Op]

nltion.

Op

I

How-

suggest In D. III. 2. a, then It would

implies [A[OpJ].

For, according to that defl-

means the same as "U[~p]'' and, according to
D.III.4,

[U[~pJ] implies [A[U[~p]]].

With regard to the second claim (that [C[Op],q]
implies
[Aq]),

again this does not follow formally from any of the
assump-

tions or definitions so far provided.
on the general principle that

[[Ap]

&

The claim would seem to rely
[Cp,q]j Implies [Aq].

Chisholm

in fact endorses this principle in an earlier publication,^^
although

he does not explicitly do so in Person and Object

obviously

operative in

D. Ill, 13.)

.

(However, it is

Nevertheless, even this principle
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(which is certainly not a theorem
of the system) does
not sanction the

inference Chisholm makes.

We may accept the principle
that [Cp,q]

implies [Tp], and hence we may
accept that [C[Op],q] implies
[Op].
Therefore, [C[Op],q] implies [[Op]
&

[C [Op

.

]

,

q

]

]

^9

[A[Op]]

ollowed from [Op], then we would
be able to say that [[Op]
q]]

implies [[A[Op]]

&

&

[C[Op],

[C[Op],q]] and thus implies,
according to the

general principle provided at the
beginning of this paragraph,
But we have just seen that

[Aq].

[A[Op]] does not follow from [Op]
ac-

cording to any assumptions and definitions
with which Chisholm has

provided us.
I

have already made mention of the anomalous
nature of

D.II1.4, but there are other problems with
it also.

D. 111.4 fails to

fulfill one of its primary objectives, namely,
the sanctioning of the

principle that from [Ap] one may derive [A[Ap]].

Chisholm clearly

subscribes to this principle (witness his reply to
the objection
raised immediately following the presentation of T.III.5)
and he

clearly does so, as

1

have mentioned, in order to salvage the notion

of moral responsibility.

tioning this principle.

And yet D.1II.4 does nothing toward sanc-

Now Chisholm obviously believes that agent-

causal contribution is transitive, although this does not follow

from D.III.4.

But let us suppose that the transitivity of this re-

lation were a theorem of the system.

Then it is indeed true, given

such transitivity and also clause (i) of D. 111.4 (whereby [Sp]

implies [Ap]) and, in addition, clause (ill) of D.III.4 (whereby [Sp]
implies [A[Sp]]), that [Sp] implies [A[Ap]].

But since [Ap] does not
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imply [Sp], this is still
of no help,
F
(11) of D.III.4,

it
-LL is
J.S also true,
trup

given clause

that [Up] implies [A[Up]];
but again, since [Up]

does not imply [Ap],
,bis too is of no help.

It seems to me that

Chisholm should have stuck
closer to the program of his
earlier
publications in which he presents
the analysis of the concept
of
agent-causal contribution as in D.III.4.
a above and in which he
adds
as an assumption that

[Mp,q] implies

[M[Mp ,q] ,q]

This, combined

.

with the assumption (Chisholm
does not claim it to be a
theorem in
earlier publications, as he does in
Person and Object with T.III.l)
that [Mp,q] implies that

£ occurs, automatically yields

equivalence of [Mp,q] and [M[Mp,q],q].

This would,

I

the strict

think, have

yielded at least some of the results that
Chisholm seeks in Person
_a

nd Object in a far less complex and
unsatisfactory manner.
I

Ap

have no quarrel with Chisholm's rejection
of "Up

Up,

a

and "Up-

J

U[Up]" as theorems.

be quite correct in this regard.
A. III. 8,

however,

I

do question.

Nor do

I

Tp,"

His comments seem to

find D.III.5 objectionable,

It seems to me that in this assump-

tion Chisholm confuses the concepts of agent-causal
contribution and

agent-provision of opportunity just as he elsewhere confuses
(as was
mentioned above) the concepts of event-causal contribution and
eventprovision of opportunity.

But once again,

I

shall not attempt here

to give a fuller

account of the concept of the provision of oppor-

tunity (although

I

shall do so later

Chisholm

s

remark, that the lower-case schematic letters in

— see

D.VI.17).

the assumptions, definitions and theorems so far formulated are to be
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replaced by expressions designating
actions, is puzzling.

suspect
that he makes this claim at least
partly in response to a comment
I

made by Annette Baler, on an earlier
paper of his, to the effect that
he has failed to note chat the
proper objects of one's Intentions
are

limited to one's actions.

Baler's contention, however, is,

false, and Chisholm's capitulation
ill-advised.^^

think,

I

Ue have already

noted that Chisholm seems to use the term
"action" to designate
doings; at least, he seems to use the term
in this way in D.IlI.l.

Moreover, the examples that he gives when
discussing the present point
(

His raising his arm," "His stealing the money,"
and "His breaking

his promise") do indeed appear to be phrases
that designate doings.
But Chisholm is surely wrong if he is to be
understood to say that the

schematic letters that he has been employing are to be
replaced in
every instance by expressions that designate doings.

For, according

to his own analysis, a doing is a conjunctive state of
affairs of

which an undertaking is of necessity a conjunct.
were to claim (and
so)

then

1

see no reason why he would not be prepared to do

that, necessarily, if

^

Now, if Chisholm

^ undertakes

and

p

is a conjunct of p,

undertakes p; and if he insists that, necessarily, if

takes p, then

p

is a doing;

implies [(gq) U[Uq]].

implies [U[Up]], and

S

under-

then he is committed to the view that [Up]

Now, he has already denied the claim that
1

[Up]

do not. think that he would find the nev/ly-

noted implication of his views any more palatable than this claim.

Moreover, Chisholm's analysis of the concept of an action would seem
to be self-defeating if

the range of the "p" in D.IIl.l were to be
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understood to be linii
tpH t-p
limited
to actions.

I

think that what Chisholm

should have said in this
context Is that the lowet-case
schematic
letters so far used are to be
replaced by expressions
designating
dSSds or, more accurately, either
deeds or would-be deeds.
But an
adequate understanding of this
point must await the more
detailed
discussion in the next chapter
concerning the distinction
between
doings and deeds.
It is difficult

to evaluate

D.ln.6.

First, a minor point: as

before with D.III.3, clause (ii)
of the deflnlens of D.III.6
seems to
require (despite Chisholm's use of the
term "event") that a proposition contribute causally to an
event, and this again Is clearly
contrary to Chisholm's intention.
Secondly, another minor point: the
"also" in clause (11) of the deflnlens
seems to imply that not only is
[C[Ap],q] true if [Rp,q] is, but that
[C[Ap),p] is true whenever [Ap]
IS.

But this is false, even according to
Chisholm, and hence is not

to be Inferred from his use of
"also."

(It would seem best in fact

simply to strike "also" altogether from
the deflnlens.)

Thirdly, and

more importantly, it is unclear why Chisholm
thinks that D.I1I.6 concerns a relation "fundamental to the theory
of agency"; for the de-

finiendum bears no great resemblance to any normal
statement concerning that

by -relation with which most action-theorists appear
to con-

cern themselves (if they concern themselves with it at all).

The

re lation that is usually discussed by such philosophers
is expressible
in a phrase of the form "By

doings replace the blanks.

ing,

S

s," where verbs expressing

But Chisholm appeals instead to the
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concept of agent-causal
contribution, rather than
to the concept
of
oing or acting, and
it has already been
remarked that in earlier

publications he says that to
do or to act is to
undertake a state of
affairs; nowhere does he
say that to do or to
act is to contribute
i-H-Uz to a state of affairs. But let ns for
the moment suppose
that in

Persojz^ni^^y^ Chisholm

in fact does tacitly
accept the

that to do or to act is
to contribute causally
to a state of

affairs; how does D.I1I.6 fare nn ^h-!o o
tare on this supposition?
•

to determine.

but also (Aq]

This is difficult

Note that, in order for (Rp„)
to imply not Just [Ap]
(as is clearly desirable),

lC[Ap],qJ] implies [Aq] must be
true.^'^
the system.

.

Moreover, if, as

the principle that

[(Ap) i

But this is not a theorem
of

have argued above, Chisholm's
use of

I

the concept of agent-causal
contribution is objectionable, it
is not

easy to assess the truth of
D.III.6.
an agent does something

causes

cj

to occur?

^

Should we assert that, whenever

by doing something
£, then his doing

£

Any adequate answer to this
question would have

to rely on an acceptable
analysis of the concept of doing something.

But Chisholm has not provided
such an analysis.

Turning now to D.III.7, we may note
once again that Chisholm's

analysis appears wanting.

This is a difficult matter, but if we are

to understand the definiendum
in what seems to be the intuitive way,

then the deflniens is inadequate.

one undertakes £] and

^

wants

demonstration); and suppose that
pose of bringing about £.

Consider the case where

to occur

^

is

[some-

(perhaps for purposes of

himself undertakes £ for the pur-

It certainly seems that in such a case S
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does not undertake to brino
o

about that his undertaking

£ should

£ause £ to occur; and so there
seemc: to u
seems
be no justification for
assertlng that In such a case
[U[p i [C[UpJ,q],]

[Pp.ql

Itself is true.

le

true, even though

Perhaps, however, for his
own purposes, Chis-

hol. can .ake do with D.I1I.7
as a merely stlpulatlve
definition.

If

this is so, he would have been
better advised to state
explicitly that
this was his intention.
A. 111. 9 seems

to be innocuous;

it serves simply to fill
out

Chisholm's characterization (given by
means of A.III.l through
A.III.7) of the concept of undertaking.

Also, it seems to me correct

that

[Pp,q]

implies neither that

£

occurs nor that

£

occurs.

Final-

ly, Chisholm's rejection of D. III.
7. a would also seem correct.

D.III.8, the definition of

contributes causally to

the purpose of bringing about £,"
is very complex, and

why It should be so.

I

£

for

am not sure

It seems to me that from Chisholm's
point of

view the following would suffice:
jX Ill.S.a:

Qp,q =df.

(ar)(Pr,q & C[Ur],p).

But T.III.5 seems to me correct.
I

have already commented on Chisholm's reply to the
objection

which Immediately follows T.III.5 and how it seems to me
that the
truth of

Ap

A[Ap]" does not follow formally from any of the as-

i

sumptions, definitions or theorems that he provides.

Nevertheless,

he is right in distinguishing this principle from the principle "Ap
^ (a 9 )Qq

,

[Ap

,

]

"

and he is right to reject the latter.

I

think, too,

that he is right in ascribing a confusion of these two principles to
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the objector.

Chisholm’s analysis in D.III.9
of the concept of
intending a
state of affairs as a
preliminary step towards
another state of affairs reflects his belief
that an event (in this
case an Instance of
agent-causal contribution, may be
the (event-)ef f ect of
another event
even when it (the former event)
is freely brought
about.
As recorded
above, 1 am inclined to think
that a distinction should
be made in
such a case between the concept
of causal contribution
and that of the

provision of opportunity.

But. again,

characterize the latter concept.

I

shall not attempt here to

As for D.III.IO, it seems that
this

definition is better suited to an
analysis of the concept of undertaking an attempt rather than an analysis
of the concept of making an
attempt.

In any case, keeping in mind
D. III. 8. a above,

I

think the

following would suit Chisholm's purpose
better than D.III.IO does:
(aq)(as')(at')(stQq,p

&

~(ar)(stQq,[r i

Of course, embedded in this definition
is Chisholm's notion of agent-

causal contribution, according to which
it is possible for a person
to

contribute causally to the free causal contributions
of himself and

Others
What of the six "observations" that follow D.III.IO?
first (that making an attempt to bring about
to bring about £>

plies [[~Kp]

Chisholm
he should

s

6i

seems to me correct.

£

does not imply failure

The second (that [Jr,p] im-

[(aq)(Kq & Pq,p)]]) does not follow formally from

definitions D.III.9 and D.III.IO, and
V\/ant

The

to assert

it.

I

am not sure why

The third (that attempts may be "half-
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hearted" or confident) seems
innocuous.

attempt at

to bring about

a later time t'

Tl,e

fourth (that making an

£ does not imply not making an attempt

to bring about

the negation of

fifth (that making an attempt at

undertaking a preliminary step at

t

J:

j,)

to bring about

towards

j,)

seems right.

£

seems to me to be

is stipulated in D.III.IO that if
S makes an attempt at

Chisholm

s

S

The

is compatible with

right, and yet it is ruled out by
Chisholm's own definitions.

about £ then

at

undertakes no preliminary steps at

t

t

For it

to bring

towards £.

Hence,

holding both to the assumption expressed
by the fifth ob-

servation and to D.III.IO is inconsistent.

Such Inconsistency would

not arise were he to suscribe to
D.III.IO. a instead of D.III.IO.

Finally,
re and

the sixth observation concerning the
distinction between

^

^

dlcto statements about making attempts seems
quite correct

to me.

We can now turn to a consideration of
Chisholm's attempt to

analyze the concept of intentional action.

I

think that Chisholm is

right to reject the simplistic definition D. III.
11, since it includes

inadvertent successes and happy failures in the class of
intentional
actions; but the remedy he adopts, which is that of stipulating
that

everything the agent undertakes in preparation for his action should
be successfully achieved,

is not the correct remedy.

particular suggest that D.III.ll.a is defective.

Two cases in

First, consider the

case where the would-be assassin aims to shoot his intended victim
right between the eyes, but his hand slips and he shoots his victim

straight through the heart instead, thereby killing him Instantly.

107

Surely It IS
counterintuitive to say
his action
unintentional, and
yet not everything
he undertook to do
was successfullv
esstuily aaccomplished.
ut, as long as we
agree to one point
nr, iI think
thinl. this
m
seeming counterexample can in fact be
ruled out.
out
Thn point is this:
The
whenever one
undertakes and makes an attempt
to kill a person
by shooting him
right
between the eyes, one also
undertakes
Lakes and al
also makes an attempt
to
kill him by shooting him.
(There
ere is
Is a general
„
principle operating
here that 1 shall not
attempt to formulate.)
if rhls is true, then
we
n^ay say that the
assassin intentionally
killed the victim by shooting
hi. but did not intentionally
kill the victim by
shooting him straight
through the heart.
The second main objection
to D.IIl.n.a has been
voiced by Michael Corrado.
who thinks the second
conjnnct of that
definition is inadequate.
.

•

•

,

He says:

This objection is,

I

think, more telling than the first
and in fact

points up a major defect in
Chisholm's analysis of the concept of in
tentional action.
Corrado's example is not fully explicit,
but per
haps the following will
serve to flesh it out sufficiently.
Suppose
the two things

my arm

s

I

undertake for the purpose of signalling are,
first,

rising and, second, my arm's being extended.

Suppose also
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™

each of chese events
occnts. hot only
fontnXtonsl,.
(,ot example ’
ettahfn,
at„.s tfsfn, an.
on.ettahfn,
a„.s hefns ex-

—
::r
s

--

Of „hfch

tfsfng not

f

hoth tafse „„

a™

at^'s being exten.e.

an. exten. ft.,

win

.efthet.,

then have been inten-

tionally brought
about (which In itself
serves
rves ds
as

•in.ll.a. Since, in this
example, nothing

a ff^

aa

counterexample to

is un.ertaben for
the sahe
f.ese two things) an.
therefore, it see.s
reasonable to say,
.y
signalling will also not
have been Intentional.
On at least one
count, therefore,
Chlshol.'s analysis of the
concept of intentional
action is wanting.
o

D. III. 12 IS a little
odd.

The concept of a basic
act or

basic action has been
analyse, in a variety of
ways by philosophers
since it was first
Introduced by Arthur Danto
sixteen years ago,^^
but it is usually
agreed that a basic action
is one which is
performed
without being perfor„,ed by
perforning some other action.
Since
Chisholm has already offered
an account of the
"by"-relatlon by means
of D.III.6, one would
have thought that he would
offer not D.III.12
but rather the following:

^

111.12.

:

Bp =df.

Ap & ~(aq)Rq,p.

For some reason, however,
Chisholm thinks that, whenever one
performs
basic action, one brings
about an event which one undertakes

directly,

which one undertakes without
undertaking some other
its sake.

He is, of course, at liberty
to stipulate that

this is how he proposes
to use the term "basic action,"
but the dis-
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parity between his use of
the term and the more normal
use of the term
should be noted.
Another point concerning D. III.
12 is the
following.

Chisholm has not ruled out
the possibility that one
undertake a state
of affairs for its
own sake.
Indeed, it would not have been
surprising had he explicitly
assumed that, for any state of affairs
£, [Up]
implies [Pp,p].

To be on the safe side, then, Chisholm
might have

done better (from his point of
view) to say the following:

D^II.12.b

:

Bp -df.

C[Up],p

&

-(3q)(p?^q & Pq,p).

Finally, D. III 13 seems unobjectionable,
as does the assump.

tion (A. III. 10) which follows it.

Note, however, the different uses

of the term "brings about" in
D. III. 12 and D. III. 13.

In D. III. 12

isholm appears to use this term as if it
were synonymous with "suc-

cessfully undertakes," and in

D. III. 13 he

appears to use it as if it

were synonymous with "contributes causally
to."

It seems,

then, that

even at the conclusion of the presentation of
his theory of action,

Chisholm is undecided as to just how to interpret that
key locution
brings about £."
In conclusion, how is Chisholm's theory of action to
be rated?
It may fairly be said that this theory constitutes
a valiant effort to

come to an understanding of certain concepts that loom large in many

areas of philosophy.

Indeed, by means of his theory Chisholm seeks

to resolve some intriguing puzzles,

the resolution of which would ap-

pear requisite for an adequate philosophical account of human ac—
tion.

47

But

of them here;

I

shall not discuss these puzzles or Chisholm's treatment
for it has been seen that many of Chisholm's proposed
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analyses of the concepts with which
he is concerned are
defective.
Moreover, his discnssion is so
laconic that it is often
difficult to
appreciate the reasons for certain of
his remarks, although, as I
suggested above, there is perhaps a
stronger structure to these remarks than at first appears.
In the next chapter I
shall attempt to
draw up a theory of human action of
my own.
I shall strive to retain
certain of Chisholm's insights, but
the theory will be quite
different
from his in many respects (although
it will, of course, be
predicated
on the Chisliolmlan premise that
actions, being events, are abstract

entities).

I

hope that the finished product will
be such that (1) it

avoids replicating the defective features
of Chisholm's account,
It avoids

Introducing fresh defects of its own,

(3)

(2)

it provides satis

factory resolutions of the prominent
problems of action-theory, and
(4)

its Internal structure will readily be
seen to be coherent.
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V

A THEORY OF HUMAN
ACTION

—

Problems to be Rpsn ived

The history of philosophy
is rife with accounts
of hu.an action. so.e of greater
.erit than others.
Pe„ are as detailed as
Chisholm's.
None that I know of both
matches Chisholm's for detail
and treats events as
abstract entitles. ^ Rather
than consider other
philosophers' accounts of human
action, therefore. I propose
to turn
in this chapter to an
account of human action of
my own. Given the
rough criteria presented at
the outset of the last
chapter, it will.
I think, prove
reasonable to c-dxx
call the
Liie account
acrn^n^ ot human
n
action that
follows a theory.^

Any adequate theory of action
must provide acceptable resolu
tlons of certain prominent problems
in so-called action-theory.

I

have in mind sixteen problems
in particular, and the main purpose
of
the theory that

1

shall propose (and, indeed, the
underlying motiva-

tion for all the twists and turns
that the theory will take, some of

which will inevitably appear baffling
at first) is the resolution of
these problems.

The problems may profitably be divided
into various

groups, and the manner in which

I

shall designate them will reflect

this fact.

The first group of problems concerns
the concept of action,
and the first problem (la) may be
posed by means of the following
115
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Illustration.

Suppose a friend of

in my likeness.
g

constructs a giant marionette

He then has me stand
next to the marionette,
which

s lifelessly by my
side but whose movements
he is ready to con-

trol from above.
I

n.l„e

The marionette and

I

then enact this little
scenario,

raise my arm; the marionette
raises his.

marionette.

I

sit down; so does the

stand up; the marionette
follows suit.

the next five minutes,
whatever action

cates.

I

I

In fact, for

perform the marionette dupli-

Why is it. then, that we are
Inclined to say that, whereas

I

have been acting (or performing
actions, or doing things) for
five
minutes, the marionette, strictly
speaking, has not? What distlnguishes my movements from his?

Another related problem (lb) is this.
let us hope)

Let us suppose (indeed,

that, while performing this
pantomime,

breathing regularly.

I

have been

Is this breathing an action of
mine?

If it is,

it is surely of a sort different
from the sort of actions involved in

my raising my arm, my sitting down,
my standing up, and so on.

But

where exactly does the difference lie?
The second group of problems concerns
the individuation of

actions.

First (2a), consider this case.

turns home.

He opens the front door and flips the
light-switch.

light goes on.

The room is illuminated.

alerted to the fact that Jones is home.^

perform after he opened his front door?
least four.

Late one evening Jones re-

Moreover, a burglar is

How many actions did Jones
Some say one; others say at

Is Jones's flipping the switch the same action
as his

turning on the light?

Is this

The

in turn the same action as his
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illuminating the toom?
alerting the burglar?

And is this, finally, the

sa„,e

action as his

How are we to adjudicate
this matter?

A related problem (2b)
concerns what may be called the
divisibility of actions.
Suppose Jones Is a new army
recruit.
The

sergeant-major calls the troops to
attention and orders all those who
have just joined up to take one
step forward.
Jones does so.
But,
in taking one step forward,
Jones also takes half a step
forward, a

quarter of a step forward, an eighth
of
ad infinitum

.

a

step forward, and so on

Has he then performed an infinite
number of actions?

In similar fashion there is a
problem (2c) concerning what

may be called the accuraulablllty of
actions.
a

walk In the park.

Suppose Jones is out for

During the walk he does many things; he
takes

many strides; he swings his arms; he whistles
a tune; he contemplates
the absurdity of existence.

tire walk,

But he takes just one walk.

Is the en-

then, a single action of his?

Another problem (2d) concerning the individuation of
actions
has to do with the distinction between actions
and their consequences.

What is this distinction?

The problem may be put in a particularly

striking manner by means of this puzzle.
shoots Smith.

Jones, bent on revenge,

Smith clings to life but succumbs some hours after the

shooting takes place.

Jones, then, has killed Smith.

death a part of Jones's action or a consequence of it?

Is Smith's
If a conse-

quence, then, following Hume, it is logically possible that Jones

kill Smith and Smith yet live.

But this is not logically possible.

Therefore Smith's death is part of Jones's action.

But how can it be
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part of Jones's action when
what Jones did took place hoars
before
Smith died?

Finally, there is a problem
(2e) concerning the distinction

between actions and circumstances.
turnal snacks in weird
places.
It.

Suppose Jones is partial to noc-

He makes some toast and then
butters

Not only that, he butters
it in the bathroom.

butters It in the bathroom
with the knife.
the bathroom with a knife
at midnight.'*

the buttering Is an action.

Moreover, he

Indeed, he butters It In

We may safely assume that

But are the manner (with a knife),
the

place (in the bathroom) and the time
(at midnight) parts or circum-

stances of Jones's action?

To what criterion may we appeal in order

to settle this issue?

The third group of problems concerns
the concept of inten-

tional action.
raised here.

There are two problems in particular that should
be
The first (3a) is simply this.

analysis of the concept of intentional action?

What is the correct
An acceptable analysis

of this concept is desirable for many reasons,
but in attempting to

give it we must beware falling into the trap (exposed
in the last
chapter) of thinking that to act intentionally is simply to
act in

such a way that one satisfies certain intentions that one has.

We

should also bear in mind what Chisholm says concerning "inadvertent

successes" and "happy failures."
The second problem (3b) may be posed by means of this per-

plexing puzzle.

Hamlet killed and, indeed, intentionally killed the

man behind the arras, and the man behind the arras was in fact
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Polonlus.

So Hamlet killed Polonius.

12 kill Polonius.

But Hamlet did not Intenelonal-

Surely, however, just one killing
occurred at the

time and place at which
Hamlet killed Polonius.

How can this killing

have been both intentional
and not intentional?
The fourth group of problems
concerns the ”by"-relation

There are three

mam

problems in this group.

The first (4a) is

simply that of accounting for
the fact that some actions are
such that
we perform them by performing
others, and other actions appear to
be
such that we "just perform" them.

For instance, if we consider again

the case of Jones's returning
home and alerting the burglar, we find

that Jones alerted the burglar by
illuminating the room, he illumin-

ated the room by turning on the light,
he turned on the light by

flipping the switch, and (let us suppose)
he flipped the switch by
raising his hand.

But it seems probable that he did not raise
his

hand by doing anything else.

In particular,

it seems that he did not

raise his hand by flexing his muscles, that he
did not flex his

muscles by causing certain neurons in them to fire, and
that he did
not cause certain neurons in his muscles to fire by
sending any

physiological "messages" from his brain.

He "just raised" his hand,

and this fact needs to be accounted for.

Another problem (4b) is closely related to the first.
as,

Where-

in the case just mentioned, Jones apparently did not raise his

hand by causing certain neurons to fire, it seems that such a "by"-

relation can exist at times between a hand— raising and a neuronfiring.

Suppose Jones wants to cause his neurons to fire and, in
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to do so, raises his
hand.

It

seems legitimate to say that, in

such a case, Jones
causes his neurons to fire

1^;

raising his hand (or,

equivalently, that Jones raises
his hand, thereby causing his neurons
to fire).

This fact must also be
accounted for.
third problem (4c) in this group
concerns accounting for

instances of the "by"-relation
when it holds between events which do
not occur simultaneously.
In the first problem (4a), there
is an

element of simultaneity involved
in all of Jones’s actions (if, indeed, he did more than one
thing), but such simultaneity is not
necessary for the ”by"-relation to
hold.
Consider the case where Jones

drives around the corner first by
signalling, then by braking, then
by changing gear, then by turning
the steering-wheel, and then by

accelerating out of the corner.

An adequate treatment of the "by"-

relation must also be able to account for such
a case.
The fifth group of problems concerns the concept
of omission.

There are two basic problems in this group.

The first (5a) has to do

with the distinction between omitting to do something and
merely not
doing it.
that

I

For instance, at the moment there are very many things

am not doing.

(I

walking on Fifth Avenue,

am not eating,
I

I

am not drinking,

I

am not sunbathing in the Bahamas,

propounding a disproof of Goldbach's conjecture, and so on.)
of these failures to act omissions of mine?

Which ones?

am not
am not

I

Are any

What is

their distinguishing characteristic?
The second problem (5b) results from the first.

It appears

plausible to say that the distinction between my omitting to do
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soniething and my merely not doing
It has something to do with my
In-

tentions at the time

I

do not do whatever It Is
that

I

fail to do.

Nevertheless, there Is a distinction
to be made between my omitting
to do something and my
Intentionally omitting to do something.
Wl,at
IS this distinction?

How Is It to be rendered consistent
with the

distinction sought in answer to problem
5a?
The sixth and final group of problems
concerns the concepts of

decision and choice.

In the present context these problems
are per-

haps not so pressing as those just mentioned;
but the fact that their

resolution will prove to follow fairly easily from
the theory of action shortly to be presented both warrants their
inclusion here and

adds to the attractiveness of the theory.

This theory, as will soon

be seen, relies heavily on the concepts of intending
and willing, but
in so doing allows for an account of the phenomena
of decision and

choice.

The main problems in this area are again two in number.

First (6a), what is the distinction between willing, deciding, and

choosing?

Second (6b), what is the distinction between a "short-range"

decision (or choice) and a "long-range" decision (or choice)?

Is

there, for Instance, any essential distinction to be determined be-

tween Smith's deciding to stand up now (and consequently

subsequently, doing so) and his idly deciding to watch

a

,

not just

show on tele-

vision later (and, perhaps, doing nothing as a consequence of this
decision)
There are, of course, more problems that might be posed here.
But sixteen suffice.

Moreover, the sixteen that have been posed
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appear to

to be those „.ost deserving
of attention.

Before any
direct atte.pt is undertaken
to resolve these problems,
however, two
quire treatment.
First, some new, unanalyzed
concepts must
be introduced; and
then a brief, rough sketch
should be given of the
theory of action that is
to follow so that this
theory may be more
easily understood and
appreciated when it is presented
in detail.

2.

New Concepts

The concepts introduced in
Chapter II, both analyzed and unanalyzed, will figure in the
theory that is to follow.
But, on their
own, they are not sufficient
for the presentation of this theory.

Three new, unanalyzed concepts must
be introduced.
The first of these new concepts
is that of causal contribution,
a

concept with which most of us are thoroughly
familiar.

We already

saw in the last chapter the extensive
use that Chisholm makes of this
concept, and my use of it will be no less
extensive.

But my use and

understanding of the concept differ somewhat from
Chisholm's.
of all,

I

First

assume that the relata of causal contribution are
and can

only be events; as

I

use the term "causal contribution," a person

cannot contribute causally to an event.

concept of causal contribution to times.

Secondly,

I

relativize the

Thirdly,

I

claim, in con-

trast with some (though also in accordance with some) of
Chisholm's

statements, that, whenever an event
event

there occurs an event

£ contributes causally

to another

which is causally sufficient for

But all of this should be made more precise

^
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think it is safe t„
,„ake the following
assumptions concetning the concept of
causal contribution:
I

Necessarily, if

^

contributes causally relative to
and p are events.

t

^ contributes causally relative to
and^t^^to^a’
h
then p occurs at
p and p occurs at t

t

—

3.»

then both

A. IV. 2;

A. IV. 3:

and^t^^^o^a’
—
CL>

len

p

causally relative to t
is earlier than or identical
with t'.

Each of these assumptions
should be self-explanatory and
each. I
think, is uncontroverslal-except
perhaps for A.IV.3, insofar as it
does not rule out the
possibility that a cause be
cotemporaneous with
some of its effects and
Insofar as it does rule out the
possibility

cause succeed some of its
effects.
my opinion correct.
Its effects is,

I

Nevertheless, A.IV.3 is in

That a cause may be cotemporaneous
with some of

believe, amply Illustrated by the
following ex-

amples:^ when a locomotive pulls
a caboose, the motion of the former

contributes causally to the motion
of the latter, even though they
move simultaneously; so too when
a hand moves a pencil, when a gust
of wind causes a leaf to flutter,
and so on.

Of course,

there are

innumerable examples also of a cause preceding
some of its effects,
as when my pressing the brake-pedal
contributes causally to the car's

stopping, when a child's eating contributes
causally to its having

tooth-decay, and so on.

And perhaps there are cases of causal con-

tribution where it is difficult to determine whether
or not a cause
precedes its effects.

But there are and can be,

I

believe, no in-

stances of a cause succeeding some of its effects, and A.IV.3
reflects this fact.
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A distinction should be draun
between the relation of
causal
contribution and that of
being-the-cause-of
Whatever is
cause
o£ an event contributes
causally to that event, though
not necessarily
:ii£a
Ae I use the ter™ "causal
contribution." a match’s being
struck ™ay contribute causally
to its lighting, but so
may the presence of oxygen, the dryness
of the match, and so on.
Presumably only
one of these (probably the
match's being struck) ranks as
cause
of the match's lighting.
It is Che relation of causal
contribution,
not the relation of being-the-cause-of,
with which I shall be concerned in what follows.
How to characterize the latter
relation is

^

.

„

a matter that

I

shall not pursue here.

One more significant assumption
should be made concerning the

concept of causal contribution, but
in order to present it we need
first of all the following definition:
D.IV.l:

is a sufficient causal condition
relative to ~
t and t'
~
c[ =df.
and ^ are events such that:
(i) £ occurs at t;
(ii) ^ is earlier than or identical
with t'; and
(iii) it is physically necessary, but
not metaphysically

£

of

necessary, that, if
at

£

occurs at t. then

t

(An alternative rendering of the definiendum
is:

ficient relative to

£

and

_t'

for £.

)

£

£ occurs

is causally suf-

We may now say

Necessarily, if £ contributes causally relative to t
and £ to £, then there are an event
£ and a time ~t*
~
such that:
(i) ^ is earlier than or identical with
£*; and
^ii) £ is a sufficient causal condition relative to
£* and £' of £.
This assumption expresses my opposition, mentioned above, to Chis-

holm

s

part-time characterization of the concept of causal contribu-
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tlon, where he allows for the
possibility of an event's
contributing

causally to the free action of a
person.
chapter, and as

I

As

I

said In the last

shall discuss more fully In the
final chapter,

1

think it best to distinguish here
between the concepts of causal

contribution and of the provision of
opportunity.

Once this dlstinc-

tion is made, A. IV. 4 may be safely
asserted.

The reason for relativizing causal
contribution to times is
that thereby a particularly troubing
problem is obviated.

This is a

problem which in fact besets Chisholm's own
non-time-relativized use
of the concept of causal contribution,
although

I

did not discuss

this point in the last chapter.

The problem may be posed by means

of the following illustration.^

Suppose Smith is ill on two occa-

sions,
_t^

and

_t^

and

_t

2

»

and suppose Brown is re-elected on two occasions,

Suppose also that Smith's illness at

causally to Brown's re-election at

>

_t^

contributes

but that there are no other

causal connections between these events.

In such a case the statement

[Smith is ill] contributes causally to [Brovm is reelected]

requires disambiguation.

On Chisholm's account of causal contribution

this may not be rendered as
[Smith is ill at

(2)

re-elected at

_t,]

contributes causally to [Brown is

^ 2 ^’

for this statement takes propositions, rather than events, as the

relata of causal contribution.

Chisholm explicitly denies the pos-

sibility of propositions* being the relata of causal contribution, as
do

I

by means of A.IV.l.

Moreover, neither
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(

3)

[Smith is ill]
is re-elected]

contributes causally at

[Smith is ill]
is re-elected]

contributes causally at t„ to [Brown
3

t

to

[Brown

nor

^

succeeds in capturing the required
disambiguation.

For the former

does not account for the fact that it
is Brown's re-election at
13
that is at issue, and the latter
does not account for the fact that
It IS Smith's illness at

_t^

that is at issue.

It is only by rela-

tivizing causal contribution to the times of
occurrence of each

relatum that this problem may be obviated.
The second concept to be introduced here is that
of intending.

Once again, this is a concept with which most of
us are thoroughly
familiar.

Examples of intending abound in everyday life, such as

when Brown intends to go to the supermarket, when Smith
intends that

Jones should be happy, and so on.
the term

intend

(and my use of it is,

a common use ot it),

action of his.

I

believe, in accordance with

it may but need not be the case that the object

of Intention is an action.

the supermarket,

It should be noted that, as I use

For instance. Brown may intend to go to

in which case the object of his intention is an

But Smith may Intend that Jones should be happy, in

which case the object of his intention is an event ([Jones is happy])
which is not an action.

(As I shall put it in much of what follows,

if Smith intends that Jones should be happy,

is happy].)

then Smith intends [Jones

To be sure, if Smith is rational, it may be that, for his

intention to be sincere, he must attempt to see to it that Jones is
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happy.

But that is a separate issue
and is one that

I

shall discuss

in a little more detail
in Section 10 below.

Moreover, it is not
even the case that the
objects of intention are of
necessity restricted to events, let
alone actions.
For Instance, I may
intend
that Smith's car should
be waiting in front of the
bank at 3 p.m.,
January 4, 1980, and here the
object of my intention is the
proposition [Smith's car is waiting
in front of the bank at
3 p.m., January
4,

1980].

Despite its familiarity, however,
the concept of intending
is
difficult to characterize in any
positive way.
It is far easier to
say what is not true of the
concept than to say what is true
of it.
But some of the non-implications
that may be attributed to it
are of

significance and should be recorded here.
that
(5)

(

6)

ri

one of the following statements is
true:

Necessarily, if
^ considers

^ intends £
£ at t H
’

,

~t

,

then, for some time

£

at t,

then, for some time

.

Necessarily, if ^ intends
Jt
^ accepts £ at jt

£

at

_t,

then, for some time

Necessarily, if ^ accepts
S intends
at t'.

£

at

_t,

then, for some time

Necessarily, if ^ intends
^ desires £ at _t

£

at

_t,

then, for some time

_t,

then, for some time

,

(8)

at

.

'

Necessarily, if S considers
^ intends £ at _t

_t

(7)

Accordingly, we should note

'

,

(9)

^

'

.

(

10 )

Necessarily, if ^ desires
intends £ at t'.

£

at

(

11 )

Necessarily, if
^ £ occurs at

£

at £, then,

,

intends

^
t

*

for some time
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(

12 )

Necessarily, if S intends
possible that £ occur.

£

at

then it is pliysically

t

(13)

Necessarily, if ^ intends
£ at t then it is metaphysically possible that
£ occuT!

(14)

Necessarily, if S intends
£ at £, then, for some time
^ accepts [it IS physically possible that
£ occur
at t
'

(15)

.

Necessarily, if S intends
£ at £, then, for some time
^ accepts [it IS metaphysically possible that
£
occur] at t
'

Other non-implications concerning
the concept of intending
could of
course be cited, but the foregoing
are perhaps the most significant.
Nevertheless, some implications may
truthfully be attributed to this
concept

of which the following are
perhaps the most significant:

A.IV.5:

Necessarily, if S Intends
£ at t and S is rational, then
^ accepts that, for some time _t' not earlier than t
— £
niay well occur at t’
.

Necessarily, if S intends
£ at
It IS physically possible that

t

£

and S is rational, then
occur.

But these assumptions are few in
number and present, besides, two

obvious problems.

The first problem is that they both invoke
the con

cept of rationality, an obscure concept
that

clarify here.
well

I

shall not seek to

The second problem is that in A. IV. 5 the
locution "may

IS employed.

How are we to interpret this?

venture a response here, although

I

Again,

I

shall not

think the locution has some intui

tive appeal.
It would be advantageous to be able to
determine the truth-

value of such statements as the following:
(^^)

Necessarily, if ^ intends
£ at
intends £ at _t] at t;

t,

then

S

accepts [^
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(17)

Necessarily. If

I
and suchlike.

s

intends

at

£

^

lnt:i;d1

However, although

I

statement and to reject the
latter.

a.„

I

t

and p entails „ and
S

is^atlonal.^h^n

Inclined to accept the former
am not prepared to state
posi-

tively that the former is true
and the latter false.
me that the best thing to
do here Is to back off and
to acknowledge
the fact that the concept of
Intending, despite Its familiarity.
Is

not crystal-clear.

We should not force the Issue,
for there will al-

ways be statements of the sort we
have been considering and
of whose
truth-value we are uncertain.
For Instance, consider the
following:
(18)

If S accepts [It is
metaphysically necessary that £ occur] at _t and S is
rational, then S
—
intends £ at t.

Is this true or false?

I

do not know, and It seems to me
best to be

honest about the matter and to admit
one's ignorance.
there is.

1

After all.

think, no philosophical theory, concerning
any topic,

which can boast complete clarity on behalf
of all those unanalyzed
concepts employed in its foundation.
cept of intending is,

I

In the present case,

the con-

believe, unusually well-suited for the role it

is to play in the theory that is to
follow; for it is a common concept

and is readily, even if a little roughly,
understood
The third and final concept to be introduced here
is that of

willing.
here.

It

is unfortunate to have to introduce a third concept

It will be recalled that Chisholm calls upon only
two extra

concepts, those of causal contribution and undertaking, in the pre-

sentation of his theory of action.

But his use of the concept of
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undertaking was shown to be inappropriate,
and so
that concept must be found.

I

a

replacement for

believe that neither the concept
of

intending nor the concept of willing will
suffice on its own as a
replacement for the concept of undertaking,
but that they, together

with the other concepts already discussed,
are indeed jointly sufficient for a satisfactory account of action.

This sacrifice of con-

ceptual simplicity, as compared to Chisholm's
approach, is,

I

think,

unavoidable.
The concept of willing is not so common as
that of intending.

Moreover, my use of this concept may differ a
little from that use to

which one is perhaps at first intuitively moved to
put it.
way to try to understand the concept of willing and

ray

to ally it with the more common concept of decision.

careful how we go about this.
in more detail later

I

But we must be

(see Section 9 below)

,

but at this point we

First, there is a distinction

to be drawn between two categories of decision-making,

tical decision.
I

use of it is

shall discuss the concept of decision

should take note of three main facts.

and the theoretical.

A good

If I decide to turn in early,

I

the practical

make a prac-

If I decide that capital punishment is unjustifiable,

make a theoretical decision.

It is with practical, and not with

theoretical, decision-making that the concept of willing is to be
allied.

Secondly, just as not every object of a practical decision

is an action,

action.

so too not every object of a willing or volition is an

For instance. Smith may decide that Jones should be seen by a

doctor, and he may vjill that his arm should rise, and neither [Jones
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is seen by a doctor]

nor [Smith'ss arm
rises]i is an action of Smith's.
•

(Actually, there is a sense
in which
'f Smith
q
ich, if
s volition is successful, the event [Smith's arm
risesl
^
r^isesj h
an
action of Smith's.
But this
point will be discussed more
fully
Section
where the distinction between the concepts of
a doing and a deed
is discussed.)
•

i

*

^
m

Thirdly, although every Instance
of willing is an instance
of practical decision-making, the reverse
is not true.
It is only when I
intend that my decision should be
causally effective in bringing
about
that state of affairs that I have
decided should occur, that my
decision Is a volition.
(This point has to do with the
distinction between "short-range" and "long-range"
decisions mentioned In problem
6b above

.

I

do not presume that there is any
necessary restriction on

the type of state of affairs which
may be the object of a volition;

but there is certainly such a restriction
operative under normal cir-

cumstances, where the agent has a reasonable
understanding and expectation of what it is he can and cannot do.
do

and

can

are in need of definition

(Of course,

— and

the terms

such definition will

be supplied in this chapter and in
Chapter VI, respectively— but

perhaps their use here is nevertheless helpful.)

Under normal cir-

cumstances, objects of volition are restricted to those
events which
the agent believes he can bring about.

(Under normal circumstances,

then, what an agent wills is a guide to or a measure of the
confi-

dence he has in his own ability.)
volition,

Furthermore, as

I

use the term

objects of volition are restricted, under normal circum-
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stances, to those events which
the agent believes he can
bring about
without having to bring about
any other events.
Examples are: Smith
wills that his arm should rise
( _i.e.
Smith wills [Smith's arm
rises]); Jones wills that his
right knee should bend ( i.e.
Jones
wills [Jones's right knee bends]);
Brown wills that his eyes should
move U-e.
Brown wills [Brown's eyes move]); and
so on.
,

,

,

There is a sense of "will" which may
be analyzed in terms of
that sense of "will" that

1

am using unanalyzed here, and which is

perhaps a slightly more Intuitive sense
of that term than the restric
tive sense that

I

employ here.

There are some things that we will

just for their own sake; but very often
we will things not just for
their own sake but also in order that
other events may come about.
For instance, Jones may will that his arm
should rise so that Smith

will recognize him and walk over to his side
of the street.
there is a sense of "will"

—a

Now,

sense which is perhaps slightly more

intuitive than the restrictive sense that

I

employ, but a sense which

is in fact simply an extension of the restrictive
sense that

ploy

I

em-

in which Jones in this case not only wills [Jones's
arm rises],

but also wills [Smith recognizes Jones], and even wills [Smith
walks

over to Jones

s

broad" sense.

side of the street].

Let us call this willing in the

We may then say:

broadly wills £ at t =df.
either
wills £ at
or
(il) there is an event
£ such that ^
the purpose of £.

^

(i)

v^7

ills

£

at

It would be helpful if a definition of the locution "S wills

for the purpose of £" were provided here, but unfortunately

for

t

£
1

at

t

am not
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In a position to provldo such
a definition.

For this definition

would require an account of the
concept of the provision of
opportunity, and I am not yet in a
position to give such an account.
Nevertheless, there is a limited use
of the notion of willing for
a
purpose which may be accounted for
here, and indeed accounting for
It
here will prove useful later on.

^

I

propose:

wills

£ at _t in order that £ may occur =df.
wills
^
£ at _t; and
(ii) ^ intends at
£ that, for some time _t
[s wills p]
should contribute causally relative
to t~and
(i)

'

,

—

to £.

—t'

It Should be stressed that this is a
purely stipulative definition.

The definiens is not intended to account for
every type of willing for
a purpose, but only for one type of such
willing.

We may also say,

in light of D.IV.3, the following:

D^T5£4:

£

p IV

£

.

.

.

directly wills

£

at

£

=df.

£

wills

£

at £.

indirectly wills £ at £ =df.
there is an event £
distinct from £ such that
wills
£
£ at £ in order that
£ may occur.

Some additional remarks may be made in order to characterize
the concept of willing further.

As with the concept of intending,

there are many non- implications that may be attributed to the concept
of willing, foremost among which are analogues to statements
(6)

through (15) above where "wills” replaces "intends."

But there are

also some significant implications that should be emphasized in this
context, and these are:
A. IV.

:

Necessarily, if

£

A. IV.

:

Necessarily, if

£ wills £

wills

£

at £, then
at £,

then

£

intends

£

at £.

£ considers £

at £.
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Necessarily, if s wills j, at t, then
S intends at t
that, for some time ^ very close
to t, (S wills
pT
should contribute causally relative
to
Ind t'

^

to

The locution "very close to" is
unfortunately vague, but it is difficult to see how it can be improved
upon.
It is, moreover, accurate.
(If

I

will my arm's rising,

I

mean for this to happen now.)

A. IV.

serves to distinguish willing from certain
other types of practical

decision-making.

If Smith now decides that Jones
should be seen by a

doctor, it is unlikely that he means for this
to happen now and it is

even more unlikely that he regards his decision
as causally effective
in bringing this about.

D.IV.3 and A. IV.

9

yield the following theorem:

Necessarily, ^ wills £ at _t if and only if
£ in order that £ may occur.

^ wills £

The following is also a theorem (yielded by D.IV.3 and
A. IV. 7):

T^_IV^:

Necessarily, if S wills £ at _t in order that
occur, then £ Intends £ at _t.

But neither of the following is a theorem, although

I

£ may

think it is

proper to assume their truth:
A. IV. 10:

Necessarily, if £ wills £ at _t in order that
occur, then £ intends
£ at jt.

A. IV. 11:

Necessarily, if £ wills £ at _t in order that £ may
occur, then £ intends at £ that, for some time t'
[£ wills £ in order that £ may occur] should contribute
causally relative to £ and £' to £.

£ may

,

Analogues to A. IV.
also,

I

5

and A. IV.

6

(where "wills” replaces "intends") may

think, be properly asserted, but at this stage it is best to

move from a characterization of the new concepts to a brief, rough

characterization of the theory of action that is to be based on these
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concepts

Sketch of the Theory

3.

Like many others,

I

take it that a person acts only if
he

brings about an event in some way.

Unlike some,

I

believe that an

analysis of this way of bringing
about an event can be and ought to be
gxven.

In fact,

I

shall distinguish six main types of bringing
about

an event, and part of the problem
will be in deciding which types

constitute acting and which not.
It will come as no surprise that the
analysis that I shall pre-

sent of that type of bringing about an
event which constitutes genuine

acting IS a volitional one.
acts, one wills an event

£

Specifically,

I

and one's willing

contend that whenever one

^

causes some event

(either identical with or distinct from
£> to occur.

£

The distinction

between the various types of bringing about an event will
rest on a

distinction between the various restrictions to be placed on what
type
of event

£ may

be.

Formulating these restrictions proves to be

a

complicated matter, but there is no skirting it.
Once the main types of bringing about an event have been

treated and the concept of acting analyzed, the next task is to attempt to Individuate actions.

must be acknowledged.
chapter, where

I

Here the ambiguity of the term "action"

This is a matter that

raised in the last

briefly distinguished the concept of a doing from

that of a deed, and it is a m^itter that

below.

I

I

shall discuss more fully

Once the distinction has been made, the task of providing a
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criterion for the individuation
of actions Is fairly
easily handled.
Ihe result is an account
of actions as being
finely-grained entitles,
«hlch is of course In keeping
with the foregoing account
of events;
for every action is an event.

“

This criterion of
individuation

n,ay

appear at first to multiply in an
unacceptable „ay the number
of actions that may properly be said
to take place, but „e shall
see that

this is not in fact so.

There will be seen to be several
ways of intentionally bringing about an event, corresponding
to the several ways distinguished

earlier of bringing about an event.

My treatment of intentional ac-

tion will concern itself with
accounting for these various modes of

intentionally bringing about an event, and
in the course of my investigation

I

shall take into consideration certain
attempts made re-

cently by other philosophers to provide
such an account.

For the

topic of intentional action is not only
important but has also been
in recent years the focus of
considerable attention.

The various ways of bringing about an event
give rise to an

even larger number of ways of bringing about one
event by bringing
about another.

1

shall concentrate on only some of these ways, how-

ever, for there is no need to account explicitly for
all of them.

My discussion of this issue will also Include a treatment
of what has
come to be known as basic action; for this latter issue is an
important and topical one and its treatment is directly dependent on
an

acceptable account of the ”by"-relation.
The matters of analyzing the concept of omission and analyzing
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the concepts of decision
and choice are obviously
important, al-

though neither has received
much attention in recent years.
Of
course, the use of these
concepts has always been and
continues to be

widespread-all the more reason to
attempt

to provide analyses of

them.

During the course of the
presentation of the theory that is to

follow attempts will of course
be made to give, at each stage, acceptable resolutions of the
problems posed earlier.
But the theory
IS intended not simply
to provide acceptable analyses of the
key con-

cepts of action-theory and thereby
to resolve the problems that have

been posed; it is intended also
to present these analyses and to resolve these problems in such a way
that the concepts concerned may be
put to profitable use in areas of philosophy
other than hardcore

action-theory.

(I

have in mind ethics in particular.)

But the ques-

tion of v/hether or not the theory succeeds
in realizing this inten-

tion is one that

I

must leave entirely to one side.

4.

Bringing About an Event

Actions come in many shapes and sizes.

Smith may perform an

action by (a) raising his hand, bending his knee, extending his arm,
signalling, saluting, kicking himself, cursing, concentrating on a
problem, reaching a conclusion; or he may perform an action by

(b)

shooting Jones, killing Jones, frightening Jones, pleasing Jones,
even by scaring himself; or he may perform an action by

(c)

crossing

the road, hitting a forehand, singing a song, playing a piano solo.

138

cooking

n

a prayer.

dinner, multiplying 928 by
254, giving

n

speech, or saying

Of course. Smith may perform
an action by doing all sorts

of other things as
well, but this list should
give a good idea of the

variety of things that he may
do.

The reason for grouping these

examples into three separate
groups will be discussed later.
I

said in the last section that
all action is volitional.

H.A. Prichard says that
acting consists simply in willing
something.

That is, in the vernacular of
the present enterprise, his
contention
is

^

acts at

_t

=df.

there is an event

£ such

that

S

wills

(Perhaps "broadly wills," as defined
in D.IV.2, should replace "wills"
in the definiens of D.1V.6, but
this is a minor point that need not be

pursued here.)

But this is surely counterintuitive.

wxlls an event but

liis

willing has no effect?

What if a person

Surely we are inclined

to say that in such a case the person
has failed to act.

For in-

stance, suppose Jones has been in a serious
car accident and, as a

consequence, is paralyzed from the neck down.

He retains conscious-

ness in his hospital bed, lifts his head, and
sees that no one is

with him.

Noticing a button marked "Nurse," and ignorant of his
con-

dition, he attempts to lift his arm and to summon the
nurse by pressing the button.

Nothing overtly physical happens, of course.

But

suppose also that nothing at all happens as a result of Jones's
volition that his arm should rise.

Surely we are inclined to say that

Jones has failed to act, despite his attempt, and that this is so

precisely because there is nothing that he has brought about.
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u

seems, then, that a person acts
only if he brings abont

some event and that he brings
about an event only if a
volition of his
has some effect.
This contention is of course not
proved merely by
virtue of the foregoing ease;
nevertheless, 1 am at this point
prepared to assert it and to make
it more precise by means of
the following two statements:
A. IV. 12

Necessarily, s brings about
£ relative to t and
ir there is an event
^ such that:
(i) ^ wills
£ at _t; and
(11) [S wills q] contributes causally
relative
to £.

_t

A. IV. 13:

~t'

only

to —
t and

Necessarily, S acts relative to t and
t' only if there
IS an event
£ such that ^ brings about £ relative to —t
and t
.

(Note that the times to which the bringing
about and the acting are

relative in these assumptions are the times
to which the causal contribution at issue is relative.)

The question that now confronts us

Is whether or not all we need do
to capture the concept of action
IS to elevate these two assumptions
to the status of definitions by

deleting "Necessarily" and replacing "only if" with
"=df." in each
case
In order to answer this question we must digress
for a moment

and take note of the ambiguity of the term "action."

I

made brief

mention of this ambiguity in the last chapter when discussing Chisholm's characterization of the concept of an action in D.III.l.

I

said there that we must distinguish between the concept of a doing and
the concept of a deed and that the term "action" is commonly used to

express both concepts.

Now,

I

propose to use the term "doing" to
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designate that type of bringing
about of an event which
constitutes a
genuine instance of acting and
to use the tern, "deed"
to designate
that which Is brought about
when the bringing about
constitutes a
genuine Instance of acting. The
fact that the term "action"
Is ambiguous has seldom been appreciated
by action-theorists
In fact.
.

Prichard goes so far as explicitly
to deny that there Is
any such
ambiguity,
but I think that he is plainly
wrong to do so.
(In
fact.

In English many terms are
ambiguous in this way.

This sort of

ambiguity Infects, for instance,
the terms "lntentlon"-which
may
designate the process or the object of
Intention— "hope ," "fear,"
belief," and so on.)

We may Introduce here a piece of
suggestive

terminology and say that to every doing
there Is a deed "Internal" to
.

It.

24

That is, in general: an agent

S

brings about an event

£

in such

a way that the bringing about
is an instance of genuine acting
on

part If and only if ^'s bringing about
the deed internal to this doing.

ality abound.
about his arm

£

is a doing of ^'s and

£

s

is

Examples of this relation of intern-

For instance, if Smith raises his arm then
he brings
s

rising; and so, the deed [Smith's arm rises] is
in-

ternal to the doing [Smith raises his arm].

Similarly,

[Smith's

knee bends] is internal to [Smith bends his
knee], and so on.

points in particular should be noted here.
that deed Internal to it.

Four

First, a doing entails

Secondly, it is not being contended that an

event which is a deed on one occasion is a deed whenever
it occurs;
it is a deed only when it is brought about
by a person

is an event which is not a deed.

— otherwise

it

On the other hand, a doing is always
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a doing.

Thirdly, a corollary (perhaps
not yet an obvlons
one) of
this treatment of action
Is that "Smith raises
his arm" and "Smith
brings about [Smith's arm
rises]" express the same
event; so too with
"Smith bends his knee" and
"Smith brings about [Smith's
knee bends]";
and so on. 25 Fourthly,
It happens that in English
there is often a
phrase available to express a
doing when none Is available
to express
that deed internal to the
doing.
Donald Davidson, for instance,
worries about finding phrases to
express those deeds internal
to the

doings expressed by "He walked to
the corner," "He carved the
roast,"
and "He fell down."

He says:

My problem isn't that

can't imagine that there is some
“ke happen,
buftbarr”®"'
but that I see no way automatically
to produce the right
ascription from the original sentence.
No doubt each time
a man walks to the corner there
is some way he makes his body
I

way he makes his body move every
time he walks to the corner. 26
I

sympathize with Davidson's worries,

his final remark is irrelevant.

True,

but it should be noted that

there is no one way in which

a person's body moves every time
he walks to the corner, but there is

also no one way in which a person's arm
moves every time he raises his
arm.

This point, then, has no bearing on the
availability or un-

availability of appropriate phrases in English to
express deeds internal to doings.

The main point to be made here is, of course, that

the availability or unavailability of such phrases
is a purely con-

tingent linguistic fact which itself has no bearing on the
ontological

structure of a doing.
the carving of a roast,

A doing, a piece or episode of acting, such as
is in fact the bringing about of an event in a
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certain way, even if there is no
phrase available in English
to express that event.
I

shall give a precise analysis
of the concepts of a doing

and a deed In the next section
once a precise analysis of the
concept of acting has been given,
but perhaps the distinction
between
these concepts may be adequately
understood for present purposes from
the foregoing remarks.
The point of this brief digression
has been
Co put us in a position to
evaluate the suggestion that A. IV.
12 and
A. IV. 13 be elevated

to the status of definitions.

Such elevation

results in the following:
brings about ^ unrestrictedly relative
to ^
~ and
there is an event
^ such that:
(i) ^ wills
and
^ at
(ii)
wills
contributes causally relative to
and _t* to

-df.

acts relative to _t and
such that ^ brings about
_t
and _t
_S

'

_t'

£

=df.

~t'
~t

there is an event

£

unrestrictedly relative to

.

There can be no quarrel with D.IV.7, for it is a
purely stipulative

definition.

(I

use the term "unrestrictedly" to differentiate that

type of bringing about analyzed in D.IV.7 from other
types discussed

below.)

But D.IV.8 constitutes an attempt to capture as precisely
as

possible our common concept of what it is to act, and it surely fails.
For it is much too liberal.

Suppose that

^

wills some event

that his so willing causes some totally "unrelated" event
and no

related" event to occur.

£

£

and

to occur

For Instance, suppose that Jones

wills his arm's rising and that his so willing, by some misfortune,
causes a blood vessel to burst in his brain and that this in turn
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causes
expire.

hi.,

So heel ove.

(his

e™

ue^alnlng at his side)

thereupon
Although «e may acknowledge
that, In some sense ot
"bring
a.td

about" (namely, that sense
given In D.IV.7), Jones has
brought about
his own death, we are surely
reluctant to say that he has
acted In
this case.
We would rather say that In
this case, as In the case
regarding D.IV.6, Jones has failed
to act, despite his attempt.
Or

suppose that Smith wills that his
right knee should bend and
that his
so willing causes a certain
nervous Impulse to emanate from
his brain,
but that this Impulse for some
reason fades before any muscular

activity Is produced.

Once again, although we may
acknowledge that.

In some sense of "bring about,"
Jones has brought about the nervous

impulse, we are surely reluctant to say
that he has acted In this
case.
It seems that some connection
between a person's volition and

what this volition causes to happen,
other than merely that of causal

contribution, is required, if we are properly
to say of the person
that he has acted.

The most natural move in a first attempt to
forge

such a connection is,

I

think,

to make explicit mention of the event

caused by the volition in the description of the
volition itself.
This may be done in either of two ways.

We might try first of all:

brings about £ restrictedly relative to
£ and £'
“ =df.
^ wills £ at £; and
(ii)
v^7ills £] contributes causally relative to t and
~

^

(i)

_t’

to £.

And we might then say that a person acts just in case he brings
about
some event restrictedly.

But this would not do.

D.IV.9 takes only

direct willing into account (see D.IV.4), and an adequate, enlighten-
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ing account of action tmst
take Into account the
matter of Indirect

willing also.

For Instance, let

be (Jones's arm rises]
and

a be

the

event internal to [Jones su„m,ons
the nurse], and suppose
that Jones
Wills £ but that he wills it in
order that £ may occur, v^tat
if Jones
is successful? That is, what
if Jones's willing
£ in order that a may
occur contributes causally to
£?
Surely we should say in such a
case
that Jones's summoning the nurse
is a doing and that
a deed of his.

a

is

(therefore)

But analyzing the concept of
action purely in terms

of D.IV.9 would leave us none

tile

wiser in such a case.^®

If we Introduce the concept of
indirect willing into our ac-

count, which is the second way to
attempt to accommodate the insight
that explicit mention should be made
of the event caused by the voli-

tion in the description of the volition
itself, we get the following:

^ accomplishes £ relative to £ and £' =df. there is an
event £ such that:
(i) ^ wills
at _t in order that
£ may occur; and
(ii) [S wills
in
order
that
may
occur] contributes
£
£
causally relative to £ and £' to £.
c[

And then we might say that a person acts just in
case he accomplishes
some event.

But this would not do either; this account of acting is

too restrictive.

Sometimes people act unintentionally, and when they

do it may well be that no event (other than that which is
directly

willed) is accomplished thereby; nevertheless, they act.

For in-

stance, suppose Smith wills that his hand should move in order that
the event internal to his signalling Jones may occur, but suppose that

he fails to signal Jones and that all he succeeds in doing (other than
to move his hand)

is to knock over Brown's Ming vase.

[Jones knocks
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over Brown's Ming vase] Is a doing
of Jones's, bat the account
of
action just proposed does not allow
for this.

There are innumerable paths that one
could follow at this

point in order to improve on what has so
far been proposed in the

attempt to say what acting is.

But at this stage

self with describing just one of
these-the path
to all others.

a matter that

I

I

shall content my-

believe preferable

Just why this path is taken and not
some other path is
1

shall not discuss further; my handling of
this issue

must be judged according to the comprehensiveness,
explanatory power,
and intuitive appeal of the theory to which
it gives rise.

First

£ constitutes

1

require a technical concept.

an event

^ just

Let us say that an event

in case whatever causes

£ also causes

£.

Or more precisely:
D. IV. 11

:

£ constitutes £ at t
(i) £ occurs at £;
(ii) £ occurs at _t;
(ill)

(iv)

=df.

there are an event £ and a time _t' such that r
contributes causally relative to t' and t to p*
~
~

and
for any event

£ and any time £' if £ contributes
causally relative to £' and £ to £, then
£ contributes causally relative to £' and t to £.
,

This definition is supposed to accommodate, at least in part, the fol-

lowing sort of Intuition.

l>Hien

Jones insults Smith by calling him

names, there is a tendency to say that his calling Smith names "just
is' his insulting Smith in this case.

Or when Jones apologizes to

Smith by sending him flowers, there is a tendency to say that his

sending Smith flowers "just is" his apologizing to him.
to be expected and as will be seen below,

I

Now, as is

advocate a criterion for
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the individuation of doines
u-Lngs armr-rin
according to which doings are
finely*-

grained; and so It is false,
on

names is

•

i

i

i

„ie„, that Jones's calling
Smith

Idem^

„ith his insulting Smith
or that his sending Smith
flowers is identical with his
apologizing to him. Nevertheless,
it is
true that on these occasions
his calling Smith names
constitutes his

insulting Smith and that his
sending flowers

constitu^^^T^logiz-

ing to Smith, and so we have
here at least a partial account
of the
just is intuition.
Not only is D.IV.ll useful
in this regard (more
will be said in this respect when
the "by"-relation is discussed
In

Section

7

below), but also

I

believe that it is this relation of
con-

stitution that will allow us to provide
the link that we are looking
for, that IS,

that noncausal link between the
volition and what the

volition causes to happen which obtains
whenever a person acts.

But,

first of all, let us note two theorems:

—

Necessarily, if £ occurs at _t and there are an
event £ and
a time _t
such that £ contributes causally relative to
~t'
and _t to £, then
at t.
£ constitutes

£

—

Necessarily, if £ constitutes
at _t, then £ constitutes r at

•

£

at

£

and

£

constitutes

~r

t.

Let us then say:
D. IV. 12

brings about £ directly relative to
£ and £' =df. there
are events £ and
such
that:
£
(i) £ wills
£ at £ in order that £ may occur;
(ii) [£ wills
£ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and £' to £; and
(iii) £ constitutes
£ at £'

£

:

And let us now consider the following claim:
D. IV. 8. a

:

acts relative to £ and £* =df.
there is an event
that £ brings about
directly
relative
to £ and £*
£

£

D.IV.S.a has a lot going for it.

£

Note that the fact that

such

£

in
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D.IV.12 is both an object and
an effect of S's volition
rules out the
possibility that a person acts when
his volition happens only
to cause
some totally "unrelated" event
to occur.
D.IV.S.a Is therefore an
improvement on D.IV.8.
But note too that D.IV.12
allows for the possibility that £ be distinct from
r.
D.IV.S.a la therefore also a
significant Improvement on the
suggestion that a person acts just in
case he accomplishes some event.
Let us see how D.IV.S.a fares
In a
few test cases.
The simplest case is where

nate the same event.

and "r" in D.IV.12 desig-

For instance, suppose Smith directly
wills that

his arm should rise and that his arm
rises as a result of this volition.

Has he acted?

confirm this?
Smith wills

£

Yes.

It would seem so.

Let

£

Does D.IV.S.a, via D.IV.12,

be [Smith's arm rises].

Now, we know that

and that his so willing contributes causally
to £.

We

want to be able to say that he has thereby acted;
specifically, we
want to be able to say that he has raised his
arm.

That D.IV.12

says that, in this case. Smith brings about his arm's
rising directly

may be seen as follows.
£,

£

then he wills
(at £, say),

an event

wills

£

£
at

£

We know, given T.IV.l, that, if Smith wills

in order that

£ may

Since Smith does v/ill

clause (i) of D.IV.12 is satisfied; that is, there are

(namely, £) and an event

£

occur.

in order that

£

£

(namely, £) such that Smith

may occur.

Clause (ii) is also satis-

fied, since we are given that Smith's willing

causally relative to

£

and some time £'

clause (ill) is trivially satisfied.

to £.

£

at

£

contributes

Moreover, given T.IV.3,

Hence, Smith brings about

£

tllrectly relative to

_t

and

and lienee, nceording Lo
D.IV.H.a,

acts.

Of cou..e,

.V,

same event, and this
is part of the strengtl, of
that definition.
in
general, if r is distinct
from £ in D.1V. I2, tl.en S acts
unsuccessfully, and hence
unintentionally.
(AJ thougl, this will be
discussed
in more detail
Section 6 below, we may note now
that wlienever one

m

ntent ionally
lienee all

versa.)

,

one acts successfully,

thougli not vice versa:

unsuccessful actions are unintentional,
though not vice
As an Illustration, let
£ be the event internal to [Smiti,

knocks over brown's Ming vase).
^ be the event internal to (Smith
moves his hand)
is (Smith's liand moves)), and
jr be
the event
internal to (Smith signals Jones).
Now, if Smith wills
^ at t in

order that
tive to

stitute

_r

may occur, if his so willing
contributes causally rela-

and

£

_t'

at _t',

to

Cl

but not to r, and if

^ happens

in fact

to con-

then, according to D.IV.12, we may
say that Smith

brings about £ directly relative to

t

and

_t'

and, according to

U.IV.S.a, we may say that Smith acts
relative to

seems absolutely right.

t

and

_t

'

And this

.

But let it be noted that D.IV.12, unlike

D.1V.7, is sufficiently restrictive so
that not just any effect of a

volition IS ruled in as a deed.
fore,

but let

sault).

If

it

£ now

For example, let
^ and

£

be as be-

be the event Internal to (Smith turns a somer-

turns out that (Smith wills
n in order that

occur) contributes causally relative to
ly, would be a very strange,

_t

and

to

£

r

may

(which, obvious-

yet presumably possible, turn of events),
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probably it does not also contribute
causally to
(ii) of D.IV.12 IS not
satisfied and

to be a deed of Smith's.

causally relative to
likely that

appropriately, turns out not

Or even if Smith's volition does
contribute

and

_t

and hence clause

_t'

£ constitutes £

to

£

at £'

of D.IV.12 IS not satisfied and

£

;

in this case,

it is highly un-

and, if this is so, clause (iii)

turns out once again not to be a

deed of Smith's.
One strange aspect of D.IV.12 should be
noted.

The following

is not a theorem;

(19)

Necessarily, if S brings about
[£ and £] directly relative to _t and _t
then ^ brings about
£ directly relative to _t and _t' and
^ brings about £ directly relative
to £ and _t
'

'

(19)

,

.

is not a theorem in part because the following
is:

T IV.
.

Necessarily, if £ brings about
£ directly relative to
and £'
then, for any state of affairs
£, if £ occurs
£ then £ brings about [£ and £] directly relative

:

£

,

,

to

£

and £'

.

At least, T.IV.5 is a theorem if the following assumption is
made, and
it is one that I am prepared to accept

(it would be hard to adduce

convincing arguments against it)
A. IV. 14

:

Necessarily, if £ contributes causally relative to t
and £' to £, then, for any state of affairs
£, if r
occurs at £'
then £ contributes causally relative to
£ and £' to [£ and £]
,

Now if A. IV. 14 is true, then, given D.IV.ll and T.IV.4, the following
must hold:
IV-

:

Necessarily, if £ constitutes £ at £, then, for any
state of affairs £, if £ occurs at £, then £ constitutes
[£ and £]

at £.

And it is from this that we get T.IV.5.

Let us consider a particular
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case.

Suppose

tive to

Sn.ltl,

brings about [Smith’s knee
bends] directly rela-

and t', and suppose that
Carter is President at

t

t

.

'

It

follows that Smith brines
orings aboIl^
-r-ui
about rrc
[[Smith's
knee bends] and [Carter is
President]] directly relative
to ^ and t
He also brings about
i

'

[[

.Snlth's knee bends] and ]two
plus

1

and

^

,

and so on.

.

two equals four

]]

directly relative

This undoubtedly sounds odd,
but

think that It Is truly objectionable.

do not

1

Perhaps these strange conjunc-

tive events could be ruled out
as deeds of Smith’s if a n,ore
restrictive analysis of the concept of
constitution were given, and perhaps

thereby (19) could be rendered a
theorem, of the system.

But any such

tinkering with the system would be
very complicated, and

I

do not

think the results would be worth the
sacrifice in simplicity.
us note that (19) Is

a theorem of

For let

the present system, and that we

are not committed to saying that.
In virtue of the fact that Smith

brings about [[Smltli's knee bends] and
[Carter Is President]] directly

relative to

^

and

ly relative to

^

,

Smith brings about [Carter is President] direct-

and t'.

Moreover, the falsehood of (19) does not

imply th 0 falsehood of the following:

Necessarily, if ^ brings about
[£ and £] directly relative to _t and _t
then either ^ brings about
£ directly
relative to _t and _t' or
^ brings about £ directly relative to £ and _t
Indeed,

I

'

,

'

.

believe that (20) is true.^^

So far,

then, D.IV.S.a has not been faulted, but

think it remains unfaulted for long.

I

do not

Let us for a moment return to

the case where Smith attempts to signal Jones but succeeds merely in

knocking over Brown's Ming vase, and let us now elaborate on this and
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suppose that Smith thereby
eoy bre-ikc;
breaks the vase, causing
Brown to Jump up
in horror, dance around In
a fit of rage
u^e, crip,
trio tail
f.n over,
bump his

head on the nearby andirons,
and lose consciousness.

There Is a
sense in which Smith brings
about not Just that event
Internal to bis
knocking over the Ming vase, but
also all of the following:
[the vase
breaks], [Brown Jumps up in horror],
[Browr dances around in a
fit of
rage], [Brovm trips), [Brown
falls over], [Brown bumps
his head on the
nearby andirons], and [Brown loses
consciousness]. Now, none of these
events is brought about by Smith
directly, but they are all brought
about by him indirectly, where:

brings about £ indirectly relative
to t and t' =df.
there are an event
£ and a time _t* such that:
(i) ^ brings about
£ directly relative to t and t*( 11 ) £ contributes
causally relative to t* and t'“to
~
—
£; and
(iii) ^ occurs exactly once at t*.^^
S

The question now arises: Does our
acknowledgment that D.IV.13 cap-

tures a legitimate sense of "bring
about" necessitate a revision of

D.lV.8.a?

I

think it does, although this is debatable.

For instance.

It might be argued that, although
it is true that Smith brings about

(indirectly) all of those events mentioned, there
is no need to say
that they are deeds of his;
his,

they are merely consequences of a deed of

that is, of the event internal to his knocking
over Brown's Ming

vase.

Hence, it might be argued,

the individual.

of his.

there is also no need to say that

Indirect bringings about of these events are doings

Moreover, it might be said, we are always able to admit that,

in bringing about the vase's breaking.
Brown's jumping up.

dancing around, etc

.

,

Smith has acted, for the following is

Brown's
a

theorem:
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I^V^:

If

7i
thatf

^

1 brings about £ Indirectly relative to
there are an event
£ and a time t* such
brings about £ directly relative
to £ and £0.

But, although the foregoing
line of reasoning has its
attrac-

tions,

1

think we ought nevertheless to say
that Indirect bringings

about are genuine doings and that
events indirectly brought
about are
genuine deeds. Granted, many events
are thereby admitted as doings
and deeds which one is perhaps
at first Inclined to rule
out as such
(for instance, if

1

now bring about my hand’s rising
directly and it

turns out that this contributes causally
to an atom’s being displaced
on Mars a million years hence, it is
at least questionable whether the

atom’s being displaced should rank as
a genuine deed of mine); but if
we do not allow indirect bringings
about to be doings and those events

Indirectly brought about to be deeds, many
events that appear to be
cases of genuine doings or genuine deeds
are ruled out as such.
instance,

I

For

think that Smith's breaking the Ming vase is
a genuine

doing of his, and yet it is not a direct bringing
about, but only an

indirect bringing about.

Let us, for the sake of completeness, as-

sume that Smith knocks over the vase relative to

t

and t*.

It is

hardly likely that the vase breaks at t*; indeed, let us
assume that
the vase breaks at

,

some moments after t*.

It is then not true

that Smith brings about the vase's breaking directly relative
to

and

_t

.

For the event that, in this example. Smith wills at

of his hand s rising, and this event occurs at

cannot be said to constitute the vase's breaking at

not

_t

.

'

,

t

t

is that

and hence

It follows

that the vase's breaking is not a direct deed of Smith's, and that
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Smith's breaking the vase
is not a direct
doine8*

v
Yet we are surely

Inclined to say that Smith's
breaking the vase is
an action.
There is a pattern that „ay
be distilled fro™
this case.
is the breaking of
a vase?

What

It is the direct
bringing about of some

event which itself causes
a vase to break; that
is, it is the indirect bringing about of
a vase's breaking.
Similarly, what is the
lurning on of a light?
It is the direct bringing
about of some event
Which Itself causes a light
to go on; that is, it is
the Indirect
bringing about of a light's
going on.
Or again, what is the
killing
of a person?
It is the direct bringing
about (perhaps in some manner
requiring specification) of
some event which itself causes
(perhaps in
some manner requiring
specification) a person's death;
that is, it is
the Indirect bringing about
(perhaps in some manner requiring
speci-

fication) of a person's death.
definitely.

Such examples may be multiplied
in-

Now, it seems intuitively obvious
that these indirect

bringings about are genuine doings;
hence D.IV.S.a requires modlflcation.

Several points ought to be made here.

First, it must of

course be acknowledged that there is
a third alternative that could
be investigated here, other than
those of ruling in all indirect

bringings about as doings and of ruling
out all indirect bringings
about as doings, and that is to rule
in some indirect bringings about
as doings while ruling out others.

But

I

know of no plausible cri-

terion that may be employed for this
purpose, and so

I

have bitten

the bullet and concluded that we ought
to rule in all indirect
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bringings about as doings.

Secondly, ruling in all
indirect bringings

about as doings does not
alter the fact that tho se
events indirectly
brought about are
consequences of deeds, even if they
are now themselves to be called deeds.
For every indirect deed is
a consequence
of a direct deed,
and many indirect deeds are
themselves consequences
of indirect deeds.
Finally, it might be thought that
the implications

of admitting indirect
bringings about into the class of
doings, if

persistently and consistently investigated,
would result in the following thesis: all deeds are either
events directly brought about or
consequences of events directly brought
about.

(The concepts of a

doing, a deed and a consequence
will be more fully discussed in the

next section.)

Even if this were true, note that this
thesis is quite

distinct from the following: any event
to which a volition contributes
causally is a deed.

For this thesis

(where the scopes of its quanti-

fiers are read in the most natural manner)
has already been dismissed
in our discussion of D.IV.7.

Note also that the related thesis, that

all deeds are either events directly brought
about or consequences of

events directly brought about but not both,
seems to be false.

For

when Jones raises his hand and thereby flips the
switch, it seems that
he brings about both the event Internal to
his raising his hand and
that internal to his flipping the switch directly,
indeed that the

former constitutes the latter, and yet also that the former
contributes causally to the latter (this being a case of
simultaneous
causation).

Moreover, the related thesis that all deeds are either

events directly brought about, and not constituted by other events
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directly brought about, or
consequences of events directly
brought
about, is false.
Let us suppose that Jones
raises his hand quickly.
Then he brings about both
[Jones's hand rises] and
[Jones's hand

rises
quickly]; the former constitutes
the latter, both are direct
deeds,
and neither is an indirect
deed.
But I think that the thesis
that all
deeds are either events directly
brought about or consequences of

events directly brought about is
false anyway, as

Consider this case.

I

shall now explain

Jones is learning how to play
tennis.

His instructor says that, in order
to hit a forehand, Jones
must

first swing his racket backward,
then step across

on to his left

foot, and then swing his racket
forward, making contact with the
ball

just in front of his left foot.

Suppose that Jones does all this and

that, wonder of wonders, he hits a
forehand.

Is it not clear that

Jones's hitting the forehand is an action,
that is, a doing of his?
If It IS,

then D.IV.S.a is again seen to be inadequate.

For consider.

Suppose Jones brings about the event Internal
to his swinging his
racket backward (£, say) relative to

_t^

and

that he brings about

the event internal to his stepping
across on to his left foot (£, say)

relative to

and

_t^,

and that he brings about the event internal

to his swinging his racket forward

(r,

say) relative to t. and t..
—5

Now Jones brings about that event internal to his
hitting a forehand
(^,

say) relative to

and

^

and, most importantly, it is not an

event that he brings about directly.
brings about indirectly.

It is,

Nor is it an event that he

rather, an event composed of events

that he has brought about, some directly, some perhaps indirectly.
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And yet „e have said that
it seems that

s

is a

^

e£ done s's,

that
that Jones's hitting the
forehand is a doing of his,
or
in still
her words, that in bringing
about ^ relative to t and
t
Jones

Is,

,

^^Intxve to

^

t
and -6'
t
-1

n t\i q
D.IV.S.a
cannot account for this.

Riix

*_

In order to come to grips with
this case we must seek to
dis-

cern the relation between Jones's
bringing about £,
and r on the
one hand and his bringing
about s on the other.
The key word here is
one that has already been used:
"composed."

compos^

of his bringing about

bringing about
about
s.

r.

His bringing about

is

s

his bringing about
£, and his

Conversely, his bringing about
£, his bringing

and his bringing about

r

are all parts of his bringing about

How are we to account for these relations
of being-composed-of

and being-a-part-of?

It is important to note that Jones's
bringing

about £, his bringing about

and his bringing about

£

are neither

individually necessary nor jointly sufficient for
his bringing about
It is possible for Jones to hit a
forehand without taking a step

across on to his left foot; moreover, Jones may
bring about £,

£

on some other occasion and fail to hit a
forehand.

account is,

I

believe, the following.

swinging his racket backward at
forehand at

—3

and

-^4

j*Jst

_t

2

>

and

_t^

and

say the following;

The proper

We should note that Jones's

£2 "jest is" his hitting a

is" his hitting a forehand at

_t^.

and

that his stepping across on to his left foot

his swinging his racket forward at

forehand at

£

And so

1

_t^

t_^

and

t_^

,

and that

and t^ "just is" his hitting a

believe that, in general, we may
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£

is composed relative
to t, and
—

-at

(i)

(11)

p and q

of „

t

1

.

-ni

i
n
^
-3ji sre events;
and
there is a time t such
that
(a)
occurs at t-i and
and
occurs at t.
and
,

.

"

’

’

i

.

(b)

constitutes £ at t, and
tutes £ at _t, and
and
there is a time jt such
that
(a) ^^occurs at't
and
and
.

.

.

.

(b)

constitutes
tutes p at

P at

.

and

.

consti-

.

.

£

.

occurs at

and

—tm’

.

consti-

t

—

We may then say:

D.IV.15:

brings about
£ synthetically relative to
are events q
i
u
f
-^1’
®’Jch
that:
5.n
(
composed relative to
) £ IS
t and

Ithere

‘

t'

£n»
(il) for any event
£, if

inf
and tt"°"IS
(b)

either
(a)

and

-t

-df

^t'

>

.

^

m

of

a

Identical with

•

q,

•

•

,

or

later than t^ t* is not later
than t",
not later than t
and
'

brings about
and _t" or
^ brings about
and £". JJ

^

£

,

directly relative to t*
—

,

(3 )

Now,

£ indirectly relative

if it is true in the foregoing
example,

by bringing about

relative to

_t^^

s

synthetically relative to

to —
t*

as it seems to be,
tj^

that,

and t^, Jones acts

and £^, we must once again modify
D.IV.S.a.

In fact,

given the foregoing considerations
concerning indirect and synthetic

bringings about,
D. IV. 16

.

I

suggest that we say first of all:

brings about
£ actively relative to ~t and ~t' =df
either
(i) £ brings about
£ directly relative to _t and t’; or
(ii) ^ brings about
£ indirectly relative to £ an^ t'; or
(iii) £ brings about
£ synthetically relative to t a^d t'.

£

We may then say:
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D.IV.S.b:

acts relative to _t and
such that ^ brings about

^
t

'

t

<Jf.

there is an event
p
relative to t and

^ actively

.

At this point „e should
return to that list of
actions pro-

vided at the beginning of
this section.

The reason for their
grouping

into three separate groups
should now be obvious.

Those actions,

doings In group (a) will normally
be such that the deeds
Internal to them Will be brought
about
those in group (b) will
of necessity be such that
those deeds internal to them
will be brought
about i ndirectly ; and those in
group (c) will normally be
such that
those deeds Internal to them
will be brought about
synthetically
I
say "normally" with respect
to groups (a) and (c)
for there is, I

dir^;

.

,

think, no

ng.cessity

that those doings in group
(a) be direct and that

those in group (c) be synthetic.

Suppose, to take an example from

group (a), that Smith has been
paralyzed and that he is only beginning to re-learn the use of his
leg.
self may be synthetic.

In such a case his kicking him-

In order to do it, he may have first
to draw

his foot backward— this being one
direct

doing— and then bring

his

foot downward into contact with
some other part of his anatomy (pre-

sumably his other leg)

this being another direct doing.

to take an example from group

arithmetic.

(c)

Or suppose,

that Smith is a wizard at mental

In such a case, he may bring about the
deed internal to

his multiplying 928 by 254 directly.

Most people, of course, must

perform all manner of preliminary calculation
before arriving at the
correct answer.
Ihis case concerning mental arithmetic highlights
a desirable
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feature of both D.IV.8.a
and D.IV.8.b: neither of
the. rules out the
possibility that action may be
purely mental.
I think it is
obvious
that action may be
purely mental, although this is
a point which,
curiously, is often overlooked
in the current literature
this
.

connection mention should also
be made of what may be called
"abnormal" action.
I have in mind in
particular both psychokinesis
and telepathy.

Suppose that Smith wills an event

certain lightbulb explode
(perhaps

^

^

in order that a

just is [the lightbulb explodes]),

and suppose that his so willing
contributes causally, by means of

alpha-waves emanating from his brain,
to ^ and that
the llghtbulb's exploding.

^ constitutes

Then, in this case. Smith brings
about

the lightbulb’ s exploding
directly (by psychokinesis).

pose that Smith wills an event
of spades occur to Jones

^

(perhaps

Or again, sup-

in order that the image of the ace

£

just is [the image of the ace of

spades occurs to Jones]), and suppose
that his so willing contributes
causally, by means of alpha-waves emanating
from his brain, to
that

£ constitutes

the image's occurring to Jones.

£

and

Then, in this

case. Smith brings about the image's
occurring to Jones directly (by

telepathy).
tend,

is

Both cases may seem odd, but this oddness,

s

would con-

merely a function of the abnormality of the conditions
that

are said to obtain.

bulb

I

1

am sure that it is correct to count the light-

exploding and the image's occurring to Jones as deeds of

Smith's, given the conditions stipulated in each case.
We may now, finally, address ourselves to the task of resolving the first group of problems, consisting of problems
la and lb.
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We have in fact bee n xn
a position to resolve
the first of these
ever
since the statement of A. IV.
12 and A. IV. 13.
Regarding la, why is it
that I act whereas my marionette
double does not? The answer
is, of
course, that I act by virtue of
actively bringing about
certain
events, and that my actively bringing
about certain events itself
occurs by virtue of my willing certain
events.
Now, the marionette

Itself wills nothing and can will
nothing.
act, even though the deeds that

I

actively bring about may strongly

resemble the motions of the marionette.
treatment.

Do

I

act when

I

Therefore, it does not

breathe?

Problem lb requires different

Yes, but only by virtue of my

raising my arm, my sitting down, my
standing up, and so on.

The

difference between my breathing and my other
actions is this: my
breathing is merely an indirect bringing about
of mine, whereas my
other actions are cases of direct bringings
about.

The breath's en-

tering and leaving my body is the effect of
an event directly brought
about, but is not itself directly brought
about.
are relatively rare occasions on which

I

Of course, there

willfully hold my breath and

exhale it, and on these occasions my breathing is
a direct doing of
mine.

In addition,

it is of course possible that my breath's enter-

ing and leaving my body on occasion not be a deed
of mine at all,

either direct or indirect (or even synthetic).

But this is not the

case in the present example.

There is a bonus to be derived here.

Wiat is left over if
fact that

I

I

Wittgenstein asked:

subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the

raise my arm?" 35

The answer, which Wittgenstein himself
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feared forever elusive, may
now fairly easily be
given.
If i aubtracf rhe fact that my arm
goes up from the fact
that I raise it. the
remainder (in typical cases,
at least) is an instance
of my willing
that my arm should go up
together with my so willing's
contributing
causally to its going up.
One last point: the account
that has been given in
this section of what it is to act
is not of course designed
to account for
every legitimate use of the term
"action" and its cognates.
In particular, there are uses of the
term "action" according to
which an
action is Just an event (witness
Newton's law concerning "actions"
and
"reactions"); there are also uses
of the term according to which
an
action, though not just any event,
is still such that no volition
is

essentially Involved in it (witness
habitual actions and reflex actions); and there are uses of the
term "action" according to which
the thing that "acts" is not even
a person (witness group and corpor-

ate actions).

Now, nothing has been said in this
section which be-

gins to give an account of any such
"action."

But the sort of action

that has been accounted for here is
so important, and so significantly different from any of these other
sorts of action, that a separate

account of it is fully justified.

From now on, however, when

I

say

that all action is essentially volitional,
it should be understood
that It is a particular sort of

section

that

I

have in mind.

action— that accounted

for in this
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The Individuation of Action
s

5.

If we assume that D.IV.S.b
is correct
correct,

then we may expect
doings and deads ic fall Info
three .aln categories:
those which are
direct, those which are Indirect,
and those which are
synthetic. We
may say first of all:

D.IV.17

Is a direct doing of S's =df.
such that £ IS [S brings about

£

£

there Is an event
directly). 36

^q

We may also say:
Is an indirect doing of S's «df.
there is an event q
^
such that £ is
brings about
indirectly].

£

£

And we may say
is a synthetic doing of S's =df.
there Is an event
such that £ IS [S brings about
synthetically].

£

q

£

We may then say:

£^is a doing of ^'s =df.
either £ is a direct doing of
S s or
£ is an indirect doing of S's or £ is a synthetic
doing of
s.
An event cannot be a doing on one occasion
and not on another,
For instance,

[Smith multiplies 928 by 254] is a doing of
Smith's

whenever it occurs; indeed, it is a doing of his
even if it never
occurs.

37

But when exactly does a doing that occurs
occur?

a tricky question, but

I

think the following is accurate.

This is
If the

doing is a direct doing, then it occurs at least at the
time the volition involved occurs and at the time the deed involved
occurs.
is,

if

about

^

brings about

£ directly relative

£ directly] occurs

at

any or all of the times in

£

and at

betvt?een

£

_t

'

.

to

_t

and

_t

'

,

That

then [S brings

Whether or not it occurs at

and £'

(if there are any such
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times) is a „,ooc poi„t-a
point whlcl,

I

do not feel competent
to re-

solve, but also a point whose
resolution is,

think, not required in

I

order for the present account
of action to be accepted.
the doing at Issue Is an
Indirect doing,

Similarly, If

then it occurs at least
at

the time the volition involved
occurs and at the time the
deed in-

volved occurs, but also at the times
to which the causal
contribution
involved is relative.
That Is, If s brings about
£ Indirectly relative to

£

and £' by virtue of bringing about

£ directly relative

and £* and of
£ contributing causally relative to £» and £'
[S

brings about
£ indirectly] occurs at £, £*

It occurs at any or all of

the times in between

(if there are any such times)

JL*

t'.

£

to

to £,

t

then

Whether or not

and £' other than

is a moot point which

do not feel

1

competent to resolve.
The times at which incdirect doings occur
has been of special

interest in recent philosophy.

For instance, consider the case of

Smith's killing Jones relative to

t

and

t\

and suppose that he kills

Jones by virtue of pulling the trigger of his
gun relative to
_t*

t

and

and of that event internal to this pulling of
the trigger con-

tributing causally relative to

_t*

and

_t'

to Jones's death.

Now, the

current account of the times at which indirect doings occur
has it
that [Smith kills Jones] occurs at least at

_t,

_t*

and

not it occurs at any or all of the times in between

than

_t*

is an issue left unresolved.

respect that the contention that, if
tive to

^

and

jt

,

then

t

;

and

whether or
t'

other

It should be noted in this

^

brings about

brings about

jo

indirectly rela-

indirectly] occurs at each
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t

,

and

.

.

lapse between

.

b

,

and

and

^

_t

•

,

becones less plausible
as the temporal

incenses.

Pc

instance, snppeae

Cat S^itb
kills Jones by ylttue of
bis pnUins the ttf.get
of bis gnn telatiye
to see closely related
ti^es on April 6 and by
virtue of Jones’s
dying tbe following December
17.
To say that tbe killing
occurs
throughout the months in between
sounds odd; but to say
that it occurs
at those times to which
the pulling of the trigger
is relative and at
the time of Jones’s death
seems reasonable. At any
rate, that is the
position that

1

adopt.

At what time, finally, does
a synthetic doing occur?

It occurs at least at the time the
volition (or volitions) Involved
occurs
(or occur) and at the time
the deed (or deeds) Involved
occurs (or occur),
and also, if any of the deeds
Involved are indirect, at the

times to which the causal
contribution (or contributions) Involved
is
(or are) relative.
Whether or not the doing occurs at any
or all of
the times in between the time
of the first volition and that of
the

final deed (if there are any such
times), other than at the times of
the intermittent volitions and
deeds, is a moot point that

I

do not

feel competent to resolve.
It should be noted that,

according to the present account,

it

IS possible for a doing to occur
at a time which is indefinitely

later than the time at which the agent
involved passes from this world
This may sound odd, but

I

do not think that it is truly objectionable.

For It IS not possible, according
to the present account, for a doing
to occur and yet not occur at
some time at which the agent involved
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is alive; aad this is
so sl.ply because,

first, every doing
involves

a

volition and, second, a person
cannot will an event and
not be alive
when he does so.
It is, of course, possible
(and this is especially
obvious in the case of Indirect
action) that a deed should
occur and
yet not occur at any time
at which the agent (or.
Indeed, agents)
Involved is (or are) alive.

And so, in

sun,,

it is certainly possible

for an action, whether
"action" Is understood in the sense
of "doing"
or "deed," to occur when the
agent involved is not alive.
But, to

repeat, it is not possible for a
doing to occur and yet not occur
at
some time at wliich the agent involved
is alive.

Although an event cannot be a doing on
one occasion and not on
another, it is nevertheless the case
that an event may be a deed on
one occasion and not on another;
for it is a deed when and only when
it is actively brought about by
an agent.

Hence the concept of a deed

must, strictly speaking, be relativized
to times.

gives rise to one small problem, however.
that an event remains a deed?

This relativlzatlon

How long are we to say

One obvious suggestion is that an

event, once a deed, remains a deed for as long as
it occurs without

interruption.

For instance, let

£

be [Smith's arm rises] and suppose

that Smith brings about

£ directly

deed of Smith's at

The suggestion is that

_t

'

relative to

for as long as it occurs without interruption.

suggestion that

I

shall adopt.

£

and

and t'.

£

remains a deed of his

Then

£

is a

This is, indeed, a

We should, however, take note here of

a proposed counterexample to this suggestion.

raises his arm relative to

_t

Suppose that Smith

and that his arm continues to rise
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in a "natural" manner
fro„,

akes over at

through

t_,;

but suppose that a
machine

and that from that moment
onward Smith's arm rises

only because of the machine's
intervention, until it ceases
rising
“S say that Smith would have
halted the motion of his

-En+m'

arm at

^

if he had been able.)

According to the suggestion,
[Smitli's

arm rises] is a deed of
Smith's from t^ through t^^^,
but Is it not
more reasonable to say that
It is a deed of his from
t^ through t_,
only? I think we should deny
this.
After all, what is it that
distinguishes the motion of Smith's
arm at t from its motion at
t
?
Is

—n+1

it desired by Smith at

but
Duc not af
at

t

t

?

MmtNot

necessarily; being

desired by its agent is not a
necessary condition of an event's
being
a deed.

Is it intended by Smith at
t^ but not at t^^^?

Not neces-

sarily; being intended by its
agent is not a necessary condition
of

an event's being a deed.

Perhaps [Smith's arm rises] is in Smith's

control at t^ but not at t^^^?

intuitive appeal,

I

Although this suggestion has some

think that it too should be rejected.

After all.

It has not been said that an
event must be in the agent's control if
It

IS to be a deed,

nor do

I

think that this should be said.

Control,

whatever it amounts to, would seem to me
to be a condition of free
action in particular, and the present
discussion of action is supposed
to take all action into account,

free and unfree.

And so

I

am not

persuaded that the purported counterexample is
a counterexample.

Per-

haps the intuition behind this proposed
counterexample is taken care
of if we note that it is perfectly possible
that Smith desire or intend

[Smith's arm rises] up until

t

and that he cease to do so at

t

—n+1,,

or
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he be

in control of

actly) up until

t_^

'

tills

deed (whatever this amounts
to ex-

and that he cease to be so
at

—t n+1'

There is one more problem
that must be taken care of before
analysis of the concept of
a deed may be proposed.
Let
be

£

[Smith

s

arm rises] and suppose
that Smith wills

at

£

_t

and that he

thereby succeeds in bringing
about £ directly relative to
ppose, too, that Smith

is the only arm that rises at
t'.

s

seems reasonable to say that
arm rises].
t'

onward,

So

£

£ constitutes £

is a deed of Smith's at

£ never ceases

and

t

to occur,

always rising from that time on.
arm that rises, of course.)

t

i^,

'

at

t

’

,

'

.

It then

where £ is [an

But suppose that, from

.

that at least one arm is

(It need not always be the same

It is surely false that

deed of Smith's from £' onward.

t

£ remains

a

But perhaps we can account for this

simply by noting that Smith's volition
at
tribute causally to
£ indefinitely.

does not continue to con-

t

Hence some mention of S's ori-

ginal volition must also figure in the
analysis of the concept of a
deed.
In accordance with the foregoing observations

following (where
D.IV.21:

—t n

is iust prior to

t

I

propose the

)•

-n+1 ’

is a direct deed of S^'s at t
_t^ =df.
there
are events £ and
£ and a time ^ such that:
(i) ^ wills
£ at _t in order that r may occur;
(li) [S wills
£ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and
to £ and
and
[S wills
£ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and
£^ to £;
(ill) [£ wills £ in order that
£ may occur] does not contribute causally relative to £ and t
to £; and
T£t1_^
(Iv) £ constitutes
at
and
and
at
t
£
£^,
—

£

,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Note that the following is a theorem:

.

.
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T^V^:

Necessarily, if £ is a direct deed of
S' s at t ... p
then there is a time _t such that
brings'ibout
^
directly relative to t and _t^ and ...
and ~
S brings
about £ directly relative to t and t

.

*

~

.

-ai

A direct doing, then, occurs throughout
the time at which the deed
internal to it occurs, as seems only fitting.
Similar considerations apply to the question
of when an in-

direct deed occurs.

Bearing them in mind, we may,

think, state the

I

following
IV- 22

:

is an indirect deed of
s at t
t
=df.
there are an event
£ and times t and t' such that:
(i) ^ brings about
£ directly relative to ~t and ~t'
(ii) £ occurs exactly once at t';
(iii) 3. contributes causally relative to t'
and t
to
and £ contributes causaTly relative to
£ and
_t'
and _t^ to £; and
(iv) £ does not contribute causally relative
to _t' and

£

,

.

.

.

,

’

.

.

.

-^+1
Fioally

,

a similar analysis of the concept of a synthetic

deed may also be given, based on D.IV.15 above.

very complex, however, and

I

This analysis is

shall not give it here.

Basically, the

idea is that a synthetic deed occurs when and only when at least one
of those deeds of which it is composed occurs.
D. IV. 23

:

is a deed of ^'s at
direct deed of
s at
deed of S's at t,

£

.

,

of S's at t,,

r}

.

.

_tj^,

.

.

_t

.

.

.

^
.

t

,

,

t

.39-"

We may then say:

=df.
either £ is a
_t^^ or
£ is an indirect
or p is a synthetic deed
.

,

.

,

Assuming that the concepts of a doing and a deed are rendered

sufficiently precise by means of D.IV.20 and D.IV.23, we may

no\<r

turn

to the question of the individuation of actions and how problems 2a

through 2e are to be resolved.

Since doings and deeds are states of

affairs, indeed, events, it follows from A. II. 12 that they are
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"finely-grained," that la, that a doing
(or deed)
a doing

(or deed)

^

if and only
-Lip entail
y if
entailsc,
£

observation helps us deal with
problem 2a.

£n
It

and

j,

£

is Identl cal with

entails £.

This

was asked how many ac-

tions Jones performed, after
he opened the front door,
when he flipped
the light-switch, thereby
turning on the light, thereby
illuminating
the room, and thereby
alerting the burglar. The answer
is, as may
now be seen, that at least
four doings occurred (namely,
[Jones flips
the light switch], [Jones
turns on the light], [Jones
illuminates the
room], and [Jones alerts the
burglar]) and probably many more
besides
(such as [Jones flips the
light-switch in the hallway],

^.

)

;

simi-

larly, at least four deeds
occurred (namely, those Internal to the

doings just mentioned) and probably
many more besides.

There is a

sense, of course, in which [Jones
flips the light-switch] "just is"
[Jones turns on the light], and so on,
but this is not a question of

these events' being identical but of
their being related by the "by"relation.

This matter will be discussed further in
Section

It may be objected here

7

below.

(as Donagan objected to Chisholm's

theory of events^°) that actions are
"unacceptably multiplied" on a

finely-grained theory of action.

For instance, suppose the light-

switch that Jones flips in the foregoing example
is located in the
hallway, in his house, in the Bronx, in New York State,
etc.

present theory,

[Jones flips the light-switch],

light-switch in the hallway]
hallway in his house],

,

On the

[Jones flips the

[Jones flips the light-switch in the

[Jones flips the light-switch in the hallway

in his house in the Bronx]

,

[Jones flips the light-switch in the hall-
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way in his house in the Bronx in
New York State], and so on, are
all
distinct doings of Jones’s.
Does this not contradict the
fact that
only one light-switch-flipping
occurred?

It does not.

Here

I

will

merely invoke, without further discussion,
that strategy discussed
and adopted at the end of Chapter II.
a

it is reasonable to say that

light-switch-flipplng is an occurrence of the event

[a

light-switch

is flipped], and this event occurs
only once at the time and place

Jones flips the light-switch.^^
What of problem 2b?

Does Jones perform an infinite number of

actions when he takes one step forward by virtue
of his taking half a
step forward, a quarter of a step forward,
and so forth?

tions are,

I

Our intui-

think, unclear on this point;^^ but, according
to the

present theory, Jones does perform an infinite number of
actions.
For instance, let us call that event internal to [Jones
takes one

step forward]

p^,

and let us suppose that Jones brings about

ly by virtue of his willing

p

and this volition's causing

In order for his half-steps, quarter-steps, and so on,

of his,
I

p

Hence

p

p directly

is distinct from his

bringing about each of its fractions directly.
think not.

I

Does it?

and all of its fractions are direct deeds

of Jones's and his bringing about

I

to occur.

to be actions

must constitute those events internal to them.

think it does.

p

p direct-

Is this objectionable?

think this thesis would certainly be objectionable if

it Implied that a separate and distinct volition accompanies each

distinct doing and deed, but this is of course not an implication of
the theory.
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As for problem 2c and the
issue of the accumulability
of actions, it begins to look as if
D.lV.S.a might be preferable
to

D.IV.S.b after all.

Given D.IV.15, it turns out
that Jones brings

about the event internal to
his walk synthetically and
that therefore,
by D.IV.S.b, D.1V.20
and D.IV.23, his walk is a doing
of his and the

event internal to it a deed.
tionable.

Now, perhaps this is not too
objec-

But is it not theoretically
possible that direct doings be

^

accumulated

ir^inltum

so that a person's entire life
(if, as is

perhaps practically impossible, the
person is continually active)
turns out to be one big synthetic
doing, and hence a doing, of his?
It seems so;

and perhaps it would be better if
the present theory did

not have this implication.

But we are caught in a dilemma here.

For

if we rule out one synthetic
doing on the grounds that it is just too

big and lasts too long to count as
a single doing, how are we still
to rule in as doings those synthetic
things,

forehand],

such as [Jones hits a

[Jones drives around the corner], and [Jones
multiplies

928 by 254], which appear to have a legitimate
claim on the title

doing.

For my part,

I

can find no acceptable way to rule in the

more compact, short-term synthetic doings and to rule
out the larger,

long-term synthetic doings as genuine doings.

My decision has been,

as in the case of indirect bringings about, to bite
the bullet and call
aJJ.

synthetic bringings about doings.

Hence

I

have claimed the truth

of D.IV.S.b (as opposed to D.lV.S.a), D.IV.20, and D.IV.23.

The al-

ternative (to claim that only direct and indirect doings and deeds are

genuine doings and deeds), though simpler, seems to me even less
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palatable
When It comes to problem 2d
and the distinction between
actions and consequences,
however, the advantages of
the present theory
of action are clear.
In one of his papers J.L.
Austin says:
single term descriptive of what
he [the agent] did may
be made to cover either a
smaller or a larger stretch of
the narrower description being
[A]

clued ’t^e°"

uL

or "effects" or fhe

of his

Since Austin wrote this, rt has
become somewhat of a commonplace
to
say that there is no hard-and-fast
distinction between act and consequence, that the distinction Is more
linguistic than ontological.

For

instance, Eric D'Arcy proposes the
thesis that the term which denotes
the act, in the description of
a given incident, may often be
elided

into the term which denotes the
consequence of the act,^^ especially

when the consequence is anticlpatable.'^^
As a rule

...

Indeed, he says:

the line between "act" and "consequence"
may

be drawn at different points when
the elements of a given epl-

sode are being analyzed.

Joel Feinberg calls the phenomenon that
Austin points to the "accor-

dion effect,"^^ and Donald Davidson^^ and
Bruce Aune^^ speak approvingly of his discussion of this.

But surely, if an act is an event

and a consequence is another event which
is an effect of that act, no

amount of linguistic legerdemain will be able
to accomplish the

miracle of merging these two separate and distinct
entities into one
In fact,

both Davidson and Aune explicitly recognize this point (al-

though Austin, D Arcy and Feinberg do not) by stipulating that
what
is stretched and squeezed when the accordion
effect is operative

i.s
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Che descr iption of the
act concerned, and not the act
itself

A proposed example of the
accordion effect Is the case of
Jones's flipping
of the switch, thereby
turning on the light, illuminating
the room
and alerting the burglar.
In this example, for Instance,
the term
Jones flipped the switch”
is presumed to "cover a smaller
stretch of
events than the term "Jones
alerted the burglar." Perhaps, on
a

Davidsonian ontology of events, according
to which a single event
often bears several descriptions
and according to which [Jones
flips
the switch] and
cal,

[Jones alerts the burglar] are (in this
case) identi-

there is some excuse for saying that
the accordion effect is

operative here.

For there may be, indeed there surely
is (given the

distinction between direct and indirect bringing
about) a legitimate
sense in which "Jones alerted the burglar"
"covers" the event of the

burglar's becoming alarmed whereas "Jones flipped
the switch" does not
and given that, on such an ontology, "Jones
flipped the switch" and

Jones alerted

tlie

burglar" nevertheless describe the same action,

perhaps there is good reason to talk about the
"stretching and
squeezing" of descriptions in this case.

But, to repeat, there is no

good reason to talk of the stretching and squeezing of
actions them-

selves

.

On the ontology of events and actions proposed in this chapter, however,

talk of the accordion effect would appear unwarranted.

For [Jones flips the switch] and [Jones alerts the burglar] are not

identical, on this theory, and so the fact that the description of
the former fails to

cover" an event that the description of the
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latter

covers" Is of no special Importance.

It seems to me a con-

siderable advantage of the present
theory that talk of the accordion
effect may be dispensed with;
for having to account for the
descriptions of actions, as well as
the actions themselves, can only
serve
to complicate matters.

In the present context

of an event

£

I

am of course taking a consequence

to be any event to which

£ contributes causally.

that, although it is obviously true
that,
5,

if

£

£

Note

is a consequence of
£,

may be and indeed very often is distinct
from £, it is yet possible

for a doing or deed to be a consequence
of a doing or deed.

We have

already seen that all indirect deeds are
themselves consequences of
direct deeds.

That a doing may be a consequence of a doing
is made

clear by the fact that, if Smith hypnotizes
Jones and Jones walks

around in circles as a consequence, then both
[Smith hypnotizes
Jones] and [Jones walks around in circles] are
doings, even though
the latter is a consequence of the former.

believe in fact that,

in general, a doing has exactly the same
consequences, on a particu-

lar occasion, as the deed internal to it, but

I

am not sure how this

might be proven.
What of problem 2d in particular, however?

When Jones kills

Smith, is Smith's death a part or a consequence of what Jones does?

We are now in a position to see how this question requires clarification.
ly.

When Jones kills Smith, he brings about Smith's death indirectSmith

s

death, therefore, is a deed and it is part of the event

which is Jones's killing Smith and which is composed in addition of

a
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volition of Jones's and of a direct
deed of Jones's contributing
causally to Smith's death.

But although Smith's death
is part of

Jones's killing him, and although it is
of course true that it is
logically impossible that Jones kills
Smith and Smith yet live, it is
also true that Smith's death is a consequence
of a doing of Jones's.
This is because the killing is an indirect
doing, and every indirect

doing is performed partly by means of a
direct doing.
case, Jones shoots Smith.

In the present

Let us assume that his pulling of
the

trigger is a direct doing of his.

We may then say that Smith's death

IS a consequence of Jones's pulling the
trigger.

Speaking loosely,

then, we may say that Smith's death is both a
part and a consequence
of

what Jones does."

But this is, of course, just loose talk; the

way in which to make it more precise has just been
shown.
Finally, v/ith regard to 2e, it is clear that, on the present

account of action,

[Jones butters something],

[Jones butters bread],

[Jones butters toast in the bathroom], and [Jones butters toast in
the bathroom with a knife], are all doings of Jones's.

[Jones butters

toast in the bathroom with a knife at midnight] is a different matter.
If we take "midnight" to designate a particular midnight

(as we

clearly should, given the wording of the illustration), then this
state of affairs is a proposition, and hence not an event, and hence
not an action.

There may yet be some sense in which the manner, the

place, and the time are "circumstances" of the particular occurrence
of

[Jones butters something] in question, but the temptation to clar-

ify this sense is diminished insofar as, given the present finely-
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grained individuation of actions,
not only [Jones butters something)
but also [Jones butters
toast], and so on, may safely
be said to be
doings of Jones's.
In this connection it should
be mentioned that there is

another sense of "circumstance"
which is often Invoked in actioncontexts.
In this sense, a circumstance
is an event which occurs
round about the time at which
the action occurs but which is
neither
the action Itself, nor a cause
of the action, nor a consequence of
the

action.

I

shall forgo

trying to render this sense of "circumstance"

more precise here.

6.

Intentional Action

We should now turn to an account of
intentional action.

order to facilitate the discussion

I

In

shall at first concentrate

solely on intentional direct action.
Let us begin by considering the following
proposal, which is

one that no philosopher that

I

know of has seriously thought to be

adequate

—

•

S.

intentionally brings about

and
(i)

(ii)

_t'

^
^

£ directly relative

to

=df.

intends £ at jt; and
brings about £ directly relative to

Although both clause

(i)

_t

~t

and t'.

and clause (il) of this definition do,

I

think, state necessary conditions for the truth of the definiendum,

they do not state, singly or jointly, a sufficient condition for its
truth.

Consider this counterexample.

event internal to his hitting Jones.

Let

S

be Smith and

£

be the

Suppose that Smith is talking
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to Brown and, also,

that.

lhat

,.e

Intends that

^ should

occur, and suppose

In the course of his talk
with Brown, he becomes
excited and

starts gesticulating wildly,
thereby inadvertently hitting
Jones, who
happens (unknown to Smith) to
be standing close by.
Certainly Smith
does not intentionally bring
about p directly, and yet
according to
he does.

The most obvious move, in an
effort to improve on D.IV.24, is
to introduce the concept of
willing here and to attempt to forge
a

link between what

S

wills at p and what is thereby
caused to happen.

If we look at D.IV.12 above,
is

the move that immediately suggests
itself

to stipulate that "p" and "r"
designate the same event.

XIV.ld.a

I

That is:

Intentionally brings about
p directly relative to ~t
_t
-df.
there is an event
£ such that:
(i) ^ wills
£ at _t in order that £ may occur;
(11)
wills £ in order that
£ may occur] contributes
causally relative to _t and £' to
£; and
(iii) £ constitutes
£ at t'.
S

:

and

Note that the following are implications, and
obviously desirable ones
of the definiens of D. IV. 24. a:

relative to
t

£

and

(see A. IV. 10).

plications also.)

_t'

first,

that

^

brings about

(see D.IV.12); and second, that

S

£ directly

intends

£

at

(The definiens of D.IV.24 of course has these im-

But D.IV.24. a will not do, for essentially the same

reasons that Chisholm adduced in the last chapter in
his criticism of
D. III. 11.

Nevertheless, we may note that the person has certainly

acted successfully, even if npt intentionally, in Chisholm's
examples,
and so we may say:
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——

!

'

Ui)
(.

Wliat

111 )

directly relative to t
there is an event
^ such that:
£ at _t in order that j? may occur;
IS wills
£ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to _t and _t' to
p; and
£ constitutes £ at t'.

has gone wrong with D. IV. 24. a?

with reference to

D. III. 11

in particular),

As Chisholm notes (but
it fails to take account of

the fact that "an agent performs an
intentional action provided there
IS something he makes happen in
the way he intended

tion is,

I

think, absolutely right.

.

This observa-

But what sense are we to make of

the notion of making something happen
"in the way one intends"?

As we

saw in the last chapter, Chisholm believes
that what this amounts to
IS a requirement

that the deed be not just successfully brought
about,

but that it be brought about in a manner which
is

ful."

"

completely success-

On these grounds he proposes D. III. 11.
a; but this definition,

too, was found to be wanting.

Several philosophers seem to accept Chisholm's insight that

acting intentionally requires that one's deed or deeds be made to

happen

in the way one intends"

— as,

indeed,

I

think they should

— but

they do not seem to have made it any clearer, although this is not for

want of trying.

For instance, Alvin Goldman proposes an account of

intentional action in which a person is said to act intentionally only
if his having an action-plan causes the deed in question "in a certain

characteristic way." 53

Goldman is of course aware of the vagueness of

this locution, but he claims that it is not incumbent upon him, qua

philosopher, to seek to dispel it.

He claims, rather, that this is a

matter which properly concerns the neurophysiologist.

But such an
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abjuration of philosophical inquiry
is,

I

believe, premature.

Similarly, Gilbert Hantan has
suggested that a person acts intentionally

only if an Intention of his
causes the deed in question "in
less explicitly specified

«ay,"”

a

more or

and Richard Foley has proposed that

person acts intentionally only if
a volition of his causes the deed

a

in question

in the way envisaged.

But none of these substitute

locutions is any clearer than that
locution which we are seeking to
understand, namely, "in the way one intends.”
At one point Foley suggests a reading
of the locution "in the

way envisaged” which results in the
following definition (when modified to fit the present framework):
D lV.24.b
.

:

intentionally brings about
£ directly relative to ~t
jt' =df.
there is an event £ such that;
(1) ^ wills £ at £ in order that
£ may occur;
(li)
wills £ in order that
may
occur] contributes
£
causally relative to £ and _t’ to
£ in a manner
which does not surprise S; and
(iil) £ constitutes
£ at _t'.^^

^

and

But it is wrong to take "in the way one intends” or "in the
way en-

visaged

to mean the same in this context as "in a manner which does

not surprise £.

"

For consider this case.

Smith is excruciatingly in-

ept and, not unreasonably, totally lacking in self-confidence,

llhen-

ever he manages to do what he Intends to do, he is astonished.

Now,

Jones is an insensitive, self-satisfied scoundrel who continually

berates Smith, mocking his ineptitude.

Smith finally becomes so ex-

asperated at Jones's insulting behavior that he decides to teach him
a lesson.

He decides that, if Jones insults him just one more time,

he will punch him in the mouth.

The next day Jones again insults
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Smith and Smith carries out his
intention
-LULenrion.

He punches Jones in the
i

mouth; but, true to form, he is
-Lb surnriQ^a
surprised that^ uhe succeeds
in doing
so.
According to D.IV.24.b,
H.u, men.
then
Smith adoes not act intentionally
when he punches Jones in the mouth.
But the
Lue ract
ic,
fact is,
of course, that
he does.
,

There are still others who have
tried their hand at analyzing
the concept of intentional action.

For Instance, Judith Jarvis
Thom-

son proposes an analysis in terms of
the concept of hope.^^

analysis is,

I

believe, defective, but it is very
complicated and

shall not discuss it here.
of my own.

This

1

1

propose to turn, rather, to an analysis

However, before doing so, brief acknowledgment
should be

made of a method of treating this issue
which is distinct from that
general method adopted by Chisholm, Goldman,
Harman, Foley, and others.
G.E.M. Anscombe has given a clear statement
of this method.

Rather

than deal with the causal history of the deed,
Anscombe proposes to

deal with the reasons for which it is brought
about by the agent.
(There are those, of course, who believe that such
reasons just are

causes of the deed in question, but Anscombe is not of
this opinion.)
Her proposal amounts to the following:
D. IV. 24. c
:

^ intentionally

brings about
directly relative to t
and t^' =df.
there is a rational explanation of [S brings
about _p directly relative to t and t']»^^

Bruce Aune has also given voice to the same intuition.
in outline,
D. IV. 24 d
.

:

His proposal,

is this:

^ intentionally

brings about _p directly relative to _t
and
=df.
there is an intention
such that
has
rationally explains
brings about _p directly relative
to ^ and t
'

]
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This approach to the present
problem is difficult to evaluate,
for
the concept of rational
explanation must first be clarified.
Both
Anscombe and, especially, Aune
undertake such clarification, but
their
treatment of this issue is incomplete
in certain respects, as they
are
themselves aware. Nevertheless, I
suspect that this approach, even
if adequately clarified,
would prove defective.

First,

1

think there

may well be intentional actions
performed by an agent for which the
agent has no reason, and hence for which
there Is no rational explana.

.

tion.

61

Having a reason for acting is,

I

think, a mark of deliberate

action, and whereas all deliberate action
is intentional, not all in-

tentional action,

I

believe, is deliberate.

matter of deliberate action shortly.)

(I

shall return to the

Secondly, it would seem to me

possible to give a rational explanation of an
unintentional action.
Suppose

I

want to please my host and, for this reason, reach
out for

a second cup of coffee.

But suppose that, in so doing,

I

unintention-

ally knock over the coffee pot, spilling its contents
on to my host's
lap.

Does my desire to please my host rationally explain my
knocking

over the coffee pot?

I

to say that it does.

Perhaps either Aune or Anscombe would reply that

am not sure, although it seems to me plausible

it offers no " complete " rational explanation of this action.

There

may be something to this reply but, without further details, it is
one that

1

cannot adequately evaluate.

I

would rather, therefore,

turn back from reasons to causes and see if we cannot, following the

general method adopted by Chisholm, Goldman, and the rest, come up
with a satisfactory account of intentional action.

I

think we can.
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The most striking feature
of a deed which is
intentionally

brought about, over and
above its being successfully
brought about,
IS that it comes about
in the way the agent
intends.
This, as has
been said, is Chisholm's
insight, and it is one with
which

complete agreement.

But what does this amount
to?

I

am in

Foley states the

issue this way;

wbiVh^a’

seems, a criterion of doing
something deliberately
^

perfec^^curacr^f h"

coLequanceTith

also want a criterion which does
nni“®"‘’'
mistaken about how the
State
s?«foraff!
of affairs in question is
caused. 62

think this is both a correct
and a useful way of looking at things.
(Where Foley uses the term
"deliberately- I would rather use the term

I

intentionally," but this is a minor
point that
the moment.)

I

shall overlook for

Foley's proposed solution, as has already
been mentioned

concerns the element of surprise, and
it is one that has been found
wanting.

But we should nevertheless attempt
to meet his requirements

for a satisfactory criterion.

really rather straightforward.

The correct solution,

I

believe, is

For an action to be intentional, it

must come about in one of a certain limited
number of ways acceptable
to the agent.

In order to pin down this concept we should
first give

a preliminary definition, namely:
D. IV. 26;

contributes causally relative to jt and t' to
p via
there is a time p* not earlier than
and
not
p
later than jt' and there is an event
such
that:
p
(i) p contributes causally relative to t and t* to
r;
(ii) p contributes causally relative to
and
t*
to
s;
p
(ill) p contributes causally relative to
and
t'
to
p
p;
(iv) p contributes causally relative to p* and t' to
p;
(v) p contributes causally relative to p* and t' to
p;
(vi) p occurs exactly once at p*; and
(vii) s entails r.^3

_r

=df.
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If

£ contributes causally

to

£ via

on some occasion, then r may
be

r

said to be an intermediary
on that occasion.
At
_t

£
=dt

We may then say:

comes about, as a result of
£, as

~S

.

intends at

there are events r ^
r„ such that
(a) ^ intends at _t that, for some
time _t * £ should
contribute causally relative to
^ and ~t* to p
either via £2
via r^ and
(b) £ (in fact) contributes causally
relative to t
and _t- to £ either via r
or ... or via r ;~and
vii; there is no event
£ such that
(a) ^ intends at _t that, for no time
£* £ should
contribute causally relative to _t and t* to
~
p
~
^
via £, and
(b) £ (nevertheless) contributes
causally relative
to _t and £* to
via
r.
£
(1)

,

.

.

.

,

,

,

,

n this case,

through

are anticipated potential intermediaries,

one at least of which turns out to be
an actual intermediary.

over,

More-

there occurs no actual intermediary which was
anticipated by

as not occurring.

S

(Note that this is not to say that no intermediary

occurred which was not anticipated by

as occurring.)

^

Clause (ii)

rules out what Foley calls "radical mistakes"; moreover, his
stipulation that "perfect accuracy" not be required is also met,
especially
since in most cases the disjunction of

will contain more than one disjunct.

through r^ of clause (1)
It seems,

then, that we may

truthfully assert the following:
D. IV. 24

.

:

intentionally brings about £ directly relative to t
and £' =df.
there is an event £ such that:
(i) ^ wills £ at £ in order that
£ may occur;
(ii)
wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes
causally relative to £ and £* to £;
(iii) £ constitutes £ at £'
and
(iv) at £' £ comes about, as a result of
wills £ in
order that £ may occur]
as ^ intends at £.

^

;

,

In this connection we may note the following theorem:
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!
relative to

1

i?t-tlonally brings about

and f'

directly
j,
brings about £

!

If D.lV.24,e is accurate,
as

I

claim,

then the concepts of

Intentionally bringing about an event
indirectly and of Intentionally
bringing about an event synthetically
are easily accounted for. Ue
may say:

DiIV^:

S

intentionally brings about
£ indirectly relative to t
event £ and a time _t* such that:
o
( 1 )
^ intentionally brings about £ directly relative to
_t
and _t*;
(ii) at _t' £ comes about, as a
result of
as S intends
at

(iii)

D.IV.29;

^
_t

£

—

£,

and
occurs exactly once at t*.
_t;

intentionally brings about
£ synthetically relative to
t
-df.
there are events
£, such that:
(1) £ is composed relative to _t and
of

and

•

•

•

,

,

(il)

for any event £, if
£ is identical with £, or
or £ is identical with
t*
£^^, then there are times ~
and £" such that
(a) _t is not later than _t*, £* is not later
than ~
t",
and _t” is not later than _t
and
(b) either
(a) ^ intentionally brings about
£ directly relative to jt* and £” or
(3) ^ intentionally brings about £ indirectly
relative to _t* and
and
(iii) ^ intends at _t that, for some time £'
£ should be
composed relative to _t and
of £^^,
,
£^.
.

'

.

.

,

,

,

.

It should of course be noted that it is a theorem,

£ directly relative

tentionally brings about
[£ brings about

£

£

to

£

[£ intentionally brings about

£

and £'

£

*

]

and £*

]

implies

to

]

implies

and, third, that

£ synthetically relative

£ synthetically relative

_t

[S

second, that [S in-

]

indirectly relative to

indirectly relative to

implies [£ brings about

and £'

.

first, that

intentionally brings about £ directly relative to
£ and
[£ brings about

.

£

to

£

and £*

and £’
]

Given
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that D.IV.24.6, D.IV.28
and D.IV.29 are accurate,
we may say:

|^lnte«ionally brings about

actively relative to

and

t

f an^^’fof

^ directly relative

fo"ran“ct^or

^ “di-^^ctly relative

to

And we may also say:
acts Intentionally relative to
t and
an event
£ such that S intentionally

1

actively relative to
We may of course also say
that

and

_t

S

_t

and

acts unintentionally relative
to

just in case he acts relative to

intentionally relative to

t

t' =df
there is
brings about p
^

t

and

_t'

t

but does not act

and t'.

Let us now see how this account of
intentional action measures
up to a few test cases.

The most interesting ones appear to
concern

indirect action; at any rate, these have
been the main focus of attention in the recent literature, and
to them.

I

shall here confine my attention

First, suppose that Jones is intent on
shooting Smith.

takes aim at Smith's heart and pulls the
trigger of his gun.

He

His aim

is a little off, however, and he
shoots Smith straight between the

eyes instead, nevertheless still managing thereby
to kill him instantly.

Now it turns out, according to D.IV.28, that
[Jones shoots Smith

straight between the eyes] is not an intentional
doing of Jones's; for
Jones has no intentions regarding the event internal
to this doing,
and so clause (ii) of D.IV.28 fails to be satisfied.

result not counterintuitive?

No,

I

But is this

do not think it is.

For Jones

certainly did not intentionally shoot Smith straight between the eyes

.

186

This of course leaves open
the possibility of his
intentionally pulling the trigger (probably
a direct doing) and
of his Intentionally
shooting Smith (another Indirect
doing).
In such circumstances
as
those Just sketched, I would
think it almost certainly
true that

Jones

^

intentionally pull the trigger.

Wl, ether

or not he also in-

tentionally shot Smith will depend
in part upon how detailed
his picture was of how the bullet was
to find Its way Into Smith's
body.
The fact that Jones did not
Intend that Smith should be shot
straight
between the eyes does not Imply that,
by shooting him straight between
the eyes, he did not Intentionally
shoot him.

For

I

tlilnk It

Is true

that. If Jones Intended that the
event Internal to his shooting Smith

in the heart should occur,

then he also intended that that event
In-

ternal to his shooting Smith should occur.

And, as long as he did

not Intend that this latter event should
not be brought about by

virtue of the bullet's piercing Smith's brow
instead of his heart,
then Jones did Intentionally shoot Smith,
although, to repeat, he did

not intentionally shoot him straight between
the eyes.
Or take these two cases given by Aune:
I intend to frighten Smith
and decide to do so by making a
threatening gesture. My eyesight is poor, however, and I
approach a rack full of coats, taking it to be Smith.
I make
the threatening gesture.
Smith, at the other end of the room,
sees me making the gesture to the coatrack and, thinking I
have gone mad, becomes frightened.
It seems doubtful that I
frightened Smith intentionally: my decision to make the
threatening gesture does not cause Smith’s fright by the appropriate sequence of events. On the other hand, suppose that
I intend to kill Smith and, as a means
of killing him, decide
to stab him with an icepick.
I then lunge with the icepick,
but I miss my target, striking his neck with my clenched fist.
A blood vessel breaks in Smith’s neck, and he dies.
In this
case it seems that I do kill Smith intentionally, although I
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do not kill him in the way
that I Intended to kill
him- the
sequence of events connecting my
decision to stab Smith with
Smith's death would seem to be
close enough to ?he ei^lsIJned
sioned
sequence to render my killing
intent ional!64

Anne's conclusion is that "[tlhese
contrasting cases suggest that the
notion of doing something with an
intention is a little too vague
to
be pinned down by any precise
formula.

unwarranted,

think.

I

"‘>5

gut this conclusion is

Clause (11) of D.IV.27 gives us
the clue as

to how to adjudicate these cases.

Did

I

Intend that Smith should not

become frightened in the manner that
he actually did?

perhaps this is likely) then
Or again, did

I

I

did

likely) then
cases,

I

^

If not

intentionally kill him.

strike

(and perhaps this is

The problem in such

submit, is not with the formula that

I

(and

intentionally frighten him.

intend that my clenched fist should

Smith's neck and break a blood vessel?

If so

I

have proposed but with

whether or not there is sufficient Information to
know how to apply
it accurately.

The concepts of intentional and unintentional doings
and deeds
and related concepts may of course be formally analyzed
in terms of

D.IV.31, but

I

shall not present explicit analyses of them here.

I

propose, rather to turn now to a consideration of the third group
of

problems posed at the outset of this chapter.

Assuming the accuracy of the foregoing account of Intentional
action, encapsulated in D.IV.31, problem 3a has in fact already been
resolved.

What of problem 3b?

This too may now be resolved.

Given

that, on the present theory, doings are finely-grained, the solution
is fairly obvious.

Since [Hamlet kills Polonius] and [Hamlet kills
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«

seeing how the former

„,ay

be unintentional
and the latter yet
in-

tentional, even though Polonius
was the .an behind
the arras.
And it
«y still be .aintalned that only one
UHling occurred since, to
invoke the strategy used
before in Chapter II
and also earlier in
this
chapter, [something is killed,
occurred only once at
the tl.e and
place at which Hamlet killed
Polonius.
It has sometimes been
claimed that

there are no such things

as unintentional actions,
even though there are
such things as ac66
ons.
This claim is
implausible and can now be
seen
to be false; at least,
it is false when
"unintentional action" is understood in terms of D.IV.31.
It has also been claimed
that certain
f.

actions cannot be committed
unintentionally (first degree murder,
for
example).
This is true, but quite
compatible with the definitions
presented

«

I

mentioned a short while ago that

where Foley uses "deliberately."
ge,

I

would use "intentionally"

Perhaps this is Just a question of

nevertheless, there is a concept distinct
from that analyzed

In D.IV.31 which it would be
useful to analyze, and

following

I

propose the
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S acts deliberately
relative to t and t =df
t-h.
~
~
events £ and £ such that:
(i) there are times t
t
that
('o'v
-tn
—I’ — 2’
^
IS just prior
to _t,
(b)
is not later tlian“t, and
and t
not later than t
-^-1 is
and
,
(c) S considers [S wSlls
^ in order that n may
occur] at t^ and
and S considert (S wills
’

*

i

*

•

.

.

.

^
to

(b)
(c)

.

.

.

^

(11) either
(a)

.

.

’

intentionally brings about
_t

and

_t

'

or

,

q

directly relative

^intentionally brings about
£ indirectly relative to

£ and t
£ intentionally
relative to

_t

*

,

or

brings about
and t'.^^

£ synthetically

The consideration specified in
clause (i) of this definition may be
termed "deliberation." often, of
course, deliberation will Involve
a

mulling of alternatives and the willing
that contributes causally to

£

and

will then be a choice (see D. IV. 51 below)

£

discuss this issue.
33

:

But

.

I

shall not

However, we may say, in connection with
D.IV.32:

acts impetuously relative to _t and t’
=df.
^ acts relative to _t and t^; and~
(il) S_ does not act deliberately
relative to

£

(i)

t

and t'.

And, finally, we may also say:
D IV. 34
.

:

acts voluntarily relative to _t and £' =df.
either
^ acts intentionally relative to t and t'; or
(ii) (a) £ acts intentionally relative to
_t and
t', and
(b) [£ acts] is uncoerced at t.

£

(i)

Of course, "uncoerced” is an undefined term,
but

define it here.

I

shall not seek to

As to the terms "involuntary" and "nonvoluntary," it

would perhaps be best to adopt the following conventions: a doing
may
be said to be nonvoluntary if and only if it is not voluntary; no
doing

may be said to be involuntary, since an "involuntary action (deed)" is

commonly held to be one to which no volition contributes causally, and
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-ce

is HOC what

I

call a deed at all.

ot coutse.

this

is not

^

of

hindlng-indeed, this is the
case with all of the
tet.s
-^toduced in this chaptet-so
long as the

coscents. fot the expres-

sion of which

I

propose the use of these
terms, are clear.

In this
J.L. Austin in particular
has provided a valuable
service
in several of his
papers by discussing the usage
of such terms as

intentional," "deliberate,"
"purposeful," "impetuous," and
so on.*^’
It is not my aim
here to embroil myself in
such discussion; nor do
I make any claim
that the concepts analyzed in
D.IV.31 through D.1V.35
are those unfailingly
expressed by the English terms
"intentional,"
deliberate," and so on.^“
Nevertheless, I do believe that
these
concepts, like the other
concepts analyzed In this chapter,
are of
first importance to action-theory

~—

By -Relation and Basic Action

We should now turn our attention
to the ”by"-relation and the

resolution of problems 4a, 4b, and
4c.

As far as

I

can tell, there

are few restrictions on how the
-by-’-relation may relate one type of

bringing about to another.

In Section 4 above six types of
bringing

about were distinguished, and there
are doubtless others that could be

distinguished also.

There are, therefore, many different
possible

exemplifications of the ’'by"-relation.

In this section, however,

shall concern myself with just five of
these.

I

These five strike me

as being the most important; an account
of the others could be gener-

ated from the account that

I

shall give of these five.
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Let us take explicit note here of
one salient general feature
the

^

by -relation.

This is that it is necessarily true
that, if

brings about
^ by bringing about £, then

brings about
case,

^

£ (although

it

S

brings about

is not necessarily true that,

brings about [£ and £]

)

.

£

and

S

in such a

This feature must be incorporated

into our analysis.

Consider problem 4a and, once again, the case of
Jones alerting the burglar by illuminating the room,
illuminating the room by

turning on the light, turning on the light by flipping
the switch,

flipping the switch by raising his hand, but not doing
this last thing
by doing anything else.

How are we to account for this?

Given the

apparatus that has already been set up in this chapter, the answer
comes fairly easily.

If we assume,

as

I

think we should, that [Jones

raises his hand] and [Jones flips the switch] are direct doings of

Jones

s

and that the remainder

(

1.e

,

[Jones turns on the light],

[Jones illuminates the room], and [Jones alerts the burglar] are in-

direct doings of Jones's, then we should note that there appear to be
three main types of the "by"-relation Involved here.

These are,

first, the type which binds a direct doing to a direct doing; second,
the type which binds a direct doing to an indirect doing; and, third,
the type which binds an Indirect doing to an indirect doing.

Let us

call the deed internal to [Jones raises his hand] £, that internal to
[Jones flips the switch] £, that Internal to [Jones turns on the

light] £, that internal to [Jones illuminates the room] £, and that

internal to [Jones alerts the burglar] £.

72

Let us assume that Jones
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brings about each of

£

and

^ relative

to

and

t

correct to assunie that
^ constitutes ^ at

t

'

,

t

'

.

Now

but not

I

^

think it is

is in virtue of this fact
that we say that Jones brings
about

a

by bringing about
£, but not

versa

contributes causally to
£ but not to £?
installs the switch].)

.

(What event is there that

One such event is [someone

Generalizing on this,

I

believe we may say the

following

—

brings about £ directly relative to t and
t' by
bringing about £ directly relative to
and 7' =df.
£
(i) ^ brings about
£ directly relative to t and t';
brings about £ directly relative to t and t';
“
~ and
(iii) £ constitutes
£ at t'.^^

^

’

The type of "by"-relation that obtains between
Jones's bringing about

£

and his bringing about r, however, is not that
type ana-

lyzed in D.IV.35.

For it is hardly likely that it is the case

indeed, for the sake of argument, let us assume that
it is not the

case

that

£

also occurs at £'

;

and so D.1V.35 is inapplicable.

hence

£ does

not constitute

r

at t',

We should note, however, that r is

brought about indirectly by Jones; that this is so in virtue of the
fact that he brings about

£ directly;

and that it seems that we are

prepared to say that he brings about
£ by bringing about £ simply

because it is in virtue of his bringing about
£ that he brings about
£.

Generalizing on this,

I

believe we may say the following:
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s brings about
^ indirectly relative to t and t* K
bringing about
£ directly relative to ~t and t'~=df^
there is an event
£ such that:
(i) S brings about
£ directly relative to t and t'(ii) £ contributes causally
relative to t' and
(XXX
s brings about r
directly relative lo Tanf
tcausally relative to t' and
t*~to
~
~
^(v
(V) r occurs exactly
once at t'; and
(vl) r_ entails £. ^‘^

q-

Once again, however, the type
of "by"-relatlon that obtains
between Jones's bringing about
r and his bringing about
s is neither
that type analyzed in D.IV.35
nor that type analyzed in D.IV.36.
For
it is hardly likely that
it is the case-indeed, for
the sake of argument, let us assume that it
is not the case-that r and
s occur at
the same time; moreover, both
r and s are brought about
Indirectly.
But D.IV.36 may nevertheless
guide us here.
For it appears that r

contributes causally to
a

s,

and that it is in virtue of this
fact chat

by -relation obtains between
Jones's bringing about

bringing about

s.

£

and his

(The same, indeed, may be said of Jones's
bringing

about s and his bringing about

u.

)

It seems,

then, that only minimal

change to clauses (i) and (ill) of D.IV.36
is required to yield the

correct analysis for this case, and

—

IV 3
•

:

1

propose the following:

brings about £ indirectly relative to _t and t*
by
bringing about £ indirectly relative to
and T'
£
~ =df.
there is an event
£ such that:
(i) £ brings about
£ indirectly relative to t and t';
(il) £ contributes causally relative to
t' and t* to £;
(lii) £ brings about
£ Indirectly relative to t and t';
(Iv) £ contributes causally relative to £' and
~t* to £;
(v) £ occurs exactly once at £'
and
(vi) £ entails £.

^

;

We should note that it is not only the case in our example
that

Jones brings about

£

by bringing about £,

tliat

he brings about s by
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bringing about

r,

and so on, but It is also the
case that he brings

about u by bringing about
a

by bringing about

^

^

of

j,.

of

r

j,.

3 and

D.IV.37 yield this result, although

r,
I

and s. that he brings about

and so on.

D.IV.35 through

shall not attempt to establish

this in dGtail here.
But what of

£

in our example?

How is it that Jones brings

this about directly but not by
bringing about some other deed
directly?
That is just the way it is.
(As we shall shortly see,
£ may be

said on this occasion to be a basic
deed of Jones's.)

There is no

real mystery about this; it just happens
that Jones raises his hand
but not by doing anything else.

just

this way.

by willing £.^^

though

I

It is not necessarily this way;

it

Note, of course, that Jones does not
raise his hand

Given D.IV.12, it is easily seen why this is so
(al-

again do not presume that it is necessarily so):

[Jones wills

£] is not a doing, direct or otherwise, of Jones's.

Let us now turn to a consideration of problem 4b.

little more difficult to handle.

This is a

The case to be considered is that of

Jones's raising his hand in order that his neurons may fire;
he succeeds in his endeavor and it therefore seems legitimate to say
that
he causes his neurons to fire by raising his hand.

The oddness of

this case is brought out by the fact that it is reasonable to assume

both that [Jones

s

hand rises] is a direct deed of Jones's and that

[Jones s neurons fire] contributes causal.ly to and precedes [Jones's

hand rises].

Given these assumptions, it turns out that [Jones's neu-

rons fire] is neither a direct deed, nor an Indirect deed, nor a
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synthetic deed, and hence, according
to D.IV.23, not a deed at
all of
Jones's.
In order to deal with this
problem we should note, first,
that Jones does Indeed bring about
[Jones's neurons fire]

event £) unrestrictedly relative to
some times
and, second,

t

and

t'

(call this

(see D.IV.7)

that, although he would appear to
bring about

£ unre-

strxctedly on every occasion on which he
raises his arm, the distinguishing factor in this case is that on
this occasion he intention
brings about 2 unrestrictedly, where:
^

D.1V.38:

intentionally brings about £ unrestrictedly relative
_t and £’
=df.
there is an event £ such that:
(i) ^ wills
at
_t;
and
£
(il) at £' £ comes about, as a result of
~ wills £]
as ^ intends at t.

^

to

Now, the type of "by"-relation at issue in the
present example seems
to be that captured in the following definition:

D.1V.39:

S brings about
£ unrestrictedly relative to _t and t* by
bringing about £ directly relative to _t and _t* =df7
~
there are events £ and £ such that:
(i) ^ wills
£ at £ in order that £ may occur;
(ii) either
(a)
wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes causally relative to ~
£ and ~t’ to ~r
via £ at £*, or
(b)
wills £ in order that £ may occur] contributes causally relative to £ and ~
£* to £
via £ at £'
and
(iii) £ constitutes £ at £'
;

.

At this point we may take either of two paths.
an event, such as £,

Either we may say that

that has been unrestrictedly but Intentionally

brought about and which contributes causally to a deed which is directly

brought about, is itself a genuine deed
in any case,

D.IV.23.

— but

this is clumsy and would,

necessitate extensive revisions to

Or we may say (and this is what

I

D. IV. 8.b, D. IV. 20 and

prefer to say) that an
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event, such as £, that has been
unrestrictedly but intentionally

brought about by means of directly
bringing about some other event
is
an int entional side-effect of the
direct doing in question.
If „e
take this latter path, as

OiIV^:

I

propose, then we may say:

is a side-effect of [S brings
about £ directly relative
_t and _t
-df.
there is a time
J
such that S brines
about ^ unrestrictedly relative to _t and
t* by bTingine
about £ directly relative to t and t'.

£

to

An intentional side-effect will then be
one that has been intentionally brought about unrestrictedly but
will not necessarily be a deed.

Hence my proposed resolution of problem 4b
is that the type of ”by"-

relation at issue is that analyzed in D.IV.39,
that [Jones causes his

neurons to firej is not a doing of Jones’s, that
[Jones's neurons
fire] is not a deed of Jones's but that

[Jones's neurons fire] is in-

deed an intentional side-effect of a direct doing of
Jones's.
V/e

may now turn our attention to problem 4c.

How are we to

account for the fact that Jones drives around the corner first by
signalling, then by braking, then by changing gear, then by turning
the steering-wheel, and then by accelerating

answer is,

I

think, easily given.

out of the corner?

The

The obvious point to make here is

that [Jones drives around the corner] is a synthetic doing composed of
the direct doings

(if they are direct) of his signalling, braking,

and

so on; and it seems to be simply in virtue of this fact that he per-

forms the synthetic action by performing the direct actions.

propose

Hence

I
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brings about
£ syntlietically relative to t and t' h
about £ directly relative
to
and
4f
brings about
(
directly relative to t*
)
£
and t"I
^ =>'“'''=tically relative to t Ind
t’;"anf
(iii) there are events rj^.
such that
— X'
/^\
Lliat
£n oatju
U;
a IS composed relative to ? and t' of r
-1

Ibringing

’

’

.

•

y
»

•

blc:i“i!f“:
(c)

2

(d)

t
_c

•

•

-

£

i<*en-

is not identical with
and
Is not later than t=*,
t* is not later than
and ^ IS not later than
,
t'.

Other types of the "by-'-relation
could be accounted for here-

perhaps the most important of those
that remain unaccounted for
are
those of a person's bringing
about an event
^ synthetically by bringing about an event

event

£ indirectly

£ synthetically

and of a person's bringing about
an

by bringing about an event

£ synthetlcally-but

the foregoing should suffice
as an indication of how these
other types
of

the "by"-relation might be
accounted for.

I

want to turn now to a

very brief discussion of what has
come to be called basic action.
The term "basic action" was first
introduced by Arthur Danto
and has been the subject of much
discussion since that time.^^
Danto' s analysis of the concept differs
from that which

I

shall short-

ly present in significant respects,
and other philosophers' account

also differ from mine.

But, speaking generally,

1

take a basic ac-

tion to be that which Danto and most of these
other philosophers take
it

to be,

namely, an action which is performed, but not by performing

some other action.

Slight complications arise when an attempt is made

to render the concept of basic action more precise,
however, due to

the fact, amply demonstrated above,

that several types of bringing
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about an event

„,ay

be distinguished.

But,

If ue restrict our
atten-

tion to those types of bringing
about an event which are
genuine Instances of acting, Chen our
task is considerably simplified.
For
given D.lV.S.b, only the direct,
indirect or synthetic bringing
about
of an event constitutes
genuine action.
Now, we already know (see

U.IV.36) that, whenever one brings
about an event
£ indirectly, one
does so by bringing about an event
£ directly; and so we also know
(see D.IV.41)

that, whenever one brings about an
event

one does so by bringing about an
event

said

£ directly.

£ synthetically,

It has also been

that It seems impossible that one
should bring about an event

directly by bringing about an event

£ indirectly

(where

is not

£

itself brought about indirectly) and also
impossible that one should

bring about an event

£ directly

by bringing about an event

£ syn-

thetically (where £ is not itself brought about
directly).

Hence,

when it comes to the treatment of basic action,
we may confine our
attention exclusively to direct action, and in light
of this

propose

I

the following:

D.IV.42

^ basically

brings about p directly relative to

=df.
(i)

(ii)

D.1V.43:

brings
there is
directly
directly

^

^ nonbasically
(i)

and

-t'

about £ directly relative to _t and _t
and
no event £ such that ^ brings about
£
relative to _t and £' by bringing about
£
relative to _t and £'
'

brings about

=df.
(ii)

-t

£ directly relative

to

;

~t

and

brings about £ directly relative to _t and t'
and
does not basically bring about £ directly relative
to t and t

^
^

;

'

.

Ihe concepts of a basic doing, a nonbasic doing, a basic deed, and a

nonbasic deed may be analyzed in terms of D.IV.42 and D.IV.43.

I
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shall not present their analyses
here, however, although
it should
be noted that, strictly
speaking, each of these
concepts is both
agent- and time-relative.^^

8.

Omissions

The concept of an omission Is
an interesting one.

tinction between it and the concept
of
seemed elusive to many philosophers.

already set up in this chapter,

I

a

The dis-

mere "non-action" has often

However, given the apparatus

think that this distinction may now

be accounted for.

The term "omit" and its cognates
appear to enjoy a variety of
uses.

This makes it difficult to arrive at
a definitive judgment as

to exactly what constitutes an omission.

One point seems especially

clear, however, and that is that there
is a distinction to be made

between omitting to perform a particular action
and simply not performing that action.

But what is this distinction?

D'Arcy makes this

claim:

A person is said to have omitted X if, and only if,
(1) he
did not do X, and (2) X was in some way expected of him.^O
This is suggestive, but difficult to evaluate.

stand the phrase

How are we to under-

X was in some way expected of him"?

Are we to un0

derstand this to mean that the person in question was under some obligation, whether moral, legal, or whatever, to do X?

Perhaps his being

under such an obligation combined with his not doing X is sufficient
for his omitting X (although

1

am not persuaded of this), but it

hardly seems necessary for his omitting

X.

Suppose

I

consciously
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decide nol lo pecfo™ an
acUon and. as a nesnU. do
nol penlo™
can „e nol legUl^alely
say thal, u„den such
clncu.slances I dellbenately omitted to perform lt7
I believe so;
and no mention of an
obligation bas been made.
Is there some other
„ay. then, to understand
D'Arcy’s phrase "X was In
some way expected of him"
which renders his
criterion true? There is none
that I know of.

u

,

It might seem that a
necessary condition of omitting
to per-

form an action Is being able
to perform that action.
think, is also false.

But this.

I

For Instance, suppose Smith
is sitting In a

chair on his porch and a
car-accident occurs in the street
right outside his house.
He witnesses the accident
and debates whether or not
to go to the aid of the
victims.
He decides not to and. as
a result,
does not.
Surely we may legitimately say
that, under these circumstances. Smith has omitted to go
to the aid of the victims.

(Of

course, we would probably describe
his behavior In stronger terms than

merely "He omitted to go to the aid
of the victims"; nevertheless, the
phrase seems applicable.)

What If. unknown to Smith, he was secured

to the chair In such a fashion
chat, had he decided to go to the aid
of the victims, he would have
discovered himself unable to do so?

This fact seems to me not to warrant
retracting the claim that he

omitted to go to their aid.
Other necessary conditions of omitting to act might
be proposed, such as that the agent must consider the
action in question,

believe himself able to perform the action. Intend to perform
the
action, and so on.

But it is difficult to determine whether or not
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these conditions are in fact
necessary for the emission
to act.
Perhaps „e Should try a different
tack and atte.pt to work
our way back
fro. the concept of intentional
o.ission to that of omission
in
general
Let us consider again
gdxn cne
the case of Smith's not
going to the aid
of the victims of the
car-accident

intentional o.ission.

Th-io seems
cro
This
to be a clear case of
,

It seems that,

in this case.

to go to the aid of the
victims and that,
to the aid of the victims
occurred.

Smith decided not

as a result, his not going

Smith did not just not go to

the aid of the victims; his not
going was a consequence of a
conscious

volition of his not to go.
need,

I

In order to generalize on this
case we

believe, to Invoke the concept of
"can."

Now, there are many

types of "can," but the one that is
involved here is,

which is analyzed in D.V1.8 below.

I

think, that

This type of "can" may be charac-

terized roughly by the statement that
a person can perform an action
if and only if he has the ability
and the opportunity to perform it.

With this rough understanding of "can" in
mind, we may assert the
following
D IV. 44
.

.

^

intentionally omits to bring about
actively relative
_t
and _t' =df.
there is an event p such that:
(i) ^ accepts
cannot at _t bring about [p and p]
actively relative to p and p' at
p;
(ii) ^ intentionally brings about
p actively relative

to

]

to

(iii)

p and p' and
does
not bring about
p
and p'
;

p actively relative

to

~t

.

Note that it would not do to call upon

D.

11.12 (where the concept of

the negation of an event is analyzed) and substitute for
the definlens
of D.IV.44 the following:

p intentionally

brings about the negation of
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£

iictively relative to

_t

and

_

i?
For
whatever
i

^ brings about must be
an event, and yet there
is no 2 uaran^«<^
that the negation of an event
is itself an event.
Of t-ourse,
course D.IV.44
n
/ /
suggests that we should also
say
D.IV.45:

omits to bring about
£ actively relative to ~t and ~t'
there is an event
£ such that:
(i) S accepts [S cannot
at t bring about
[p
^ and ^q]
relative to t and t
at t

-df.

*

]

fiil^

I

^

oes not

;

^""tively relative to

ring about

t

and

£ actively relative

t

to

'

;

_t

and
and

And these theorems result:
T.IV.IO:

Necessarily, if S omits to bring
about £ actively relafive to £ and _t'7 then
£ acts relative to t and t'.

T.lV.ll:

Necessarily, if S omits to bring
about £ actively relative to £ and t
then £ does not bring about
£ actively
relative to t and
'

The following is, of course, not
a theorem:
if ^ does not bring about
£ actively relaand
£'
then £ omits to bring about
£
p actively
sl
j
relative to t and t'.
»

tive to

Now,

,

the trouble experienced earlier in
attempting to deter-

mine what is and what is not a necessary
condition of omitting to perform an action causes me to hesitate to
assert that our common concept
of omission is adequately captured by
D.IV.45.

noted here, however.

Two points should be

First, it might just be that there is no ade-

quate definition of the term

''omit''

and its cognates; perhaps this

term is irreducibly ambiguous or the concept it expresses
irreducibly
vague.

Nevertheless, some interesting concept (whether or not it is

properly called the concept of omission) £s captured by D.IV.45.
Secondly, despite my hesitation in claiming that D.IV.45 adequately
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captures our common concept of
omission,

I

am far less hesitant
in

making this claim with respect
to D.IV.44 and the
concept of inal omission.
That is. D.1V.44 appears to
me to be accurate and in
accordance with our common concept
of intentional omission.
But if
this is so, D.IV.45 thereby
receives some indirect support.
is surely true that,

tively relative to

relative to

£

and

^

if S

and

t

;

For it

intentionally omits to bring about
t

'

,

then S omits to bring about

j,

ac-

£ actively

and so we should not assert that
certain con-

ditions are necessary for the omission
to perform an act if we are
not
prepared to assert in D.IV.44 that they
are also necessary for the
intentional omission to perform an act.
In any case, I shall stick with
D.IV.44 and D.IV.45.

present account of omission is unsatisfactory,
this is not,

If the
I

think,

so much a fault of the theory presented
in this chapter as a fault

with the English language: it is just not
clear whether there are precise rules that may be drawn up for the use
of the term ''omit” and its
cognates.

If there is an important sense of "omit”
other than that

captured in D.IV.45, the present theory,

I

submit, could be extended

OO

to account for this sense.

Now, what of problems 5a and 5b?

The latter is taken care of

simply by noting the distinction between D.IV.44 and D.IV.45.
is an intentional aspect to every omission

— for

There

there is a volition

involved in every omission, just as there is in every other type of
action; but not every omission is intentional, just as not every action is intentional.

A resolution of problem 5a, however, is not so
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easily achieved.

We should distinguish between the
concept of omit-

ting to bring about

2 actively and

that of falling to bring about
£

actively, where:
s

fails to bring about

=df.
(i)

(ii)
(iii)

But,

£ actively relative

is not later than _t
~
exists at £; and
does not bring about
and t'.

£
£
£

'

to

—t

and

—t

'

;

£ actively relative

to —
t

although there is this distinction, telling, on a
particular oc-

casion, whether or not a failure to act is also
a genuine omission

may be very difficult.

Knowing the fact that, as attested by T.IV.IO,

an omission is yet an action whereas a failure to
act may not be, may
be of no practical help.

For instance, are any of the currently oc-

curring events of my not eating, not drinking, not walking on
Fifth
Avenue, not sunbathing in the Bahamas, and not propounding a disproof
of Goldbach's conjecture omissions?

In order to determine this one

must take stock of the causal history of these failures to act and try
to figure out whether or not they are causally related to any volition

of mine, constituted by any deed of mine, and so on.

This is extra-

ordinarily difficult, especially if none of these are intentional
omissions of mine.

But the problem of correctly applying the concepts

of an omission and of a mere failure to act is distinct from that of

distinguishing these concepts, and it is only the latter problem the
means of whose resolution

I

claim to have provided in this section.
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9^.

In Section

2

Willing, Decidi ng, and Chnn.c.in»

it was mentioned that
there are two main
cate-

gories of decision-making,
the practical and the
theoretical.
We
Should now note that there
are. moreover, two distinct
ways to make a
practical decision that a state
of affairs should occur.
One way is
sln.ply to form an
intention that

the state of affairs should
occur;

the other is to will the
state of affairs.

As an Illustration, con-

sider the case where, at one
point during the afternoon.
Smith decides to watch television
later that night and, when
night comes, he
turns on the television.
It seems correct to say
that Smith has made
at least two decisions in
this case.
The first is the one he makes
In the afternoon; the second
immediately precedes the television's

going

on— Indeed,

It

Is a or the cause of the
television's going on.

Despite their close relation, these
two decisions are of distinct
types.

The first,

clslon^.

I

shall say. Is a decision^, and the
second a de-

Neither type of decision Is reducible
to the other.

Put

another way: the term "decision” Is
ambiguous.
A decision^^ Is the formation of an
Intention.

may or may not come about as a result
of deliberation.

Such a decision

Smith's deci-

sion to watch television later that
night may be Impetuous, or It may
be based on the facts that a good program
will be on, that he has no

other commitments, and so on.
ever,

Wliether Impetuous or deliberate, how-

the decision Itself to watch television later
that night seems

to consist In nothing more than his beginning
to Intend to watch tele-

vision later that night.

I

therefore propose the following:
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decides £ at t =df.
^ intends £ at _t; and
(li) there is a time _t'
such that
(a) £' is just prior
to _t, and
(b) ^ does not intend
£ at t'.

^

(i)

^

Alternative locutions for "S decides^
£ at t" are: "s n,akes at
the decision^ that
should occur"

£

that

and "S fonns at

t

the intention

t

£ should occur."
Two points should be made
concerning D.IV.47.

First, it may

seem to some that a third clause
should be added to this definition,
to wit, "(ill) s considers
£ at t " But I am not persuaded that all
.

declsion^-maklng is or must be "conscious"
(although
most of It is), and so
whereas, when

I

have not supplied such a clause.

I

Intend that

sult of my decision, this is not so when

cisions^ just are volitions.

^
Hence A. IV.

decides £
2
wills £ at

_t

I

£ should occur

as a re-

make a declslonj.

For de-

Or more precisely:

t =df.
there is an event
in order that
£ may occur.

and A. IV. 11 apply to decisions

9

Secondly,

make a decision^ that a state of
affairs £ should oc-

I

cur, there Is no necessity that

S

am sure that

I

2

,

£

such that

even though they do not

apply to decisions^.

Decisions^ and declsions
2

of deliberation.
D. IV. 49:

alike may or may not be the outcome

We may say:

^ deliberately decides^ £

_t

=df.

such that:
2
(i)
is just prior to _t;
£] is riot later than £„ ^od
later than £
(iii) £ considers
decides- £] at
considers [£ decides, £] at
£

Jt

>

•

•

.

,

there are times

~t,

_t^

.

.

.

and

—t n-1
i

is not

;

(iv)

£

decideSj^

£

at

t.

t-

^

;

and
and

.

.

.

and

~S

,
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(Compare D.IV.32.)

An analogous analysis
of the concept of
deliber—
ate decislon^-maklng
(where "decides^"
replaces decidesj^" in
D.IV.49)
may be given.
At this juncture we
shouldu note a point at
u
which
the account
of action proposed
here is nm
j
accordance
with common English
usage.
Volitions are often uescribed
described Iff they are
described at alli

—

•

-f

as "willings to do” or
"willings to act.”^^

But it is clear from
the

foregoing account that it is
not necessarily the
case that every ob
iect of a volition is a doing.®^
For instance, in earlier
sections of
this chapter I have taken
pains to state that, in
normal circumstances,
when Smith raises his arm
what he wills Is not
[Smith raises his arm]
but [Smith's arm rises].
Nevertheless, common English
usage is such
that we would probably say
"Smith wills to raise his arm"
rather than
"Smith wills that his arm should
rise." This is especially clear
when
"decides" (that is, "decldesj")
replaces "wills." Whatever the
reasons for such usage, however,

I

believe that it is misleading.

When, for instance. Smith turns
on the television, the television

goes on as a result of a decision^
of his.

If his action is deliber-

ate, then his decision^ is
that the television should go on; it
is
not that he should turn on
the television.

Nevertheless, it is of

course perfectly possible for Smith
to decide^ both that he should
turn on the television and that
the television should go on.

That is

doings may well be and. Indeed, often
are the objects of decisions
and if the agent is rational (and
understands A. IV. 10 above), then,
I

believe, whenever he decideSj^ that a doing
should occur, then he

;
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also decides^ that the event
Internal to that doing should
occur.
It

is seldom,

if ever,

But

the case that a doing is the
object of a decl-

sion^ (despite the tendency in
English to describe the object of a

decision^ as if it were a doing).
is that a decision
2

Briefly put, the reason for this

effective, is a component or part of, rather

>

than a cause of, a doing, and it is thus
that the agent intends it.

This should be clear from the foregoing
account of action.

Despite the fact that a sharp distinction must
be drawn between the concept of a decision^ and that of
a decision

theless often the case that when a decision
2

also.

Given A. IV.

7

2

never-

,

°^^urs a declsion^^ occurs

and A. IV. 10, it follows, from ^'s willing

£

occur, that

Now, it

in order that

^ may

may be that

did not intend either of these just prior to

^

this is so, then ^'s deciding
2

decidingj^ them.

both

£

and

interim?

But what if

^ should occur

^

^ intends both £

both

£

and

^

and

^

at

_t.

£

at

is accompanied by his

has decided^ some time prior to

t

that

and his intention has not lapsed in the

In such a case, although it is true that he decides
_t,

t

If

t.

2

and

at

he does not decide^ them.

Nevertheless, there is,

both

£

I

believe, something that he does decide^^ should occur, and that is
that, for some time £*,

wills

contribute causally relative to
A. IV. 11 above.)

2

_t

in order that

and

jt*

to £.

£

may occur] should

(Compare A. IV. 9 and

The example of Smith's turning on the television is

a case in point.

decides

£

the event

Let us say that in this case it is at

_t

that Smith

(call it £) internal to his turning on the televi-

sion; he does not at the same time decide^^ £, for he already decided^
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It earlier in the
afternoon.

decide^ that, for

so.ne

causally relative to

£

time £•
and t'

However, when he decides^
,

[Smith decides^

to

j>.

j,)

Nevertheless.

he does

£

should contribut.
I

do not think we

can assume the truth
of the following:
(22)

affairs

^

If
decides £ at t, then there
is a state
I that
such
at t.
^ decides^

The following case renders
(22) dubious.

Suppose that in the after-

noon Smith decides^ to
watch television later that night,
but suppose
also that he has two
particular times t and t’ in mind
and that he
decidesj^ in the afternoon
that a decision

that the event
2
(call It £) internal to his
turning on the television should
occur,
should contribute causally
relative to t and t' to
this case

m

It

is not true that Smith
decides^ at

t

that his decisiou

£

2

should occur should contribute
causally relative to

t

and

to £.

_t'

there any other plausible candidate
for a decision^ by Smith
at

In such a case, then, it seems
that the agent decides

_t.

2

event

£

an

and yet does not also decide^ an
event £.

The concept of a choice may be analyzed
in terms of the concepts of a decision and an alternative.

The latter concept involves

that concept of "can” already used in D.IV.44
and D.IV.45 and analyzed
in D.VI.8 below.

£
£

We may say:

is an alternative to

£ for
and £* such that:
(i) £ can at
£ bring about
£*

(ii)

1

at

£

actively relative to

£

=df.

there are times
t'

and

can at £ bring about
£ actively relative to ~t’ and
and
(ill) £ cannot at
£ bring about [£ and £] actively relative to t' and t*.

£

£*

;
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might be thought that the definlens
of D.IV.50 should include a
belief-condition of some sort. This
is not so.
A distinction must
be made between the concept of
a genuine alternative and
that of an
It

apparent alternative, and It is the
former that
ture by means of D.1V.50.

have tried to cap-

I

Nevertheless, a belief-condition should
be

Included in the analysis of the concept
of choosing, and
clude such a condition.

shall in-

I

Note that there are two main types
of choice

Just as there are two main types of
(practical) decision.

D^IV^:
I

chooses^
(i)

(ii)

at

£

-df.

there are an
such that:
is just prior to _t;
is not later than t
and
later than t
^ accepts [p^ is an alternative
_t^ and
and at t
there is a time
such~that
(a)
is identical with
or
identical with ^
and^
(b) S considers
decides £]
there is a time _t' such that
ia identical with t., or
identical with t
and'^
(b) ^ considers [S decides,
at t.
^ decides^

—1’ —2’

•

•

•

t

event

We may say:

£ and

times

>

.

.

and

.

t

-ii-l,

is not

;

(lii)

.

.

to

for

S

or

~t

or

~t

at ~
t]

.

;

(iv)

.

.

,

'

is

*

is

,

(v)

at
•

~
jt

•

'

;

.

,

(vi)

at

An analogous analysis of the concept of choosing
2

replaces

decides^" in D.IV.51) may be given.

_t

'

;

and

(where ”decides

"
2

Note that the follow-

ing is a theorem:
T. IV. 12

Necessarily, if

:

decideSj^

£

^

chooses^^

An analogous theorem for choices
2

be given.

hold,

1

.

choices
2

e

)

p^

at

_t,

then

^

deliberately

at t.

and decisions

2

niay of

course also

It may seem that T. IV. 12 and its analogue ought not to
,

that it is possible for some choices (whether choices^ or

to be impetuous.

llliile

I

agree that some choices may indeed
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be capricious or whimsical,
It seems to me
Impossible that they should
be impetuous (or, at least.
Impetuous In the sense
that I use the term

"impetuous").

If

there has been no
consideration or deliberation
at

all of what the agent takes
to be alternative
events, then the agent
cannot choose between them.
In summation,

let us take explicit note
of the main implica-

tion-relations of the concepts of
willing, deciding, and choosing.
If we say:
DiIVc_52:

BiiVilS:

S decides
£ at t =df.
decides^ £ at _t;

either

~S

decides, £
at
^ p

_c
t

or £
S

chooses £ at t =df.
chooses^ £ at £;

either

S

chooses, ^
at
1 p

t

or _
S

S

then we may note that the following
are theorems:

TiHLll:

Necessarily, If

s

wills £ at

TrlV^:

Necessarily, If

s

chooses

£

t,

then S decides

at t,

£

then S decides

at t.

£

at

t.

The following are not theorems, however:
(23)

Necessarily, if

^

wills

Necessarily, if

^

decides

£

at

_t,

then

Necessarily, if

S

chooses

£

at

_t,

Necessarily, if

^

decides

£

£

at

then

chooses

£

at

^

wills

£

at t.

then

^

wills

£

at

at £, then

^

chooses

_t,

^

£

_t.

t.

at t.

Noting these theorems and non-theorems constitutes
a resolution of

problem 6a.
called a

short-range” decision (or choice) and what was called a

long-range
sion
2

As for problem 6b, the distinction between what was

decision (or choice) is the same as that between a deci-

(or choice^) and a decision^

(or choice^^).

With the resolution

of these final two problems we may now turn from an exposition
of the
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posed theory of action to
a brief consideration
of three f undamental objections to
it, objections which have
been forcefully voiced
in
the past against
accounts of action vdiich share
some basic features
with the present account.

10.

Objections to the Theory

The point made in the final
paragraph of section 4 above bears
repeating.
In this chapter I have not
attempted to account for every

legitimate use of the term "action”
and its cognates; nor have I
attempted to legislate as to their
use.
The point holds also of such
terms as intention," "omission,"
"decision," and so on. What I have
sought to do is to isolate and
to analyze some particularly
important
concepts and to show how they may be
coordinated so that an acceptable
theory of human action results-a
theory, moreover, which may serve as
a basis for the

resolution of problems in other areas of
philosophy.

But, in order to bolster the claim
that the theory is acceptable,

three fundamental objections to it must
be dealt with.
The first objection concerns the concept
of Intention and the

use to which

I

have put it.

Thomson says: "My suspicion is that those

who think intentlonality is the mark of action
would do best to give
up the idea of defining either 'act'
is one to which

hasty?

I

have paid no heed.

In the last chapter

I

or 'agent.

But have

I

perhaps not been too

noted that Annette Baier claims that the

proper objects of intention are actions,
think this claim is mistaken.

This suspicion

and

I

said there that

Nevertheless, it seems to have a

I
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certain plausibility, for is it
not the case that whenever
I intend
something, I intend to do something,
and is it perhaps not more
ac—
curate to say that the doing
rather than the something is
the object
of my intention?
In answer to this question,

it should first be noted
that the

primitive locution "S intends £" that

1

have adopted, if rendered into

English proper without the use of
variables, would read something like
"This person intends that that
should be the case" and not "This person intends to do that."
(Once again, I do not claim that the
concept
that

I

seek to express by means of the term
"intend" and its cognates

IS the concept which is unfailingly
expressed by these terms whenever

they are employed by competent speakers
of English.
do believe that of ten— indeed very
,

Nevertheless,

often— these terms are used

competent speakers of English to express this
very concept.)

1

by

This

understanding of the primitive locution mirrors that
appropriate to

^

accepts

£ which,

if rendered into English proper, would read

something like "This person accepts (or believes) that
that is the
case.

Now, it is true that that concept of intention with
which

1

am concerned has an intimate connection with that concept
of action

with which

I

am concerned, other than simply serving as a building-

block for the analysis of the latter.

For instance, accepting

often been characterized as a disposition to assert
£; and

I

£

has

think it

is in some sense true (given an appropriate intuitive understanding

of

disposition") that intending

occurs.

Very often, indeed, if

£

^

is a disposition to act so that

intends

£

£

then he will try to make
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sure that

j.

ofren. if

s

Is a dead either of
his or of someone else's;
and so. very

Intends e then

£

is,

for S. a "would-be deed."

But this

is not always the
case.^^

Perhaps, however, the elaim
that Bater and others
intend to
-ake, in saying that the
proper objects of Intention
are actions, is
not that if s intends
£ then £ is. for S. often or even always a
would-be deed, but that if S
intends £ then
£ is a doing of S's.
Now,

it is true that we often
utter such sentences as "Smith
Intends

to buy a new car,"
"Jones Intends to go to lunch,"
and so on.

In

circumstances, it is true, the
objects of intention that are
attributed to Smith and Jones are
doings of Smith and Jones, respectively.
That is, "Smith Intends to buy
a new car" is, I believe,

equivalent to "Smith intends [Smith
buys a new car]." and "Jones intends to go to lunch" IS, I believe,
equivalent to "Jones intends
[Jones goes to lunch)"; and both
[Smith buys a new car] and [Jones

goes to lunch] are doings.

But to acknowledge that doings may
be

the objects of intention is a far
cry from acknowledging that doings

and only doings may be the objects
of intention.

course, that

I

The fact is, of

believe states of affairs other than doings
may be the

objects of intention, and

I

think the examples cited in the foregoing

sections (such as "Smith intends that Jones
should be happy," "I intend that Smith's car should be waiting
in front of the bank at

3

p.m.,

January 4, 1980," and so on) are ample evidence that
this belief is
correct.

Moreover, given that the present treatment of intention
is

easily able to accommodate the fact that doings may be the objects
of
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intention, the contention that this
treatment is incorrect or Inadequate is surely undermined.
The second objection concerns the cogency
of the concept of

volition.

In the past it has been both vigorously
asserted and vigor-

ously denied that the concept of
volition is incoherent.

Perhaps

Gilbert Ryle is the first in recent times
to have mounted a sustained

attack against the concept of volition.
following points.

In particular, Ryle makes the

First, he says, the concept of volition is
a

philosopher's artifice that serves no useful purpose;
secondly, there
are no predicates by which volitions may be
described other than in-

directly by means of a description of the events willed;
thirdly, the
existence of volitions is not asserted on empirical
grounds ("ordinary men," he says, are never aware of their own volitions,
and no one
can witness the volitions of others); fourthly, a theory
of volitions

requires a transaction between mind and body where there can be none;
and finally, there is a danger of infinite regress if volitions are

themselves regarded as deeds, such that they themselves must be
willed.

Richard Taylor has taken up Ryle's banner and proposed the
same and related arguments.

He says:

Surely when I say I can move my finger, and know that what I
am saying is true, I am not expressing the idea of a causal
connection between the behavior of my finger and some such
internal hocus-pocus as this 1 e.
a motion-of-this-f inger
volition], the occurrence of which I can seriously doubt.
Besides, even if this picture were not quite fantastic from
the standpoint of ordinary experience, we can wonder whether
I can bring about such an internal mental cause ...
If I
can then to what further internal events are these causally
[

,

.

,
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related? And if 1 ^annot how
can we still say
^ that
move my finger after all?92

I

can

Taylor notes that the theory of
volitions is not based on any empirical evidence and claims that
the theory is the "offspring of the

marriage" between the metaphysical
presupposition that every event
must be caused by some other event
and the "bewitchment of grammar"

which IS responsible for the move from
"voluntary" to "volition.
(He does not mean to imply by this,
however,

that deeds are uncaused,

but only that they are not caused by
volitions.)

Taylor also claims

that volitions are referred to always in
terms of their alleged ef-

fects and never in terms of themselves and,
further, that it is im-

possible to refer to them otherwise.

He argues that, since in any

true causal relationship, if one knows what the
relata are, one can

always describe the relata independently of each other,
volitions are

purely fictional. 95

He says that it is "absurd" to suppose that every

voluntary motion is and must be caused by anything like a volition.
(In this connection,

by "anything like" Taylor means to include deci-

sions, choices, desires, tryings, intentions, and so on.^^)

Taylor claims that, in order for a volition to be
cause it; and hence, if

1

Moreover,

volition,

I

must

can cause a volition, why not cut volitions

entirely out of the picture and say simply that

go
I_

cause my actions?

Several philosophers have been persuaded by arguments such as
those proposed by Ryle and Taylor.

For instance, H.L.A. Hart opposes

the volitional theory; 99 D'Arcy is content to say 100 simply that the

volitional theory has been successfully undermined by the arguments
of Ryle,

Hart, Wittgenstein^^^ and Anscombe;^^^ Arthur Danto has
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denounced the concept of volition
have done likewise.

concept of volition.

and there are many others who

In particular, Melden has inveighed
against the

Like Ryle, he asks:

If I perform an act by per-

forming an act of volition, by what
means do

volition?

By another act of volition?

willing quickly ensues.

If not,

volition in the first place.

perform the act of

I

If so,

an infinite regress of

there is no need for the concept of

Melden also relies particularly

heavily on the argument that, if a volition (or
indeed, any mental
event, such as a motive, a desire, a choice,
a decision) is to be
the cause of an action, then it must be describable
independently of

its alleged effect, but that this cannot be
accomplished

.

He says

This then is the logical Incoherence involved in the
doctrine
of acts of volition.
Acts of volition are alleged to be
direct causes of certain bodily phenomena
just as the
latter are causes of the raising of one’s arm.
But no
account of the alleged volitions is intelligible that does
not involve a reference to the relevant bodily phenomena.
And no interior cause, mental or physiological, can have this
logical feature of volition.
Let the interior event which we
call ’the act of volition’ be mental or physical (which it is
will make no difference at all) it must be logically distinct
from the alleged effect: this surely is one lesson we can derive from a reading of Hume’s discussion of causation. Yet
nothing can be an act of volition that is not logically connected with that which is willed; the act of willing is intelligible only as the act of willing whatever it is that is
willed.
In short, there could not be such an interior event
like an act of volition since
nothing of that sort could
have the required logical consequences
.

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

.

.

Melden also argues that if (to paraphrase) my moving my finger leftward is distinct from my moving my finger rightward, then each of the

volitions which allegedly cause these movements must be distinct, and
this in turn implies,

first, that it must be possible to offer a set

of characterizations for each of these acts of volition and, secondly,
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that

I

have learnt that each volition
corresponds to its appropriate

effect.

However neither of these,
he claims, is the case.

Those who reject the theory
of volitions naturally do
not reject the applicability of the
concepts of decision and choice;
but
y do of course deny that a decision
or a choice may be a volition,

and hence D.IV.49 and D.IV.52
are unacceptable to them.

Perhaps J.L.

Evans was the first seriously
to attempt to accommodate Ryle's
criticisms of the theory of volitions
in a theory of choice.
According
to Evans,

there is a radical distinction
to be made between the con-

cepts of decision and choice; for,
whereas deciding constitutes a

£ reparation

for action, choosing, on Evans's
account,

the "standard" sense of "choosing").

although not, of course,

vl^ ver^;

acting (in

That is, all choosing is acting,
in particular, choosing is

doing this-rather-than-that" or "taking
this-rather-than-that

.

Evans's theory is based mainly on the claim
that the proposition ex-

pressed by the sentence "I chose to do A but did not
do it" is selfcontradictory, whereas the proposition expressed by "I
decided to do

A but did not do it" is not.

P.H. Nowell-Smith proposes a theory

similar to Evans's theory, where choosing is regarded as an
act of
selecting.

He says:

Choosing is not just doing, nor is it something other than
doing and causally connected to it, it is doing-this-ratherthan-that
Taylor has adopted a similar theory of choice and has constructed a

parallel theory of trying.

According to him, both choosing and

trying constitute types of acting.

Desires, motives and so on may
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also, presumably, be
accounted for without recourse
to a theory of
And so It IS that the
anti-volitionists claim that per-

atisfactory theories of readily
acknowledged mental phenomena

y

oice, desire, and so
on, may be constructed without
having
to invoke the
repugnant notion of volition.

There is, then, a considerable
philosophical tradition in op-

position to the theory of
volitions.
111 founded.

Nevertheless,

I

believe it is

It will not have escaped
the reader's attention that

much of the so-called
arguments against the theory of
volitions is
nothing more than an intriguing
exercise in philosophical rhetoric.
What genuine arguments there
are embedded in all of this may,
be fairly easily dealt with.

I

think,

In what follows I shall make no
attempt

to answer the anti-volitionists
point for point, but shall settle

simply for addressing myself to
their more important criticisms.
I

think that it is a measure of the
weakness of the anti-

volitionists' position that their alternative
accounts of deciding,

choosing and so on are so obviously wanting.

To consider their pre-

ferred account of choosing: surely it is
plainly false that a chosen
act is identical with the choosing of
the act.

May not a person,

whose arm is paralyzed and who is ignorant of
this fact, choose

nevertheless that his arm should rise?
type of choise that

I

(I

have called choice
2

.)

am here talking of that

Surely he may, and yet

just as surely his arm will not rise (at least, if it
does rise, its

rising will not be of his choosing).

Taylor, when discussing the con-

cept of trying, claims that trying to do something

itself const!-
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tutes doing something

some sort.

typically,

^ will

be an exertion of physical

A corollary of this position,
which Taylor

acknowledges, is that a
person who is completely paralyzed
cannot even
try to move a limb,
let alone succeed in doing so.
Taylor is prepared to accept this corollary;
and yet, even if there is perhaps
some
plausibility to the suggestion
that trying is the exertion of
physical
effort (that this suggestion
is plausible is certainly not
obvious),
this simply IS not the case
with choosing, and so this solution
is
not at hand for an account
of the choices made in ignorance
by para-

lyzed persons.

Moreover, it is surely not the case,
as Evans claims, or at
least not obviously the case, that
the proposition expressed by the

sentence "l chose to do A but did not
do it” is self-contradictory.
W.D. Glasgow points out that the
seeming oddness of such a sentence
is due to the fact that

umbrella

chose,” when so used, normally performs an

function and is used to mean the same as "chose
and did.”^^^

It is obviously inconsistent for a person
to say ”l chose and did A

but did not do it.”^^^

brella

But, when "chose” does not perform an "um-

function, there is nothing inconsistent in saying "I
chose

to do A but did not do it.”

After all, a person may choose to take

a vacation and never live to see his choice fulfilled.

In fact, when

the distinction between the concepts of choice^^ and choice2 is
made

explicit, it is clear that the anti-volitionist theory of choice

favored by Evans, Nowell-Smith and Taylor is, ironically, in general
unable to account for those non-volitional choices that

1

I

have called

221

114

choices

'

1

Similarly troubling points concerning
anti-volitionist

theories of deciding, trying, and
so on may be raised,

believe.

I

But the most telling point
of all is that there is no need even
to

entertain such alternative theories,
for the anti-volitionists' criticisms of the theory of volitions
are unsound.
I shall consider in
turn their three most important
criticisms, namely:

that based, first,

on the claim that the theory of
volitions has no empirical basis;

secondly, that based on the claim that the
theory requires an infinite
(and presumably vicious) regress of willing;
and finally,

that based

on the claim that a volition and its
effect must admit of logically

independent descriptions.
In order to evaluate the first criticism we
must ask what sort

of things volitions or willings are.

Two of the staunchest advocates

in recent years of the theory of volitions are
Wilfrid

Sellars and

Bruce Aune, and according to them volitions are thoughts.

Sellars

sometimes says that volitions are thoughts of the form "I shall now
bring about X (or avert Z) by Y-ing" or of the form "I shall now do A
in order to bring about (or avert)

sometimes he says that they

are thoughts of the form "I shall do A here and now.”^^^

Aune re-

gards volitions to be thoughts of the form "I will do A here and

now.”

By stipulating that volitions are thoughts of this type of

form, both philosophers apparently regard volitions to be a species
of "occurrent” intention.

Now,

I

think that talk of the "form" of

thoughts is unclear and that the distinction between "occurrent" and

t
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"dispositional" intentions is also unclear.

Nevertheless,

1

have

assumed that a person's willing a state of affairs
£ implies both his
intending

£

and his considering

£

(see A. IV.

7

and A. IV. 8), and this

contention is obviously closely connected with the
contention that

volitions are a species of occurrent intention.

Moreover,

I

see no

reason to disagree with the claim that willing an event is having
a

certain type of thought, and the question that must now be treated is:
Wliat

empirical evidence do we have that volitions occur?

Although we obviously do not have empirical evidence of all
our thoughts, it is clear that we do have such evidence of some of
them, if Introspection (whatever that is, exactly) may be said to

yield empirical evidence.

I

believe that introspection reveals the

existence of volitions, especially when volitions are frustrated or

require great resolution.
I

This is of necessity a personal matter, but

see no reason to bow to the assertions, so forcefully voiced by such

anti-volitionists as Ryle and Taylor, to the effect that no one ever
has any experience of volitions.

lift a heavy object,

When

I

make a real effort, say, to

am often aware of a "Right!" or a "Now!"

I

spoken, as it were, sotto voce in my mind.

thoughts of mine, and
tions.

Of course,

I

These phrases express

see no reason to doubt that they are voli-

this is not a clear-cut matter, but if, as Aune for

example claims, a volition is a thought which more often than not is
not accompanied by any imagery, it is hardly surprising that philoso-

phers have failed to discern any "tell-tale phenomenal marks" of volitions in general.

Whether or not, then, there is empirical evl-
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dence of volitions is a
matter of soma debate; it is
not obvious that
there is, but nor is it
obvious, as some of the
antl-volitlonlsts
claim, that there is no
such evidence.
However, it seems to me that
the most Important point
to be made here is that the
presence or absence of empirical evidence
for volitions is not strictly
relevant to

acceptability of a volitional account
of action such as that proposed in this chapter.
Simply put, theories do not have
to be empirically founded to be acceptable-if
they did, the theory of events
proposed in Chapter II would be quite
unacceptable—and the antlvolltionlsts’ insistence that the theory
of volitions be empirically

founded seems to me to be an outmoded
legacy of logical positivism.
Of course, empirical evidence of
volitions cannot hurt the volition-

ists
said,

attempt to render their position acceptable;
but, as
I

I

have

believe that such evidence is forthcoming anyhow.

With regard to the second point concerning an
infinite regress of willing, the proper answer to this
criticism is easily given.
Even though volitions are often called "acts of will,"
they are not,
in general, deeds. 119 This being so, there is
absolutely no ground
for assuming that an Infinite regress of willing arises
on the theory
120 ^
or volitions.
It may seem to the reader that, in admitting that
'^‘^lltions are not deeds,

the volitionist is unable to provide a satis-

factory theory of free human action.

This is not so; indeed, the

issues of free action and of volitions' causal relation to action are
^ritirely separate, as

I

shall seek to show in Chapter VI.

Finally, what of the claim that volitions and their causes

I
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ought to be independently
describabie?
unwarranted.

Again, this claim is entirely

Note, first, that the antl-volltlonists'
point has ab-

solutely no bearing on the analysis
of the concept of action
proposed
above where action is unsuccessful
(for, in the case of
unsuccessful
action, the description of the effect
of the volition, i.e.
of the
,

deed, will be quite independent
of the description of the
volition),

and that, if it has any bearing at all,
it has this only with
respect
to successful action.

But this is certainly an odd situation,
suf-

ficient to give the objector pause.

Moreover, Sellars argues that

the logical relation between a volition
and its effect, if there is

one, IS not that of entailment or
implication but of "aboutness"; he

says that, if the present objection of the
anti-volitionists were
sound, an analogous argument could be made
to the effect that a red

book could not be the cause of the perceptual
belief that one is confronted with a red book.^^^

This is,

1

think, a telling point.

But

it is Bruce Goldberg, when commenting on Melden's
argument as it per-

tains to the concept of desire in particular, who has
best brought
out the fallacy inherent in the present criticism.

Goldberg says

(and his point has equal force when "volition" is substituted for

"desire" )

Melden s strongest case seems to be where the description of
the desire Includes a description of the event which it is
alleged causally to explain.
The general principle
here seems to be that if a description of A Involves a description of
than A cannot be the cause of B.
This is supposed to
follow, I take it, from the incompatibility between (1) A
does not entail
and (2) a description of ^ is contained in
the description of A.
But there is no such incompatibility
.

.

.

Certainly, according to Hume's model of causation, to which Melden
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".akes appeal,

if

£ entails

cause of 3.

£

s

of

(or, simply,

3.

then

£

But since, as Goldberg correctly
points out

not entailing (or not implying)

3 being contained

strictly implies)

3

is compatible with a
description

in a description of
£,

there is nothing (or at

least nothing that the
anti-volltlonists have presented) to prevent

contributing causally to
£ when a description of £ (perhaps the
only available adequate description
of £) is contained in a description

£_ s

of

£

(perhaps the only available adequate
description of £)
But perhaps the anti-volitionists
'

point, though this is not

clear, is that a description of the
"relevant bodily phenomena" must
be contained in any adequate
description of the volitions which are

their alleged causes, and that it is this
position which is incoherent.
Yet this version of the argument is as
poor as that just considered.

First of all, it is not at all obvious that
it is true that a description of a volition must

object.

,

to be adequate,

contain a description of its

And even if this is the case, still

1

cannot see that there

is any incompatibility between the proposition that
(or imply)

tion of

£

£

£

does not entail

and the proposition that it is necessary that a descrip-

be contained in the description of
£; and yet this version

of the anti-volitionists' argument requires such Incompatibility.

Of course, even if the foregoing responses to the main criti-

cisms of those who oppose the concept of volition are successful, no

evidence has been adduced in this chapter which can afford a demon-

stration that what

I

claim on behalf of that concept, that is, con-

cerning the existence and nature of volitions, is true.

Indeed,

I
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know of no way to supply such demonstration;
but, if there is any

strength to be found in numbers, it should
be noted that the theory
of volitions seems once again to be
gaining support amongst philoso-

phers.

Both Sellars and Aune

,

as mentioned, believe that
volitions

occur, and they also believe that these
volitions cause actions.

Goldman, too, has propounded a theory of action
where actions are
events that are always brought about by wants and
normally brought

about by a combination of wants and beliefs.

volitional theory of action,

He has called this a

although he recognizes that volitions,

though commonly regarded as a species of desire, are
also commonly

regarded as a species of Intention.

Goldman's view concerning the

causal connection between wants, beliefs and actions is
echoed in the

writings of Kurt Baier,
has,

Donald Davidson,

and others.

There

then, been considerable philosophical opinion expressed in favor

of the theory of volitions as well as in opposition to it, although
it has been my responsibility here to pay greater attention to that

which has been expressed in opposition to it.
The third and final objection to be considered here concerns
the very propriety of the attempt to analyze the concept of action.
It might be said

(one can imagine Taylor in particular saying this)

that on the present theory there is nothing really distinctive about

deeds that marks them off from all other events, that is, that the

present account fails to highlight the peculiar nature of deeds which
does in fact serve to separate them from all other events.

For in-

stance, Taylor and Chisholm, especially, insist that a deed is an
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event caused
of this. 130

^

an agent

,

and that no other type of event can boast

For instance, Taylor says:

[W]hen I think and act— as distinguished from merely
having
thoughts occur to me, or having motions occur in my body,
as in the case of my heartbeats or the growth and
shedding
of my hair I seem to be making something happen initiating
something, or bringing it about.
I do not in this case just
passively undergo changes, whether of body or of thought, but
seem actively to produce those very changes in myself and,
consequently, in my environment ^31

—

,

.

It is Taylor's contention that there is an "absolute distinction"
be-

tween the concept of acting and the concept of being acted upon, and
that the concept of acting cannot be analyzed in terms of the con-

cepts sufficient for the description of inanimate behavior or, indeed,
in terms of any simpler accounts. 132

His claim is that, in order to

give an account of action, one must invoke the concept of an active

agent and that this renders the notion of an action's being the effeet of a mental occurrence worthless.

133

He says:

There is ... an inherent implausibility in the suggestion
that, whenever I can truly say that I am doing something, this
ought to be understood to mean that something not identical
with myself is the cause of whatever is being done.^^'^
And he urges: if a volition were to cause my hand to move, but
not move it, my hand's moving would not be an act of mine.

135

_I

did

To

illustrate this fact, Taylor considers the following four sentenceschemata:
(

27 )

e occurs.

(

28 )

Something makes

(

29 )

A does

(

30 )

Something makes A do

^

occur.

e.

136
e.
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(Possible substitution-instances of (27)
through (30) are:
(27a)

My finger moves.

(28a)

Something makes my finger move.

(29a)

I

(30a)

Something makes me move my finger. ^^^)

move my finger.

Now Taylor claims that the only entailment-relations
that hold between
(27)

through (30) are these:

(28) entails

(27).

(30)

entails (29),

In particular,

(28)

(29)

entails (28), and

does not entail (29), as the

volitionists have it.
Taylor's reasoning, however, is not persuasive.

readily grant that, in the case of free

I

would

action, an agent seems "ac-

tively to produce" his deeds, but this is very different from saying
that he does so in all cases of action.
^
true;
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Suppose determinism is

on such a supposition it would seem that any special type of

causation that might be effected by agents would be wholly superfluous
and hence it would seem that there is no reason to believe that such

causation ever takes place.

Yet even under such conditions, that is,

even if determinism is true, there are still such things as actions.

Although Taylor explicitly and repeatedly states that his theory of
action IS independent of the truth or falsity of determinism, 139 it
seems nevertheless to be the case that his theory of action is based
on an intuitive model of free

(

i.e.

,

undetermined) action.

Taylor is

of course right to point out that the only entailment-relations

at least,

(or,

implication-relations) that hold between (27) through (30)

are those that he cites; but he is wrong to attribute to the volition-
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ISCS the view that (28) entails
(or implies)

(29).

The volltlonists

would rather say that (28b) (or
something like it) entails (or implies) (29), where (28b) is as follows:
(28b)

A

s

willing that

^

should occur makes e occur.

There seems to be no way, simply by
looking at the form of the

sentence-schemata (28b) and (29)

(which is the method Taylor seems to

rely on), to decide whether or not (28b)
entails (or implies)

There is,
a

I

believe, and as

I

(29).

pointed out in the last chapter,

proper role for the concept of agent-causation
to play in a theory

of action.

But this role is not that of providing an
opportunity for

an account of the concept of action itself, but
rather that of pro-

viding an opportunity for an account of the concept of
free action.
Be that as it may, for the present we may simply note
that the theory
of action proposed in this chapter does succeed in
singling out both

deeds and doings from all other events, as the resolution of problem
la makes clear, and that the charge,

that it presents no account of

the distinctive nature of deeds, is therefore unwarranted.

With this my exposition and defense of the present theory of
action is completed.
in various ways.

It is clear that the theory could be filled out

For instance, closer attention could be paid to the

concepts of a part, a purpose, a means, an end, a reason, levelgeneration,
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deliberation, and so on, some of which have received

only cursory discussion in this chapter and some of which have not
been discussed at all.

Nevertheless,

I

believe that the truly key

concepts have been adequately discussed and the project that

I

wish
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now to undertake is that of giving an
adequate account of free human
action.

The remaining two chapters will be
concerned with the com-

pletion of this project.
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.

,
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,

(FA, p. 64)

.

3.L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," in Alan R.
White, ed..
The Philoso phy of Action (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1968), p.
40.
Henceforth I shall refer to this article as "PE."
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D'Arcy, HA,
HA. P-

32.

HA, p.

16.

p.

15.

Joel Feinberg, "Action and Responsibility," in Alan R. White,
The Ph ilosophy of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968),
p

.

40.
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Davidson, A,
Aune, R&A

50

p.

,

22.

p.
5

.

See note 41 above.

I assume, of course
that Smith's hypnotizing Jones
does
not preclude Jones's willing
certain events and this willing's
having
certain effects.
,

52 ,,

,
Roderick
M. Chisholm,
The Descriptive Element in the
Concept of Action," The Journal
of Philosophy
61 (1964), p. 619.
.

Goldman, THA

57

p.

,

.

62.

Harman, PR, p. 445

.

Foley, DA, p. 67.
^^DA, p.

68.

Thomson, AOE

Chapter XIX.

,

59 ,

Anscombe,

60 ,

Aune,

61

9

p.
p.

.

lOlff.

Anscombe explicitly disagrees

62 ,,

,

Foley, DA, p.

68

(I,

§20).

.

63

This definition is probably a little more complicated
than
would at first appear necessary, but there is a good
reason for this.
Basically, anything less complex runs the risk of
getting snagged on
the possibility that
£ occur more than once at
Unless the conditions Involving £ are added, it may be that
contributes causally
£
to £ and £ to r, and even
£ to £, without £ contributing causally to
£ via £. See note 31 above.
64

Aune, R&A

^^R&A, p.

,

p.

110 n.

110 n.

69.

69.

66 „

For instance, see J.W. Melland, "Are There Unintentional
Actions?" The Philosophical Review 72 (1963).
,
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Itie Philosophical Review
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^

Austin, PE and "Three Ways of
Spilling
^
^
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(1966).
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Alan R. Whitk ed.. The PMlokohv
“
^
tuxtord: Oxford University
riess, lyoaj, p.
Press
r>
i o oTP
>-y
139ff.;
andt".Lorenne M.
Por-ar^r.
o
^
Application of ’Voluntary,' 'Not
^noc Voluntary
voluntary
t
i’
and
'Involuntary',"
Analysis 26 (1966^.

TZm..

.
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,
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,

think It IS impossible for a person
to bring about an
event ^ directly by bringing about an
event £ indirectly (where
q is
not Itself brought about indirectly),
and also impossible for a per''''
^ directly by bringing about an event p
svni^°i
synthetically
(where £ is not itself brought about
directly), but
many different possible exemplifications of
the "by"-relation remain,
I

.

,

^ ^dink there are phrases
available to express £, r, and s
in English, but not to express
and
u.
I believe that "Jonis's hand
£
rises expresses £, that "the light goes on"
expresses r, and that
the room lights up" expresses s.

that, given T.1V.3, the type of "by"-relation
analyzed
in ^
U.IV.35 IS reflexive.
This may strike some as inappropriate.
It
should be noted, however, that given the possibility
that an event
may occur more than once at a time, this relation is
definitely
.

—

neither asymmetrical nor irreflexive suitable cases to
demonstrate
this fact are easily concocted.
It may nevertheless be thought that
the relation should be said to be nonreflexive rather
than reflexive.
I have some sympathy with this view,
but it seems to me to be no
serious matter to stipulate that the relation is reflexive.
Nothing
adverse follows, I believe, and such stipulation considerably simplifies matters.
Compare D.IV.13 and D.IV.26 and also note 31 and 63 above.

Melden correctly emphasizes this point (FA, pp. 40 and 65).
76

This definition relies implicitly on the following schematic
definition: £ contributes causally relative to _t and _t' to
£ via r at
=df.
(exactly as in the definiendum of D.IV.26, except
that "£* is" replaces "there is a time t*.")

240
77

a964T(Lc"o?kTsLn reLf to
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See note 71 above.

79t_

°
essentially the same point when he
savs- "I
fho
think there
is nothing that is always
and in each of it^
an unmistakably basic
action" (BA, p. 46).
He goes
tn a
those people who are
"positively abnormal" (l.e
?hoL
Luose
wh^tf
~
who
have a
greater renertniT-o"
u
eetions than the 'normal" person)
from
those who are "neaatlvelv
abnormal"
those who have a smaller
"
"repertoire'' Chan
tha^^^e
the normal person).
Some of
^
penetrating, some erroneous (such
as the claim that every’’"iorLr
person has the same "repertoire"
of basic actions (BA
51))
p
I shall not
’’’ but
discuss them in detail here
80
D'Arcy, m, p. 41.
•

,

’

.

^

,

(^,

I

81 m

accurately, Smith willed an event
p which is internal
Is physically incompatible with
the ocrrence of Smith s going to the aid
currencrof''smitl
of his victims, and
p consequently occurred. See D.IV.44 and
D.IV.45 below. Also see the next
section for a discussion of the
phrase "decides to do."
^

An alternative locution for ”S
omits to bring about p ac^*^8 _t'" is ”S refrains from bringing
^
1
about p
ariactively
relative to t and t*." I restrict the
present LalJsJs^o
about for the sake of simplicity and
also in order
to highlight T.IV.IO below.

—

83,

For instance, one could substitute
"accepts truly" for
"accepts" in clause (i) of D.IV.45; or one
could substitute "S cannot at _t bring about
[£ and £] actively relative to ~
t and t"'~for
~
that clause; and so on.
The word "outcome" is loaded.
Giving an account of it here
would require giving an account of practical
reasoning.
But this is
a complex topic and I shall not try
to deal with it here.
In this
connection, however, see Sellars, T&A; Robert
Binkley, "A Theory of
ractical Reason," The Philosophical Review
74 (1965); Aune, R&A,
Chapter IV (where other relevant writings are listed).
,

85

^^See Wilfrid Sellars, T&A,
p. 109, and "Volitions ReAffirmed,
in Myles Brand and Douglas Walton, ed.
Action Theory
(Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publishing Co.,
1976),
p. 47 (henceforth I shall refer to this article as
"VRA"); also Aune,
R&A p. 63ff.
,
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86t ^
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the object of"
;oHtL“i“:1ot'L‘''a"d h’“
always an event Internal
to a doln°.’
However
of the present account
that It Is necessarily
true
£ (directly or Indirectly), then j, is not a
L^rofl's.
87
Thomson, AOE pp 44-5.

is almost

’

.

,
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nnette C. Baler, A&I, pp.
648
The Intentionality of
Intentions " Th^
(1977), p. 398.
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’

89
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649

c

i

of Meta physics

.

30

.

it

^

intencds

£ and he acknowledges that
It may well be a free doing
of his or someone

i

f

els^s

and 1^^’
stands (as I shall contend in
~ d‘"'
Chapter VI) that frL H„r
the effects of any events,
then /is not! fo/s/rw/ufL^dL/
90 ^

take it

//

th/

ilf/r.'’®

—

“titly acknowledged here that

I

exprLs distinct events
account of action must be modified
somewhat.
In
this connection
CO
see note 25 above.
If

ihev^d"

Noble.

~

lM9“'’/"62f/’
92

Taylor,

pp.

°*^

•>«"cs and

49-50.

93

course, there is not only one theory of
just^^as there is not only one theory
of action.
NeverLeess, the term the theory of
volitions," like the term "actiontheory,
has become standard in the literature.)

voUin
tions,
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H.L.A. Hart, Acts of Will and Responsibility,"
in H.L.A.
.Punishment and Res ponsibility (Oxford: At the Clarendon
Press,
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Hart has in mind in particular the theory of volition
propounded by John Austin, in which volition is taken to be
a form
.
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desire
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J.L. Evans,

'Choice," Philoso phical Quarterly.
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Taylor, A&P
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76,
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Illy

in this connection,

surrounding D.IV.

6

see the discussion in Section h4
above
aoove
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112 „ ^
W.D. Glasgow, "On Choosing,"
Analysis 17 (1957).
113
™>>rella" function of "chose" is more often
in evlM*'!
d=
n
by a noun, in which case it means the
""1
samras
same
as
chose “"'"a
and took," as in "He chose tea rather
than coffee."
,

114„
Kenneth E. Nichols raises a similar point.
cept of Choice
(unpublished), p. 51.

See The Con-

,

115.

Sellars, T&A, p. 109.
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mere is no necessity
the only occasions for this that
rational person) are either when
deliberation is required or when
spective evidence of volitions.
120

that a person not will to will, but
can think of (at least, for a
the resolution of some overly long
an attempt is made to gather introCompare note 86 above.
I

Both Wilfrid Sellars ("Fatalism and Determinism," in Keith
Lehrer ed.
Freedom and Determinism (New York: Random House, Inc.
1966), pp. 156-7 (henceforth I shall refer to this article as "F&D");
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130„
_ ^
tor Chisholm,
of course, it is not quite accurate to say
that only deeds are agent-caused, since
he endorses the principle that
LAp & Cp,q] implies [Aq], and yet he gives
no indication that he regards v;hat I have called Indirect deeds as deeds.
(See note 38 of
Chapter III.)
See also Taylor, A&P pp. III-2.
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p.

136,
A&P, pp.

110-1.
113.

123 and 165.

Of course, (27a) through (30a) do not
exactly match the
form of (27) through
(30), but the principle of substitution
being
implicitly applied should be obvious enough.

138 ^
By

determinism" I mean, roughly, the doctrine
that there
is a sufficient causal condition
of every event.
See D.IV.l above.
139

Taylor,

pp

.

113-5, 128-9, and 263.

This is a concept introduced and d iscussed
extensively by
Goldman ( THA Chapter II).
It has affinities with my concept of
constitution.
,
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V

ON COMPATIBILISM

1.

Introduction

The account of human
action given in the last chapter
implies
neither that such action
is free nor that it is not
free.
To say

what free human action
is, therefore, requires a
separate account.
shall provide such an account
in the next chapter.
This will be an
Incompatibilist account, however,
and since claims for the truth of

compatibilism^ have been so often
and so forcefully made throughout
the history of modern
philosophy, some of these claims deserve
evalua-

tion here.

Classically, the stage is set by the
antagonism on this issue

between David Hume as compatibilist
and Thomas Reid as incompatibilist.

According to Hume, one acts (or refrains
from acting) freely

when one acts (or refrains from acting)
"according to the determinations of the will.

Against this Reid claimed that not only must

the act be determined by the will,
but also this determination must

be in the "power" of the agent, if the
act is itself properly to be

said to be free.

The debate has continued to this day; participants

in this debate have refined and elaborated
on Hume's and Reid's posi-

tions, only seldom forsaking these positions in
order to base their

arguments on some other foundation.

4
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But what, exactly. Is
meant by 'compatlblllsm"
and "incomPatlblUsm-1 If one claims
that compatibilism Is
true, then one
Claims that it is
metaphysically possible that
determinism be true
and free action yet
occur.
An Incompatlbillst denies
this possibilityBut what, then, is meant
by "determinism" and
"free action"?

Given

£ and £
^ -dr“„““f
(i)

or
Of 'a -df.

xfff?

—

condition relative to
are events such that:

“t

and

~f

occurs at t;
earlier than or identical with
t'- and

^ecessary,
nLe'lsaJr^thaJ''
that, if

-taphyslcally

£ occurs

at t,

then

£

occurs

let us say that determinism
is the proposition that,
for any event
a
and any time
there are an event
£ and a time t such that £ is a
,

sufficient causal condition relative
to
the concept of free action?

t

and t' of

^

And what of

Let us, for the time being, say
the

following

—

‘

and
(x)

1
_t*

bring about

=df.

£ actively

relative to

—t'

can at £ bring about
£ actively relative to -t'
and _t*; and
(ii) there is an event
£ such that
(a) ^ can at _t bring about
£ actively relative to
_t’
and _t*, and
(b) ^ cannot at _t bring about
[£ and £] actively
relative to _t' and _t*.

^

The following theorem may immediately
be stated:

liVa:

Necessarily, if S is free at t to bring about
actively
relative to _t' and £*, then there is an event £
distinct
£
from £ such that
^ is free at _t to bring about £ actively
relative to £' and t*.

Moreover, given D.IV.50, we may say that
are alternatives to one another for

S

at

£
t.

and

£

in D.V.l and T.V.l
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D.V.l constitutes an attempt to
express, 1„ terms of the
technical vocabulary Introduced In
the preceding chapters,
a proposition to which boy, compatlbllists
and IncompatlblUsts are
prepared
to assent, and which may be
expressed more loosely but more
popularly
as follows, a person Is free
to perform an action just
in case he can

perform that action and he can also act
otherwise.^

Of course, D.V.l

contains a term ("can") which has not
yet been defined, and It is the

interpretation of this term which constitutes
the bone of contention
between compatibilists and incompatibilists
In what follows

of compatibilism.

I

shall consider in detail two main
versions

These versions appear to me to be the
strongest

versions yet made available in defense of
compatibilism.
the first version to be defective, and

I

I

shall show

shall show that there is no

good reason to believe the second version true.

2.

A Conditional Version of Compatibilism

The first version of compatibilism that

I

shall consider has

its origins in the writings of Hume and its history can
be traced

from him, through G.E. Moore, ^ to P.H. Nowell-Smith^ and beyond.

There has been a tendency, ever since Moore's writings were published

Smith

a tendency strongly reinforced by the appearance of Nowells

work and also of J.L. Austin's pivotal paper "Ifs and Cans"^

to found this version of compatibilism on the following conditional

analysis of the concept of "can":
D.V.2:

^ can

do

^

=df.

^

will do

a.,

if he chooses to do a.

248

So.eU.es one finds "wants,"
"tties," „t so.e

sue,, verb.

In

pUce

of

"Chooses"; but the weight
of tradition Is In favor
of "chooses." and
I shall stick
closely to the spirit of tills
tradition.'®

Given the account of human action
presented in the last chapter. it is obvious
that D.V.2 requires revision
before It can be considered even initially plausible.
First, one must make clear
what
type of conditional D.V.2
employs.

It seems evident that the
advocate

of D.V.2 Intends the
conditional to be understood subjunctively,
and

this fact should be made
explicit.

Secondly, D.V.2 falls to make

clear whetlier a is a doing or
a deed (see D.IV.20 and D.IV.23).
Thirdly, it Is questionable
whether

tiie

concept of cliolce is best

suited for the role which It plays
In D.V.2.

The closely related con-

cept of willing would appear more
appropriate here."
of choice (see D.IV.51) involves

tlie

For the concept

concept of an alternative, where-

as the concept of willing does not;
and the concept of an alternative

seems more pertinent to the matter of
what one is free to do (see
D.V.l) rather than to the matter of what
one can do.

Fourthly, the

fact that D.V.2 requires that what would
actually occur, if the choice

were made, be identical with the object of
choice (the event is designated by "a” in both cases) suggests that, even
if otherwise adequate,
it would be unable to account for those
actions which one can perform

but which, were one to perform them, would be
instances of unsuccessful action

(see D.IV.25).

Fifthly, D.V.2 glosses over the distinction

between direct, indirect, and synthetic action (see D.IV.12, D.IV.13
and D.1V.15); one would suspect that this distinction would play a
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«le

In constructing an
adequate account of the
concept of "can," Just
as it did in
constructing an adequate account
of the concept of
action
in general.
Finally, there Is no mention of
times in D.V.2, and
this
Is a grave
omission.

In fact, three distinct
designations of times

should be made, namely,
that of the time at which the
"can" In question is operative and
those to which the bringing
about in question is
relative. 12 For instance,
there are presumably many things
that I can
now do, some of which
I can now do now and
some of which I can now do
later.
An adequate account of "can"
must be able to deal with all
Such cases.

Given these considerations, it
would appear that the phrase
that is in need of definition
in this context is not "S can
do a”
but rather "S can at _t bring
about £ actively relative to _t’
and t*.”

Indeed,

this is the phrase that figures
in clause (i) of D.V.l.

xt is plausible to assume
that,

But

in order to arrive at a definition
of

this phrase, one must first arrive
at definitions of each of "S can
at

_t

bring about ^ directly relative to

bring about

bring about

£ indirectly relative

to £'

£ synthetically relative

to

and

"S can at

and _t*," and "S can at
_t'

and t*.”

t

t

Moreover, it

appears that, in order to arrive at a
definition of the phrase ”S
can at

_t

bring about

£ directly relative

arrive at a definition of the phrase
about

£ directly relative

to

t

and

to

_t’

and

_t*"

one must first

can immediately at

t

bring

(The need to arrive at a

definition of this latter phrase will be discussed more
fully in the
next chapter.)

Now,

if we pay attention solely to this last phrase
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and bear In mind both the
definition of "S brings about

relative to

and

t

directly

given in D.IV.12 and also
D.V.2 above, it seems

that the compatlblllst
thesis that „e are now
considering is such
that, according to it, the
following is true:
"
to
and
iTanH^-df
-df.
t

t

there are events

«l«tve

^
^

and r such that
if
occur, the:;
\lTls
(1) [S wills
lnis ^ in order
-a'" that r may occur]
would contribute causally relative to
and
t'
to q, and
^
^ii; £ would constitute
£ at t'.

(Compare D.IV.12.)

At any rate,

I

shall assume that D.V.3 is a defi-

nition to which the advocate of D.V.2
would be prepared to assent.
Presumably, the phrases "S can at t
bring about £ directly relative
to

^

and £*,

^

t*," ”S can at

^

can at

t

can at
t

£

bring about

bring about

ally "S can at

_t

bring about

£ indirectly relative

£ synthetically relative

£ actively

relative to

_t'

to

to £'

_t’

and

and _t*,”

and £*," and fin-

act relative to £' and £*" would then
be definable

in terms of D.V.3.

However, if it can be shown, and

I

believe it can,

that D.V.3 is defective, then there is
no need to go beyond it to an

evaluation of the definitions of these other
phrases.
Before moving to a criticism of D.V.3, two
points should be
noted.

First, in moving from D.V.2 to D.V.3, some
objections to the

conditional compatibilist thesis that have been voiced
in the past are
nipped in the bud, insofar as they pertain, if they
pertain at all, to
the former and not to the latter definition.

(Perhaps the most promi-

nent of these objections is the one raised by Austin to
the effect
that the

if

Secondly, the

in "I shall,
'can"

if I choose" is not a conditional "if."^^)

in D.V.3 is tenseless, which is in keeping with
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the treatment of tense
in foregoing chapters.

Consequently, there

will be no treatment of
the peculiarities of
'eould have" in this
chapter , despite the fact
that this has been the
subject of consider
3ble di scussion in recent
years.

Evaluation of This Version
There are three main ways to
object to a definition such as
D.V.3.

The first is to object to it on
formal grounds,

to try

to show that, given certain
incontrovertible assumptions, it leads
to

contradiction.

The second is to try to show that,
according to D.V.3,

we cannot perform certain actions
which, according to common sense,
we
can.

The third is to try to show that, according
to D.V.3, we can

perform certain actions which, according
to common sense, we cannot.
Each of these methods of objection has
been adopted by philosophers
in the past.

I

shall discuss what seem to me the most
significant

efforts made in this respect and shall argue
that, of these attempts,
only one (one which employs the third
method of objection) succeeds
in refuting D.V.3.

There have been (at least) two major attempts to
object to
the conditional version of compatibilism on
formal grounds.

first of these owes its origins to Austin.
the matter in terms appropriate to D.V.2,

The

shall first discuss

since it is to something

very much like this definition that Austin addresses himself.

I

shall

then give an account of the implications of this discussion for D.V.3.

Austin points out, rightly, that it is perfectly legitimate
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to utter sentences
which are

—

ten do

(roughly) of the form

if he chooses to do
a,

where the "can" Is to be
construed as the "can" presently
at issue.
An example of such a
sentence is:
<2)

Smith can run a four-minute mile,
if he chooses.

But, whereas sentences of
the form of (1) are obviously
meaningful,

sentences of the following form
are decidedly odd:

7
3l

chooses to do a, if he chooses
to do

•

And yet, Austin points out, if
we apply D.V.2 to (1),
(3) is yielded
by means of substitution.

But how can it be that
(1) and (3) are

deflnltionally equivalent, when (1) is
so obviously meaningful and

(3)

SO decidedly odd?
In pursuing his point, Austin makes
the following intriguing

observations.

The "if" of (1) is not a conditional
"if," for two

reasons.

First, it allows for the affirmation of
the detached con-

sequent.

That is, from (1) one may infer

^

can do

Secondly, it does not allow for contraposition.

That is, from (1)

one may not infer
.§.

cannot do

he does not choose to do

Neither of these points holds of a conditional "if."
is in fact controversial;

stitution instances of

(1)

a.

The first claim

it has been argued that there are some sub-

which do not allow for the inference of the

corresponding substitution instances of (4).^^

Nevertheless, the

second claim seems to be quite correct, and it is sufficient on its
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own to warrant the conclusion
that the "if" of (1) is not
a condltional "if."

Keith Lehrer has taken up these
remarks of Austin in an early

article of his (and

emphasize "early,” for Lehrer may
now be fully

I

prepared to disavow the conclusions of
that article) and from them
attempts to forge an argument against D.V.2.^^
Let us assume, for purposes of reductio

^

(6)

can do a iff

S

,

It runs like this.

that

will do a, if he chooses to do a

(where "iff" is the main connective)

Then we must admit that

.

do a, if he chooses to do
£ iff ^ will do ~a
he chooses to do a., if he chooses to do
a.

,

if

Now, the right-hand side of the biconditional
in (7) has the form
If £,

then if £, then £," which, Lehrer notes, is
equivalent to

simply "If

then

We may therefore say:

will do £, if he chooses to do
£, if he chooses to
do a iff ^ will do a_, if he chooses to do a.

^

From (7) and (8), via substitution, we then derive
can do a_, if he chooses to do
he chooses to do a.

^

a_

iff

^

will do ~
a

,

if

But let us note that it is false that
(10)

^

can do

a.

iff

^

will do

a.

Therefore, it cannot be the case that (9) is true.
contradiction.

Therefore (6) is false.

Is this a good argument?

duction of
to

will do

will do

"ifs" in

a_,

_a,

will do

a_,

Therefore D.V.2 is false.

Manifestly not.

if he chooses to do

if he chooses to do

a."

Hence we have a

a_,

Note that the re-

if he chooses to do

is warranted only if both the

if he chooses to do £,

if he chooses to do £"
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are conditional "Ifs."

But Lehrer himself assun.es,
following Austin,

that this Is not the case.^O

Therefore the argument fails.

(i„

addition to this, one may well have
doubts about the propriety
of
the move from the denial of
(10) to the denial of (9).)
The moral to be dra^.m from this,

I

think, is that

odd-looking and (l)'s not being so does
not imply that

definitionally equivalent to (1).

(3)

(3)’s being
is not

It is certainly true that
sentences

the form of (1) are stylistically
superior to sentences of the form

of (3), but this is quite irrelevant
to the present issue.
a sentence of

the form "S can immediately at

relative to

and £’

_t

,

bring about

Similarly,

£ directly

if he chooses” will be far more
digestible than

a sentence of the form of the def
inlens of D.V.3 with "if he chooses”

tacked on; but this provides no basis for arguing
that the latter is
not definitionally equivalent to the former.

Hence no argument a la

Lehrer will fare any better in this case than it did
in its original
setting.
The second major attempt to show the conditional version
of

compatlbilism false on formal grounds concerns itself with the issue
of the application of "can” to the concept of willing.

Lehrer, once

again, has discussed this issue; so too has Chisholm.

shall re-

construct their observations to suit the present context.
First, consider the following two propositions:

wills £] would con^ were to will £ at £, then
tribute causally relative to _t and t' to £;

(11)

If

(12)

^

cannot will

£

at

_t.

Given T.IV.l, T.IV.3, D.IV.12, and D.V.3,

(11)

implies
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(13)

^

^

relative

But suppose the
following is also true:

“
,

^
tnen ^ would will
^hers'l'”^H“*4'?““
at

—t

t.

It is Lehrer's and
Chisholm's contention that

(

11 ).

(

12 ) and

and

(U) are

jointly consistent, but that
(12) and (14) jointly Imply
(15)

tela-

livTt:'t'rrj'
I£

this is true, then D.V.3 Is
certainly false.

j

For if (12) and (14)

tly imply (15) and are also
jointly consistent with
(11), then

(11) cannot Imply (13);

for (13) contradicts (15).

There are two main ways to Interpret
this objection to n.V.3.
The first is to view it as
an objection based on purely
formal con-

siderations;

the second is not restricted
to such considerations.

shall discuss the second
interpretation later.

1

As for the first, it

may be made clearer by the use
of certain perspicuous symbolism.
argument, when so Interpreted and so
symbolized, runs thus.

The

Consider

the following two propositions:
(11a)

Wp > C[Wp],p;

(12a)

~0*Wp.

Given T.IV.l, T.IV.3, D.IV.12, and D.V.3,
(11a) Implies
(13a)

0*Bp.

But suppose the following is also true:
(14a)

Bp > Wp.

It is Lehrer's and Chisholm's contention

their argument) that (11a),

(12a) and

(on this interpretation of

(14a) are jointly consistent,
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but that (12a) and (14a)
jointly imply
(15a)
If this is true,
(

a)

then D.V.3 is certainly false.

For if

(12a) and

jointly imply (15a) and are also jointly
consistent with (11a),

then (11a) cannot imply (13a); for
(13a) contradicts (15a).
But the advocate of D.V.3 has a ready
response to this ver-

sion of the Lehrer-Chisholm argument.

Certainly there seems to be

good reason to accept that the argument
presented in terms of (11a)

through (15a) may well be valid (although
whether or not it

U

valid

of course ultimately depends on the
interpretation given to "<>
'>"),

V"

^nd

5

but there is no good reason to believe that
(11a) through (15a)

adequately symbolize (11) through (15).

In fact,

there is good rea-

son to suppose that the former do no^ adequately
symbolize the latter.
In particular,

there is good reason to believe that the

is distinct from that in

(13);

''can''

in (12)

for in the former the "can" pertains

to willing, whereas in the latter it pertains to acting,
and

(as we

saw in Chapter IV) there is good reason to believe that willlngs
are
seldom, if ever, actions (despite the prevalence of the term "act
of

^III

2A
)•

This being so,

the "cans" in (12) and (13) surely require

different analyses and are not to be symbolized indistinguishably
they are in (12a) and (13a).

and keeping (11a),

(12a) and

it may well be true that

,

as

Making this distinction explicit, then,
(14a) as before,

(12a) and

it does indeed seem that

(14a) jointly imply (15a).

But the

advocate of D.V.3 will not accept that (11a) implies (13a); he will
rather insist that (11a) implies
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(13b)

0+^P

(or something of the sort).

There Is no obvious
formal contradiction

between (13b) and (15a). however,
and the argument collapses.^
The first method of objection
to D.V.3,

1^.

to show D.V.3 objectionable
on purely formal grounds,

that of trying
is not,

then,

successfully employed in either of
the above two arguments.
Moreover.
I know of no other
such attempt which Is successful.
Let us, therefore,

turn to the second method,

1^,

that of trying to show that,

according to D.V.3, we cannot perform
certain actions which, according
to common sense, we can.
Perhaps the most celebrated
attempt to employ this method is that of Austin,
who gives this example:
Consider the case where I miss a very
short putt and kick
myself because I could have holed it.
It is not ?^at I
should have holed it if I tried: I
did try, and missed.
It
IS not that I should have holed
it if conditions had been
ifferent: that might of course be so,
but I am talking
about conditions as they precisely
were, and asserting that
I could have holed it.
There is the rub.
But if 1
tried my hardest, say, and missed, surely
there must have
been s omething that caused me to fail,
that made^unable
to succeed?
So that 1 could not have holed it?
Well, a
modern belief in science, in there being
an explanatic^n of
everything, may make us assent to this
argument.
But such
a belief is not in line with
traditional beliefs enshrined
in the word
according to them a human ability or power
or capacity is Inherently liable not
to produce success, on
occasion, and that for no reason (or are bad
luck and bad
form sometimes reasons?).
.

.

.

,

Austin's case is in fact directed against the
following definition:
DJLiA:

could have done a =df.
had tried to do a.

1

^

would have done a, if he

Moreover, holing a putt is an indirect doing.

The case therefore re-

quires adaptation in order to fit the present context.
Let us, first, alter the case slightly so that what Austin
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failed to do was simply
to strike the golf ball, and
let us assume
(as seems natural)
that for Austin, at the time and
place in question, the event internal
to his striking the ball, had
it occurred,
would have been brought
about directly by him.
Let us call this event
£ and the times, relative to which the striking of the
ball would
have occurred, t and
Let us further say the following,
in the
.

spirit of D.V.3:
can immediately at t successfully
relative to _t and _t’ =df.
such that, if S were to will
^ at
might occur, then
(1) [S wills ^ in order that
£ may
tribute causally relative to _t

bring about p
there is an event
_t
in order that p
^

Idirectly

(ii)

c[

(Compare D.1V.25.)

would constitute

occur] would conand
to q, and

at t’.

Then, ignoring tense and substituting
"wills" for

tries," we may reconstruct the broad
outline of Austin's argument as
follows.

According to D.V.4, and given D.IV.ll, the
following is

true

Necessarily, if Austin can immediately at
p successfully bring about
p directly relative to ^ and t', then
there is an event
p such that, if Austin were t^ will p
at p in order that
p might occur, then [Austin wills p
in order that
p may occur] would contribute causally
relative to p and p' to p.
Let us, for the sake of simplicity, assume that there
is only one

event which satisfies what is said of
this event p.

p

in

(16)

,

and let us call

Now it happens that the following two propositions are

in fact true:

Austin can immediately at p successfully bring about
directly relative to t and t'

p
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(18)

Austin wills a at j: In order that
j, ,„ay occur
but
[Austin wills £ in order that
may occur] does not
£
contribute causally relative to _t
and t'
to £.

It follows that

(16)

is in fact false;

and so. D.V.4 is false
also.

Now, it is seriously questionable
whether or not this argu-

ment IS sound.
of

(17) and

What evidence does Austin adduce for
the consistency

(18)?

None, really; he merely states that
"the tradition-

al beliefs enshrined in the
word can" imply their consistency.

Aus-

tin's case has convinced some^^and failed
to convince others.

side with the others.

That is (and this will be implicit in
my

treatment of "can" in the next chapter),
(17) and
(16)

(18) are jointly consistent.

is true and that the truth of

(This is not to say that

I

I

am inclined to deny that

Specifically,

(17)

I

believe that

implies the falsity of (18).

endorse D.V.4, however.)

But it may appear

that this denial that (17) and (18) are jointly
consistent is erroneous.

After all, are there not many things

occasion,

1

may fail to do, even though

I

1

can do but which, on

will them?

The answer to this question is "Yes," and yet this
does not

affect the truth of the contention that (17) and
(18) are not jointly
consistent.

To see this, we must ask ourselves what type of "can"

it is with which Austin is concerned in his example.

It is clear,

I

think, that Austin is concerned with a "can" of ability and
not with

some other sort of

'can"

(such as the "can" of logical possibility,

physical possibility, causal possibility, epistemic contingency,
moral permissibility, and the like).
Ifs and Cans

'

Austin distinguishes

But which "can" of ability?
tv\/o

main "cans" of ability.

In

First
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there Is a narrow "can," and
then there Is a wider "can"
which comprises both the narrow "can"
and the matter of having
the opportunity
to exercise one's narrow
ability.

can

Austin calls the wider sense of

the "all-in, paradigm" sense
of "can."^^

Nowell-Smith, elaborating on this, suggests that
one has an all-ln ability
to perform an
action Just in case one has both
the opportunity and the narrower
type of ability to perform that
action.
Perhaps a more suggestive
way of putting this would be to
say that the all-ln "can" expresses
a specific ability and that
the narrower "can" expresses
a general

ability, and that Nowell-Smith’s
thesis then Is: one has the specific

ability to perform an action just In
case one has both the opportunity
and the general ability to perforin
that action.
I

think that Nowell-Smith's thesis may well
be true, but

I

shall not begin to try to give an analysis
of the concepts of general

ability and of opportunity in this context.

However, an example of

a general ability and of a specific
ability may be helpful here.

Suppose that Jones's ankles are securely shackled;
suppose also that

Jones is an accomplished sprinter.

There is a sense of "can” accord-

ing to which it is appropriate to say that Jones
can run a hundred

yards in ten seconds, even though his ankles are shackled.
this sense expresses what

1

call a general ability.

"Can" in

It is equally

clear that there is a sense of "can" according to which it is appro-

priate to say that Jones cannot run a hundred yards in ten seconds,
and this is true simply because his legs are fettered.

sense expresses what

I

call a specific ability.

"Can" in this

In this case, Jones
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lacks the specific ability to run
a hundred yards in
ten seconds
because, although he has the general
ability to do this, he has
no

opportunity to exercise this general ability.
It should be clear that the sense
of "can" which lies at
the

heart of the present discussion is
the specific, all-in sense.

It

IS this sense of "can” which is
appropriate to D.V.l and which the

corapatibilist seeks to analyze by means of
D.V.3.^^

Therefore, if it

is the general sense of "can" which
concerns Austin in his example,

we may safely ignore this example.

But

I

do not believe that Austin

IS concerned with the general sense
of "can" in his example,

for he

presents this example while discussing Moore's use
of "can," and the
latter is almost certainly to be understood in
the specific sense.
My contention, then, is that (17) and
(18) are jointly in-

consistent, although it remains true that there are
perhaps many things
that a person (such as Austin) has a general ability
to do but which,

on occasion, he fails to do, even though he wills
them.

In such

cases the person simply lacks the opportunity to exercise his
general
But the main contention of the reconstructed version of

Austin

s

argument is that there are many things that a person may have

a specific ability to do but which, on occasion, he fails to do, even

though he wills them.
the truth of my denial?

This

I

deny.

What evidence can

None, really.

I

I

adduce for

believe that Austin's

example appeals to some people because they fail to realize that it is

possible to have a general ability to perform an action even when one
is bereft of the specific ability to perform that action. 33

Never the-
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less,
(18)

the fact remains that my denial of the
consistency of

(17) and

is left undemonstrated, just like
Austin's affirmation of it.

But my denial is,

I

think, intuitively much more plausible.

from the compatlbilist

'

s

Moreover,

point of view, the fact that Austin’s asser-

tion that (17) and (18) are consistent is
left undemonstrated and
that It also appears implausible justifies
denying that his example

constitutes a conclusive refutation of either D.V.3
or D.V.4.
Let us now turn to the third method of objecting
to D.V.3

1.^,

that of trying to show that, according to D.V.3,
we can perform

certain actions which, according to common sense, we cannot.

The

second main way to interpret the Lehrer-Chisholm argument,
presented
by means of statements (11) through (15), is to be
considered in this

context.
of

This interpretation, unlike the first, allows for the "cans"

(12) and

(13)

to be of different types.

Nevertheless, it is

claimed, even though the "cans" of (12) and (13) are (or may be)

distinct,

(11),

(12) and

(14) are jointly consistent,

(12) and

8o jointly imply (15), and hence (11) cannot imply (13).

sider the following case.

pathological fear of snakes.

(14)

For con-

Suppose that Jones has an overwhelming
Smith presents him with a large basket

containing a placid python and asks him to touch the snake.

Nothing

other than his fear prevents Jones from touching the snake; but,
also, nothing other than a choice on his part to comply with Smith's

request will cause him to touch the snake.

More precisely, if Jones

were to will that event internal to his touching the snake, his volition would cause that event (see (11)); moreover, he would touch the
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snake only xf this volition
were to occur (see (14)).

But the point
IS that his fear of
snakes renders him incapable of
making this

volition (see (12)).

And so he cannot in fact touch
the snake (see

(15)), even though, according to D.V.3,
he can touch the snake
(see
(13)).

This case,
D.V.3.
a

I

believe, constitutes a decisive refutation
of

What recourse does the compatibilist who
is inclined toward

conditional account of "can” have?

He might simply insist that the

case does not constitute a refutation
of D.V.3, and he might argue
for this contention in the following
manner.

How, he might ask, are

we to understand the "can" of
(12) in light of the case of Jones and
the placid python?

The answer is apparently that (12) must be
taken

either to mean the same as or to be implied by
There are a time _t* and an event
^ such that:
(1) there is a sufficient causal condition relative
to _t* and _t of
and
(ii) it is physically necessary that, if
^ occurs at
_t,
then ^ does not will jd at t.^^

(1^)

But if this is right (so the compatibilist might
argue) then there is
no good reason to regard the case as a refutation of D.V.3.

For all

reasonable compatibilists are prepared to assert that, on occasion,

^

can immediately at

even though

^

^ bring about

does not bring about

Moreover, as determinists

36
,

_p

directly relative to

t

and

directly relative to

t

and t'.

t'

all reasonable compatibilists are pre-

pared to acknowledge that it is a consequence of their position that,
if

^

does not will

at

_t,

then (19) is true.

Hence the objector has

not adduced any evidence not already familiar to the compatibilist to
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support his contention that
Jones cannot touch the
snake; and hence
the case is unconvincing.
But this argument of the
compatibillsfs is itself
unconvincing.

It may be true that the
objector to D.V.3 has not
adduced any

evidence not already familiar to
the compatlbilist
relevant.

,

but this is ir-

The fact is that, given the
circumstances, Jones cannot

touch the snake, and this is all
that needs to be said.
If

the compatiblllst is prepared
(as he ought to be)

to ac-

knowledge that the case of Jones and
the placid python constitutes
a
refutation of D.V.3, he may nevertheless
seek to maintain that "can"
should be interpreted conditionally.
in response to this case,

For instance, he may propose,

the following:

can immediately at _t bring about
£ directly relative
to t and £' -df.
there are events
£ and £ such that:
(i) if ^ were to will
at
in order

s

that ~
£
r might
£
occur, then
(a) [S^ wills
£ in order that £ may occur] would
contribute causally relative to t and t to
~
and
(b) £ would constitute
£ at £' and
(ii) S_ can will
at
in
order
that £ may occur.
£
£
*

a

;

But how are we to understand the phrase
”£ can will
that

£

may occur"?

£

at

£

in order

If this is to be understood in the manner
of

(19) above,

then the compatlbilist has forsaken his deterministic

stance, and

I

have no quarrel with him.

in the next chapter.)

(On this score, see D.VI.4

But perhaps the compatlbilist would prefer to

assert the following instead:

265

at ^ in order that r may
occur =df
there
are events s and u and a time
t^rsuch that, if S werr
to will
£ at _t* in order that u might occur, then [S
wills s in order that u may occur]
would contribute
causally relative to t* and _t to
[S
in uiuer
order mat
~ wills ^ j-m
that
£ may occur].

But D.V.5 is objectionable.

First, it appears to rely on
the conten-

tion that, whenever one wills
an event, one wills to will
that event.
This is not only false.
it leads to an infinite
regress.
Secondly,

and more importantly, D.V.5 is open
to the same sort of counter-

example just levelled at D.V.3.

We need only substitute -will
to

will- for -will- in the case of Jones
and the placid python and make

further corresponding adjustments, and
D.V.5 is in turn refuted.
The compatibilist may attempt at this
point to provide alter-

natives to D.V.3 which do not succumb to
the sort of counterexample
given, but

1

know of no such attempt which is successful.

Moreover,

given that D.V.3 has been refuted, there
is no reason for us to concern ourselves here with a more comprehensive
conditional version of

compatibilism in which an account is given not just
of the phrase "S
can immediately at

_t

bring about

jd

directly relative to

t

and t’,"

but also of all those other phrases which
provide the means of ac-

counting for the phrase ”S can at
this point,

therefore,

I

^

act relative to

At

shall turn from a consideration of the most

popular fonn of compatibilism, that based on
can,

and t*."

a

conditional account of

to a more novel form of compatibilism, one based on an account

of "can" in terms of possible worlds.
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A Possible-Worlds V ersion of
Compatibilism

4.

Whereas variants of the conditional
version of compatibilism
just considered have been proposed by
many philosophers from Hume onward, the version that

I

shall now consider has had only
one major

proponent, namely, Keith Lehrer

This is, perhaps, mostly due to
the

.

fact that Lehrer 's version of compatibilism
was first proposed only

very recently.

Despite his opposition to the traditional
conditional

account of "can" favored by most compatibilists

believes compatibilism to be true.

,

Lehrer nonetheless

In a recent paper he has proposed

a novel analysis of the concept of "can" within
the framework of

possible-world semantics.
cussion. 40

The paper has provoked considerable dis-

^
In
it Lehrer claims that he demonstrates the truth
of
.

compatibilism.^^

Others have claimed that this is not so,'^^ but at

least one commentator has asserted that Lehrer 's analysis strongly

supports compatibilism. 43

In this section

I

shall give a brief expo-

sition of Lehrer 's account of "can" and then in the next section

I

shall seek to show that it fails to render compatibilism any more

plausible than incompatibilism.

Indeed,

if one of Lehrer 's primitive concepts

I

shall seek to show that,

(the concept of an "advantage")

is understood as it seems it should be understood,

then there would

seem to be good reason to believe that his analysis supports not

compatibilism but incompatibilism.
Lehrer explicitly assures the reader that he is concerned to
give an account of the "all-in" sense of "can."

It is clear,

then.

that the "can" with which he is concerned is the same as that which
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IS at issue in this
chapter.

Lehrer also stresses, as

I

have stressed

above, that an adequate account
of "can" involves a double
time- index,
one time-reference being to the
time at which the person has the
(allin,

specific) ability and the other being to the
time of the action.

(In actual fact, of course,

time-index, insofar as

I

1

have stressed the need for a triple

believe two distinct mentions of times are

required to state "the time” of an action.

which

I

But this is a technicality

shall suppress here in favor of reporting Lehrer
's own account

more accurately.
To set the stage of his inquiry, Lehrer gives
the following
two definitions.'^'^

~~

•

^

Where "a” names the actual world:

Condition C occurring at time jt in a determines that
do action A at time _t
in a =Sf.
(i) _t
is earlier than _t
(ii) there is a possible world w in which C occurs at
and ^ does not do A at t
and
(iii) for every possible world w, if w has the same
natural laws as a and £ occurs at _t. in w, then
~
A at t in —
w.
—S does —

•

.

^

.

;

;

^

is ancestrally determined that
£ do A at £ in a =df.
there are a time _t. and a condition C such that C
occurring at
in a determines that £ do A at t
~
in a; and
(ii) for every time £. and for every condition C, if C

It

•

(i)

occurring at
in a determines that £ do A at
in a, then there are a time
and a condition
such that
(a) _t^ is earlier than £.
and
(b) £' occurring at
in a determines that £ occur

^

,

at
It is Lehrer 's aim,

mined that

—t.

£

such that

t
in
—1
.

then,

not do A at

—S

a.

to show that its being ancestrally deter-

in a does not imply that there is no time

can at —1
do —
t
A at
.

—t n

in a.

Before embarking on his own analysis of the concept of "can"
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Lehrer seeks to dismiss what seems at
first glance to be a simple and

plausible principle concerning that concept
and seems. Indeed, to be
a

principle which ought to be incorporated into
the analysis of that

concept.

The principle in question is this:

^

A at _t^ (in a) only if no necessary condition
for doing A at t^ (in ot) is lacking.

Lehrer argues that (20) is too restrictive.

For, he says, some

necessary condition is lacking for any action which
does not in fact
occur, and it is obviously false that one can perform
only those actions which one in fact does perform.

He gives the following illus-

tration:

Imagine that I leave the fingers of my left hand relaxed
From the simple fact that 1 do this, it would be
peculiar to suppose that I could not have clenched my fingers
into a fist instead.
Yet there is a certain muscle in my arm,
flexor digitorum profundus to be precise, that must be flexed
for my hand to be so clenched, and that muscle is, in fact,
unflexed.
The flexing of that muscle is a necessary condition
of my clenching my fingers into a fist, and that condition is
unfulfilled.
Hence, according to the proposal it would follow that I could not have clenched my fist because a necessary
condition was lacking.
[I

at

But if

(20)

is false,

we may nevertheless arrive at a satis-

factory analysis of the concept of "can” and to do so, Lehrer contends, it is helpful to invoke the concept of a possible world.

Now,

it is obvious that the following does not capture that concept of

"can" which concerns us here:
D. V- 8

:

can at
world in which

^

D.V.8 requires restriction.

A
^

^

in a =df.
does A at t^.

there is a possible

For, according to D.V.8, any meta-

physically possible action is one which

^

can perform at

_t^.

Similar-
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ly,

the following also requires
restriction:

can at
such that:

^

(li)

do A at

in a =Hf

t

is a world w

f d^^Ltari^

For according to D.V.S.a.
any physically possible
action Is one which
S

can perfo™ at t^.

At this point Lehrer Invokes
the concept of

minimal difference, of which a
brief account is here in order.
The concept of minimal difference
was first introduced by

John Pollock in an attempt to
give a satisfactory account
of subjunctive conditionals.^^ Whereas Robert
Stalnaker would analyze a

statement of the form
(

21 )

If C were to occur at

_t

,

then

S

would do —
A at

—t

by means of

A at
world

is s world w in which C occurs
at _tj^ and S does
and which is more similar to a than
any'other
w’' in which C occurs at
t ,
•

and whereas David Lewis would analyze
(21) by means of
(21b)

There is a world w in which
^ occurs at t. and S does
A at
and which is more similar to a than any~
world
w* in which C occurs at _t^ and
does not do A at

^

Pollock would choose, for reasons that

I

shall not discuss here, to

analyze (21) by means of
(21c)

For every world w, if w is minimally different from
a
with respect to ^’s occurring at t
then ~
S does A
~
at t
in w.^/
•

,

The main difference between the relation of comparative
similarity and
that of minimal difference is that the former orders
worlds simply

whereas the latter only partially orders worlds.

But this differ-

ence is of no importance here, according to Lehrer; the analysis that
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is to follow could maka
equally good use of the concept
of compare-

tive similarity.
In pursuing his account of what
it means to say "I
could have

done A- Lehrer talks of the need
to find a possible world
which is
"minimally changed to accommodate” A.
A slightly odd feature of
such
talk IS the absence of any mention
of any particular condition,
or
even any particular type of condition,
with respect to which the possible world in question is supposed to
be minimally changed in order
to "accommodate” A.

At any rate, when indulging in such
talk, Lehrer

seems implicitly to rely on the following
definition:

—

world w accommodates, with respect to world
w*
=df.
there is a condition C such That:
A ^t
(i)
is earlier than or identical with t
(ii) w is minimally different from w*
with~^espect to
£'s occurring at t^; and
(lii) ^ does A at _t^^ in w.
-ti

—

;

Lehrer also makes the assumption that for every
world w, every world
w*, every condition C, and every time t^, if
w is minimally different from

w<'

with respect to

natural laws as w*.

s

occurring at

_t^,

then w has the same

Armed with this definition and this assumption,

Lehrer then considers the following proposal:
D V. 8 b
.

.

:

can at _tj^ do A at _t^^ in a =df.
there is a world
such that at
w accommodates, with respect to a,
^ doing A at _t^.

^

But D.V.S.b still requires restriction.

Lehrer gives the following

Illustration:
[E]ven if there is a possible world having the same laws and
only differing minimally from the actual world so that I perform an action I did not perform in the actual world, it by
no means follows
that I could have performed that action in the actual world.
If, for example, I am chained to
.

.

.
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a wall from which

1 am anxious to move, but
do not because
am chained, we can find a possible world
with the same laws,
minimally changed to accommodate my moving
from the room
namely, a possible world in which I am not
chained.
But* it
hardly follows that I could have moved from
the room in the
actual world.
In the possible world I have an
advantage I
lack in the actual world, to wit, of being
unchained.
That
possible world is not accessible to me. ^9

This observation, Lehrer says, suggests a
further modification.

A

possible world w, minimally different from a so as
to accommodate,

with respect to a,
be one where

^

lacks in a.

Thus:

S

doing A at

_t^,

must indeed be found, but it must

enjoys no advantage for doing A at

_t^

in w that he

can at _t^ do A at
in a =df.
there is a world w
~
such that:
(i) at
w accommodates, with respect to a, S doing A
~
~
at
and
(li) ^ has no advantage at
in w for doing A at t
—
_
that he lacks at _t^^ in a.

^

But the analysis still requires modification.

Lehrer gives this

example
There may be some time _tj^ at which I have the advantages I
need at that time to do A at
but by some time subsequent
arid prior to _t^ something happens to prevent me from
doing A at _tj^.
I might, for example, have promised to repay
a debt in a loan house at a specific time, say between one and
two o'clock on Friday.
On Thursday, I have the money and am
not too far distant from the appointed place.
But Friday
morning a tornado strikes the loan house,
and, as a result, I am unable to repay the debt at that place at the appointed time.^^

^

.

The example shows that

I

cannot at

D.V.8.C does not yield this result.

t.

.

.

repay the debt at

t

.

But

Lehrer points out, however, that

to propose the following as a response to this case would be too

restrictive
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s

can at t. do A at
-

in n -Af

t

^

luch thatT^

^vantages at

Ithat

he lacks at

—t

in a

H

In „ for doing A at t„
—
_n

D-V.S.d is too restrictive for the
reason that
some advantages a person acquires
subsequent to t. may be a
consequence of what he does from t, to t
Arriving
‘
Washington fifteen minutes
before the plane departs gives me an
advantage for getting on
^
remained home instead.
But
whL
hen
fail to act so as to secure that
advantage, it hardly
follows that I could not have gotten on
the flight.
.

La

f

bLLLLeL?

These considerations lead Lehrer to the
conclusion that a

distinction between types of advantages is
called for; some will be
admissible" and some not.

He proposes the following definitions
in

this regard:

D.V.IO;

An advantage, v, that
^ has at _t. in w for doing A
_tj^ results
from ^ doing Bi at
in w =df.
(i)
is earlier than or identical with t-;
(ii)
is earlier than or identical with
and
(iil) for every world w* and every time
if at tj^ w*
accommodates, with respect to w, S not doing B at
~
— i' then ^ lacks _v at tj in w*.

D.V.ll

An advantage, v, that

in a for doing A at
^ lacks at
is admissible to
^ from a =df
(i) -tk is earlier than or identical with
and either
(ii) there are a time t. and a world w such that
(a) _tj is earlier than or identical with
j^,
(b) ^ has V at _tj^ in w,
.

.

(c) V

results from ^ doing something JB at t^ in w,
~
and
(d) ^ has at _tj in w no advantage for doing
t^
^ at ~'
that he lacks at
in a; or
(iii) there are a time _t. an^ a world w such that
(a) jtj is earlier ’Jhan or identical with
(b) ^ has V at _tj^ in w,
(c)
results from ^ doing something ^ at _t. in w,
~
and
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V' for doing
”,
B^af
—j that he lacks at
~j
in a, then v' is
admissible to S from a
andkesults from"“what
^ does prior to
in w.
.

Note that D.V.ll Is recursive.

Given these definitions,
behrer be-

lieves, „e are finally In a
position to give an acceptable
analysis
of that concept of "can"
which concerns us here. He
proposes the
following

D.V.S.e:
^

icTthatf'
(

1)

at

_t^

at

_t

li

w accommodates, with respect to a,

S doing A
° —
and
(ii) for every time _tj later than
or identical with t.
and earlier than or identical with t
and for every
advantage v for doing A at _t^, if
has v at t
in
^
and lacks v at tj in a, then v is
admiIsibll\o
Ifrom a.
—S
;

•

In Lehrer's own words, what D.V.S.e
amounts to is roughly this:

The intuitive idea captured by our
analysis is that a person
could (at _t^) have done A at
just in case there is a possible world or scenario beginning at _t
in which what the
person does culminates in his doing A at
It is crucial
that at _t^ and subsequently to
he not have any advantages
in the scenario for doing A at t
which he, in fact, lacks,
except those that result from what he does
earlier, though
not prior to
.

Lehrer's main contention, given D.V.S.e, is of course
that its

being ancestrally determined that
ply that there is no time

_t.

1

^

not do A at

such that

S

can at

(in a) does not imt. do —
A at t
—1
—

.

It is

certainly true that this implication is not formally deducible
without the aid of some axioms concerning the concept of an advantage.
But it is Lehrer's contention that the provision of any such
axioms

which would allow for the deduction of this implication is unwarranted.
To support this contention he says the following:
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I can find no
reason whatever for supposing
that a conrl-tfior.
that determines my not performing
some actLn, evL rcondUion
that existed before I was born,
should have the result that

at

^

advantage I needed to per^^tion.
To be sure, if I have the
required advLtages
T Ih
hypothesis, I do not perform
the
ne action.
aciio^ "^But^tr
But the determination might explain
why 1 do not

’

^
not entaU that
tail
thatiI lacked some advantage needed to
perform the action
_t IS my contention that many
human actions are to be explained
an just this way.
For example, suppose an action is
exp^aJ^ef
y assuming that a person is reasonable at a given
time and
hat being reasonable, he chooses to
perform that action which
has the greatest expected utility for
him.
His not performing
some other alternative action would be
explained in terms of
that action having a lower expected utility
for him than the
action he chose. He could have chosen the
action with lower
expected utility, though perhaps that would
have been unreasonable.
It may well be the case that when he was
very young, or
even before he was born, conditions existed
that determine ’why
he would find himself acting the way he
does, that is, reasonably.
But why should we conclude from [this] that
he could not
have acted otherwise? He lacked no advantage
he needed to act
otherwise, it is simply that his so acting would
have been less
beneficial to him and, in this sense, unreasonable.

This completes my exposition of Lehrer

'

s

account of "can."^^

It is a complex account and it requires careful
consideration.

ever,

I

How-

think it will be seen that, after such consideration, the

account in no way renders compatibilism more plausible than
incompatlbilism.

Indeed, it will be seen that, given a certain natural

interpretation of Lehrer ’s key concept of an advantage, the account
appears to favor incompatibllism rather than compatibilism.

5.

I

Evaluation of This Version

have no real quarrel with D.V.6 or D.V.7.

D.V.6, indeed,

is very close to my analysis of the concept of a sufficient causal

condition;

and D.V.7 matches fairly closely my characterization of
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determinism.

There is perhaps some slight formal difficulty with

D.V.7 in that clause (ii) (b) of that definition concerns one con-

dition's determining another, whereas the concept of determination
is analyzed in D.V.6 in terms of a condition's determining a doing;

but this is very minor.

Rather, my first difficulty with Lehrer's ac-

count arises with his treatment of the principle embodied in (20).
It is unclear exactly what Lehrer's motivation is for discussing this

principle, but perhaps he feels that in undermining it he has succeeded in dismissing a principle towards which incompatibilists are

inclined and hence that, to a certain extent, he has succeeded in

rendering incompatibilism implausible.

If so,

For there are two crucial obscurities in (20).

then he is mistaken.

The first is that no

time is assigned to the "can"; the second is that what sort of neces-

sary condition it is to which appeal is being made is left unexplained.

From the example concerning

f

lexor digitorum profundus it seems that

Lehrer takes (20) in fact to express that principle which is more

adequately expressed by
(20a)

only if, for every event B, if
do A at
can at
it is physically necessary that, if ^ does A at
then ^ occurs at _tj^, then B occurs at

^

Lehrer rightly dismisses (20a)
this.
(20b)

;

it is false and his example shows

But Lehrer does nothing to prove the following principle false:
for every event B, if
_tj^ do A at _t^ only if,
if ^ does A at
that,
necessary
physically
it is
at _tj^.
occurs
then
then ^ occurs at
^

^

can at

Nor does Lehrer's case touch the following principle:
(20c)

if it
only if, for every event
then
_tj^,
at
A
does
S_
if
^
Ts physically necessary that,
does not occur at jt^^, then ^ does not occur at _tj^o
S

can at

do A at

_t^^
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Both (20b) and (20c) strongly support incompatibilism.

I

shall do

no more here, however, than point out this limitation of Lehrer's

discussion of (20).

56

When it comes to treating "can" in terns of possible worlds,
Lehrer is surely right to dismiss D.V.8 and D.V.S.a.

But

I

do not

understand why he deems it necessary to invoke the concept of minimal
difference.

Certainly, D.V.S.a requires restriction, and certainly

D.V.S.b is more restrictive than D.V.S.a; but, as Lehrer himself
points out, D.V.S.b still requires restriction.

The restriction that

Lehrer imposes concerns the concept of an advantage, and once this
concept has been invoked, there would seem to be little need to make
use also of the concept of minimal difference.

In my opinion, D.V.S.c

through D.V.S.e could be harmlessly simplified by striking clause
of each.^^

Perhaps Lehrer would demur.

(i)

Perhaps he would say that it

accommois possible that there be a possible world which at no time

dates, with respect to a,
at t

^n

^

doing A at

_t^

and yet in which

^

does A

Lehrer
with no, or at least admissible, advantage; and perhaps

can at
would say that there being such a world does not imply that ^

some time

do A at

_t^

in a.

partly due to the fact that

I

I

do not know, and my ignorance is

am unclear as to just what constitutes

a minimal change and what does not.
of miniMore important than coming to grips with the concept

with the concept of an
mal difference, however, is coming to grips
the heart of Lehrer’s
advantage; for it is this concept that lies at

analysis.

the provision of
It has already been noted that, without
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certain axioms concerning this concept,
the following implication
is
not formally deducible from any
of the definitions Lehrer gives:
it is ancestrally determined that
^ not do A at t
in a, then there is no time
such that S can~at t~"
^
~
-i
do A at _t^ in a.

But it should also be noted that
the negation of (22) is also not

formally deducible from any of Lehrer 's definitions.
itself undermines Lehrer'
truth of compatibilism.

s

This fact in

contention that he has demonstrated the

For note that it is open to one to accept

Lehrer 's account of "can” and yet to insist that
incompatibilism is
true.

One may do this simply by claiming that, if

S

not doing A at

in a is causally necessitated, any world in which S
A at
~ does —
(and hence in which
is one where

A

_t^,

^

^ enjoys

to wit,

he not do A at

not doing A at

—t

is not causally necessitated)

an enormous and inadmissible advantage for doing

the advantage of its not being causally required that
58

Now Lehrer certainly says (see the long quota-

tion which completes my exposition of his account) that he finds no

reason to accept this incompatibilist claim, but

reason not to accept it.

I

in turn find no

For it seems to me that this move is open

to the incompatibilist unless and until an account of the concept of

an advantage is given which rules the move out.

The main point to be made here is, of course, that the tena-

bility of Lehrer 's version of compatibilism is contingent upon an

adequate account of the concept of an advantage.
no such account.

But Lehrer provides

Let us, however, attempt to provide one (but only a

rough one) for him.

Terence Horgan suggests that we understand the
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concept of an advantage as follows:
(23)

Necessarily, for every world w, S has
at t
in w an
advantage for doing A at
that he lacks at t Tin a
xf and only if el_ther S has at t^
in w a bettl^ opportunity to do A at
than he has at _t in a or S has
at t
in w a better ability to do A at
t^ th^ he has
.

.

.

at

_t^

in a.

Now Lehrer does not himself state
(23), but it seems to constitute
(23)
a reasonable interpretation of the
concept of an advantage, or at

least of his use of it.
,

At any rate, in what follows

I

shall take

despite its having obscurities of its own, as
accurately

characterizing Lehrer 's notion of an advantage.
The question now to be addressed is this: Does
Lehrer 's ac-

count of "can” prove the truth of compatibilism when
the concept of
an advantage is understood as it is in (23)?

Before attempting to

answer this question, however, we should briefly take note of
another
issue concerning (23).

accepted, then Lehrer

circularity.
(24)

It is Morgan's contention that,
s

can at

jt^

(23)

is

account of "can" suffers from conceptual

His argument runs as follows.
S_

if

do A at

_t^^

It would seem that

in a

is equivalent to

(24a)

has at
both the ability and the opportunity to do
A at
in a. ^(^

^

If we construct the inelegant neologism "canning" from the verb "can,"

we may infer from the equivalence of (24) and (24a) the following:
(25)

The concept S canning at t do A at t in a is identical
j
^
with the concept S having at t both the ability and the
j
opportunity to do A at t ^^ in a
^

^

.

But since, according to (23),
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(26)

The concept of an advantage Is to
be understood In
terms of the concepts of ability
and opportunity,

we may conclude

Lehrer’s analysis of the concept of
"can" is conceptual^
ly circular.
This is in fact a reconstruction of
Horgan's argument, for he
does not present it in quite so
explicit a manner.

But if the re-

construction is accurate, then it is easily seen
that Horgan's argument is inconclusive.^^

First, it is not at all clear that one pro-

position's being equivalent (that is,

I

take it, strictly equivalent)

to another implies that the concepts
constructed from them in the

manner of (25) are identical.

For a criterion of identity for con-

cepts would first have to be given.

2^ true,

it is not clear that

(27)

Secondly, even granting that (25)

follows from (25) and (26).

It

would seem at least that (26) should be strengthened to
read as
follows
(26a)

The concept of an advantage is to be understood only
in terms of the concepts of ability and opportunity,

and even then it is not clear that (27) would follow.

Arguments against Lehrer's account of "can" may be made on

various levels.

Consider the following:
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Argument A:

(1)

It is ancestrally determined that S
~ not do A at

in a.

Therefore

(2)

Therefore

(3)

and

(4)

(5)

Therefore (6)
Therefore (7)

There are a condition (call it C) and a
time (call it
li) such that C occurring at
in a determines that
^ not do A at _tj^ in a.
C occurs at
in a.
For every world, w, if w has the same laws
as a and
in w, then ^ does not do A at t
— occurs at
in ~
w.
For every time, _t, if
^ can at _t do A at~t i^a,
then there is a world w such that (a) w h^s
the same
laws as a, (b) for every event
and time t* earlier
^
than or identical with _t, if
^ occurs at t* in a then
B occurs at _t* in w, and (c)
w.
^ does A at I^ in ~
^ cannot at t. do A at t in a.
it It is ancestrally determined that
^ not do A at t
in a, then there is no time _t. such that
^ can~at t~^^
“
do A at _t^ in a.

Argument A constitutes an attack on Lehrer

mention of the concept of an advantage.

'

account without making

s

In order to block the con

elusion, Lehrer must deny the truth of premise
(5).

strikes me as highly unintuitive.

This denial

What such a denial amounts to is

roughly the following: it is possible that ”S can at t do A at
—
—
—1
.

in

ot

—t

be true even though there is no world

_w

—t

having the same natural

laws as a (and this includes a, of course) in which S's past history
up to and including _t^ is as it in fact is

in which

^

does A at

possible that

A

^

_t^.

can at

(

i. e.

,

as it is in a) and

Or in other, even rougher, words: it is

do A at

_t^

even though his actually doing

physically requires that an indefinite number of events, which

in fact did occur, never occurred.
I

think Argument A is an embarrassment to Lehrer.

If we now

invoke the concept of an opportunity, we may produce a short argument
which, in my opinion, is an embarrassment to any compatibilist

sider the following principle:

.

Con-
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P.l:

If It IS ancestrally determined
that ^ not do A at t
in a, then there is no time
such that S has'at tT^
in a an opportunity
lity to do A at t
—

—

P.X seems to me to be true.

Lehrer might not agree, but
nothing in

his paper implies that it is false.

Nov consider the following
argu-

ment

Ar£umen^:
Therefore

(1)

For every time,

-i-

/o\
(2) P.l.
(3) If it
_tj^

£

.

,

“

if s can at

“

do A at t
in a
opportunity to do —
A at t’.

is ancestrally determined that
^ not do A at
in a, then there is no time _t
such that ~
S 7an at
do A at
in a.
.

_tj^

Both premises seem true to me.

But

I

think that we may construe cer-

tain of Lehrer 's remarks in such a fashion
that, were he confronted

with Argument B, he would deny that the first
premise is true, though
on what grounds

I

cannot say.

If neither Argument

A nor Argument B is sufficiently embar-

rassing to Lehrer, it may yet be pointed out that, in answer
to our

principal question as to whether or not Lehrer *s account of "can"
proves the truth of compatibilism when the concept of an advantage
is

understood as it is in (23), it can be shown that it

^ open

to the

incompatibilist to accept Lehrer 's account insofar as it is constituted by the definitions that he presents together with the account of
the concept of an advantage that is provided by (23).

In order for

this to be demonstrated, P.l and also some further principles must be

Invoked.
P

2

•

The other principles are:
If there is no time _t^ such that
^ has at _t^ in a an opportunity to do A at
then, for every world w and for
every time _t
if ^ has at _tj in w an opportunity to do A
j
then
this
opportunity is inadmissible to ^ from a.
-tn’
,
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P.3:
o, and for every
inadmissible to
Is an advantage v such
thars
s V
in w and v is inadmissible to
S from a.

time‘T"''irf f
. from
fri^:a, then there

J

Iat
P.4:

L

For every world w, if S_ does
a time _t^ such that
^ has at
A at t
—

—

—
_t^

then there is
—n
in w an opportunity
to do

.

Each of these principles is
perhaps more controversial than
its successor, but each seems reasonable
to me.
P.2 of course relies on
the

concept of admissibility with regard
to opportunities.

provide an analysis of this concept here;

I

I

expect that some recursive

analysis akin to that given in D.V.ll
would suffice.
of P.2 rests on the observation
that at

opportunity to do A at

_t^;

shall not

The plausibility

time does

have in a an

S

hence it would seem that, if in some
world

w he does at some time have such an
opportunity, the opportunity must
arise from some prior action of his in w for
which he has some ad-

vantage inadmissible to him from

a.

This reasoning is, of course, not

conclusive, and P.2 is perhaps the most questionable
principle of the
four principles invoked here.

P.3, given a proper understanding of

the admissibility of opportunities, would
seem to follow directly from
(23).

But

I

shall not attempt to show this, and so

a new principle.

I

include it as

Finally, P.4 seems to be obviously true.

With the aid of P.l through P.4

I

shall now prove the truth

of that proposition which serves as a conclusion to both
Argument A

and Argument

i

.

e

,

I

shall now prove the truth of (22).
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Argument C

:

(

(

Therefore

1

)

2)

(3)

u

is ancestrally determined
that

S

not do A at

P.l.

There is no time _t such
that ~
S has at
opportunity to do A at t
.

_t^

~

in a an

(4)

P.2.

Therefore

(5)

For every world w and for
every time t., if s has
at
in
an opportunity to do A at
t
^
then this oo^
portunity is inadmissible to
^ from^a.

Therefore

(7)

(

(

6)

8)

For every world w and for every
time t^, if s has at
in w an opportunity to do
A at
then s“has at
in w an advantage for doing
A at t„ and this advantage is inadmissible to S from
~
P 4
.

.

Therefore (9) For every world w,
if ^ does A at _t
in w, then there
""""
advantage
^
forV-""
or doing A at _t
and this advantage is inadmissibL
to ^ from a.
( 10 )
D.V.S.e.
Therefore ( 11 ) For every time t.,
if s can at tj do A at t„ in
a,
then there is a world w in which
does A at t and
^
in which S does not have at
_t^ an advantage f^ doing
A at
which is inadmissible to
^ from a.
Therefore (12) There is no time
such that S can at t/do A at t

-

Therefore (13) If it is ancestrally
determined that
in a,

then there is no time

do —
A at
I

—t

in a.

t.

S not do A at t
such that ~S can at _t^

think the strength of Argument C lies in
the fact that none

of P.l through P.4 is as strong
a principle as those expressed in

premise (5) of Argument A and in premise

(1)

of Argument B.

This

being so, any claim by a proponent of
compatibilism that Argument C
in some manner "begs the question" is even
less warranted than such
a claim would be when made with regard
to Argument A or Argument B.
I

can imagine, however, that Lehrer would wish to dispute
P.l and

P.2 in particular, though what his reasons for doing so
would be
not know.

I

do

But this fact, if it is a fact, is not so important as the

fact that nothing in Lehrer 's paper serves to rule out any of P.l
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through P.4.

This being the case, and given that
(22) is provable

from them and D.V.S.e, it is
certainly not true that Lehrer's analysis of the concept of "can"
(D.V.S.e) proves the truth of or even

strongly supports compatibilism,
even when the key concept of an

advantage is understood as it seems it should be (see
(23)).

His

analysis fails to render compatibilism any more
plausible than
incompatibilism.

Indeed, if, as

I

believe, P.l through P.4 are

reasonably held to be true, then Lehrer's analysis appears
to support, not compatibilism, but incompatibilism.

NOTES

Compatibilism also goes by the name "reconciliationism"
and
when coupled with determinism, is said in
philosophical circles to
constitute soft determinism.
David Hume, An Inquiry Concern ing Human UnderstandinP
„
TNew
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc.,
1955), p. 104: "By liberty ?
we
can only mean a power of ac ting or not acting
according
to
the
—-—
/ mi
r
~n—*
minations of ^-Vv
the TTTit
will ."n
(The use of the word power here is puzzling.
since elsewhere ( A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford:
At the Clarendon
Press, 1888), p. 171) Hume denies any interesting
philosophical function to this term by claiming that the distinction
between power and
"without foundation.")
Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan
(Colller-Macmillan, Ltd., 1962), p. 54), who says that a voluntary
act
is simply one which "proceeds from the will."
,

.

.

'

/-\-P

"•»

'

.

!

'

Ti

Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mi nd
(Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 254 and 265.
T~it^ll
consider Reid's views in somewhat more detail in the next chapter.
4

Recently, incompatiblllsm has been defended by recourse to
certain theorems of quantum physics, to Godel's theorem, and to issues concerning the "observer-predictor" puzzle.
These matters provide dubious support at best for incompatiblllsm, and I shall not
discuss them in this chapter.
See Chapter IV, note 138.
Also c^. Roderick M. Chisholm,
Person and Object (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.,

1976), D.II.4.

Two Interesting points should be made in connection with
D.V.l.
Note, first, that it would not be appropriate to substitute
for clause (ii) of that definition the following:
^ can at jt bring
about the negation of £ actively relative to _t' and
For there
is no guarantee (as mentioned in the last chapter when discussing the
concept of omission) that the negation of £ is an event, even if £ is;
and yet whatever ^ actively brings about must be an event.
Secondly,
D.V.l does not rule out either of the following two types of cases:
(i) ^
free at _t to bring about £ actively relative to _t' and _t*,
constitutes
£
£ at Jt*, and ^ is not free at _t to bring about £ actively relative to _t' and _t*; (li) ^
free at _t to bring about £
actively relative to _t' and _t*, £ constitutes £ at _t*, and ^ is not
free at _t to bring about £ actively relative to £' and _t*.
But I can
see no harm in this.

^
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Chapter VI

Books,

WOl )

•

(Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin

Ltd;^lS^and"'•^fs

>=hat type of analysis which
appeals to the IZ
Z°t
context, see Roderick M.
Chisholm "I I
i
^ Philosophical Papers," in
Bernard Berofsky
ed
Free Will’ a^n^"
Determimsni (New York: Harper and Row,
343-4~
1966),

pp.

11 ,.

connection the classic compatibilists
such
'^he concept of willing.
See

H KK

notf 2 aLve^

distinct designations of times should
be made does
not imply
imnlv^that'l’h'^*'
that three distinct times should be
designated.
13

Austin, I&C^, p. 301.

14.

especially Austin, I&C
pp. 305-6 and 310 n
11 and
M
3.0
^
"
Nowell-Smith,
I&Cr,
330-1
pp
“
also
M.R.
Ayers,
.4'
"Austin
on
'To uld
la* and^^
a to
Could Have
Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1966); and
Don Locke,
Ifs and Cans Revisited," Philosophy
37 (1962)— henceforth I shall refer to this article as "ICR."
;

.

,

,

.

,

15

Austin, I&C
account of can."

,

pp.

299-301, where Austin considers Moore's

16 ^

can

One should not confuse the "can" of (1) and
(2) with the

of permission.

^^David Pears ("Ifs and Cans," Part I, The Canadian Journal of
Philosophy
henceforth I shall refer to this
,^^1 (1971), pp. 254-5
article as ^^^
Part I") makes this claim where "do a" in (1) and
3
(4) is replaced by "resign."
He contends that one can resign only
if one chooses to resign.
It is unclear to me, however, how this
point is relevant, even if true.

—

*

18

Keith Lehrer

197 .

,

"Ifs, Cans and Causes," Analysis

,

20 (1960)

That is: Necessarily,
^ can do ^ if and only if ^ will do
if he chooses to do
(where
"if
and only if" is the main connective).
^
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20 ^

assume that Lehrer and Austin are both
right on this
Ithough It should be noted that
the point is controversial
See
Non-conditional Ifs
T ^u^^ar^^PhilLoV.

ef

•'

Uruce Goldberg and Herbert Heidelberger
("Mr
Lehrer nn
21 (1961)) sp!ll
explicitly.
David Pears (I 6 C , Part I, pp. 271-2)
also has reserva3
tions concerning Lehrer *s argument.

consecution of Cans," Analysis,

Lehrer, "An Empirical Disproof of Determinism?"
in
I^^^dom and Determinism (New York: Random House,
T nc.,
1966), pp. 195-7, and "'Can' In Theory and Practice:
A Possible Worlds Analysis," in Myles Brand and
Douglas Walton, ed
Action
(Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.
D. Reidel Publishing
19/6), pp. 248-250 (henceforth I shall refer to this
article as "CTP")Roderick M. Chisholm, "He Could Have Done Otherwise,"
The Journal of
philosophy 64 (1967), p. 311, and
p. 57.
^ ^

T

u

h|^

.

,

:

,

23
OT
27

The response that follows is close to the main
point made
"Hypotheticals and 'Can': Another Look," Analysis,
^

(1967).
24

See Chapter IV, note 119,

25

That- the "cans" of (12) and (13) are in fact distinct will
be assumed later when it is said that
either means the same as
( 12 )
or is implied by (19).
26 ,

Austin, I&C^, p. 308n.

27 ^
L•§
Nowell— Smith (I&C„, pp. 331—6); Arnold S. Kaufman
("Ability," in Myles Brand, ed.. The Nature of Human Action (Glen»

view, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1970), p. 195).
28

Bruce Aune ("Abilities, Modalities, and Free Will,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (1963), p. 399).
»

,

29

Austin, I&C^, pp. 319-320.

30

The terms "specific ability" and "general ability" are
borrowed from Don Locke (ICR, p. 254). Locke does not use them in
quite this way, however. A.M. Honore ("Can and Can't," Mind 73
(1964), p. 463) makes a similar distinction.
,

Certainly the general sense of "can" is not appropriate to
D.V.l.
Consider this case.
Let the "can" in the definiens of D.V.l
be the "can" of general ability; let "p' designate the event internal
to Jones's taking one step to the right; let "p' designate the event
internal to Jones's taking one step to the left; and let Jones's
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iens of D.V.l will be'^saJlsf
iL^ (once
and yet in no sense of "frpA" i
s-nces .o 3., .i;•

32

.

th^properti'
times are mentioned);

f-

Austin's discussion of Moore Int; it-o o- -•
V'""'
P. 296) in the examination of
the sense of ''cL" ^hat
thiJ
Moore employs
in the following passage
(Moore, E. p
128)have walked a mile in twenty
minutes this morning
but I certainly could not have
run two miles in five mlnu
es
I did not, i n fact
do either of these two things;
,
but
iti^
pure nonsense to say that the mere
fact that I did not does
way with the distinction between
them, which I express by
within my powers, whereas ?he othL
.

S^not*"

—

It is clear from Moore's
subsequent discussion of this example
that
he has the specific sense of
"can" in mind, and it is almost
c!Lr
that Austin so understands Moore.

L

33

Even so,

1 cannot see any reason to
believe that one mav
“bother specific or general, to perform
an action
anr yet fail to perform it for "no reason"
and
whatsoever -an issue suppressed in tlie reconstructed version of
Austin's argument. Thus
specific abilities with general abilities
is
olerloL'^a''
looked, Austin s point would seem very
questionable. Moreover
It will be clear from the next
chapter that my saying this is not
grounded in some "modern belief in science."
’

34

Adapted from Lehrer (CTP, pp. 248-9) to fit D.V.3.

35

The mention of
does not will p] is
^ is required since
not an event; hence, given D.lV.l, there can
occur no sufficient
causal condition of
does not will
.

36.,

Mote that, while most compatlbilists are in fact determinthe truth of compatibilism does not imply the truth
of determinism, just as the truth of incompatibilism does not
imply that
humans ever in fact act freely.
Compare note 1 above.
ists,

37

See Chapter IV, note 119.

38.,

Mote that whether or not the regress is "vicious" is a
separate question.
See Chapter IV, note 120.
39

Lehrer, CTP.

Terence Horgan, "Lehrer on Could -Statements ," Philosophical Studies
32 (1977) (henceforth I shall refer to this article as
LCS ); Robert Audi, "Avoidability and Possible lAJorld^," Philosophical
Studies 33 (1978) (henceforth I shall refer to this article as "APW").
'

'

,

,
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I

tailed references tr^h^texJ!
42

43

Morgan, LCS

,

409; Audi, APW, p.

p.

shall dispense with de-

419

,

Audi, APW, p. 419.

44

definitions that in this section I
attribute to I ehrpr
modified versions of tliose that he
himself gives
The
edifications are designed to dispose
of some superficial formal
problems and to promote clarity of
exposition whilst aithe same
time preserving the spirit of
the original definitions.
a

1

-

u

Lehrer, CTP

,

253.

p.

46

John L. Pollock, Subjunctive Reasoning
(Dordrerhr Hniior,a/
Boston. U.S.A.: D. Reldel P^Ib-ilshlng Co.
1976)^ Hencefor h TsUall
refer to this book as
,

putting the matter only in rough form.
Pollock in
act distinguishes between many kinds of
subjunctive conditionals.
.

^^Pollock
49

PP

,

.

22-3.

Lehrer

CTP, P-

254.

Lehrer

CTP, P-

255.

^^Lehrer

CTP, P-

256.

^^Lehrer

CTP, P-

257.

^^Lehrer

CTP, P-

266.

For the sake of simplicity
CMC cLLecL inac an event may be ancestrally determined
even though none of its causes occurs more than ten minutes before
it does.
iaw.wi.ci.

See D.IV.l.

The main difference between D.V.6 and D.IV.l

is that, whereas in the former _tj^ is stipulated as being earlier than
latter _t is stipulated as being either earlier than or
—n»

identical with t'.
^^(20b) and (20c) will be discussed more fully in the next

chapter

Audi (APW, p. 414) also suggests that the concept of minimal
difference is dispensable.
Note that this concept still figures implicitly in clause (iii) of D.V.IO, however.
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58

Horgan gives this argument;
LCS

the concept°orthraS''^r’'^''
ii>_cpL or cne aii-m
can here
(24a) is what was said earlier
to

pp

.

409-410.

Nowell-Smlth'
Nnfp>

tn

that, des'if’

,

be

^h 3 ^

•

iS-fh:? :tf!^h^;^r^isc“si::L^^fe^r"i:i=°

aL!in"L

62

analysis of

rgen«al

plicUly ?ej-ect“(CTp'^“r'’2Lrf™irn
^ ''°-H-Smrth' s analysts
cept of the
61

s

u-i

Horgan, LCS, pp. 407-9.

Audi (APW,

p.

418) concurs,

of the con-

CHAPTER

VI

A THEORY OF FREE HUMAN ACTION

1.

Exposition of the Theory

The theory of free human action that

I

shall propose and seek

to defend in this chapter is an incompatibilist
theory.

The reader

should be aware that one of the main purposes of the
theory is that
It should enable one to deal effectively with the
following argument:
(1)

If determinism is true,

then no one ever has control

over his actions.

Indeterminism is true, then no one ever has control over his actions.
(3) Either determinism is true or indeterminism is true.
(4) If a person is morally responsible for some state of
affairs, then he must have or have had control over
some of his actions.
Therefore (5) No one is morally responsible for any state of
(2)

If

affairs
The conclusion is,

I

believe, false.

properly, however,

I

would have to give an account not only of the

In order to treat this argument

terms ''determinism'' (and, derivatively, "indeterminism") and "action,"
as

I

have already done in earlier chapters, but also of the terms

"control" and "morally responsible."
of the present dissertation.
is premise

(2)

This task is beyond the scope

Nevertheless,

that I find objectionable.

can say here that it

I

There is a species of in-

determinism (namely, libertarianism) which is,

I

believe, both true

and also such that, according to it, one has control over certain of

one's actions (to wit, one's free actions).
291

It is my purpose here to
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propose and defend a certain
version of Incompatibillsm
which, when
coupled with the claim that
determinism Is false, constitutes
a certain version of libertarianism.
The adequacy of this version
of

libertarianism in terms of a demonstration
that premise
however, Is something that

I

is false.

(2)

shall here leave unargued.

The incompatiblllst theory of free human
action chat

I

shall

expound rests on a primitive concept which
has not yet been employed,
except vicariously In Chapter III when
discussing Chisholm’s theory of
action.

This Is the concept of agent-effectuation

.

Since this con-

cept has a long and controversial history,
it Is appropriate briefly
to indicate certain highlights of this
history.

The concept of agent-effectuation, when
discussed at all, is

commonly said to concern a certain type of causation,
often called
agent-causation.
a

Sometimes agent-causation is said to be a species of

broader type of causation, often called object-causation.

any talk of agent-causation (or, as

I

I

regard

shall henceforth call it, ef-

fectuation) in terms of causation to be highly misleading.

This is

because causation is nowadays commonly thought to be a relation
that
holds between one event and another, whereas effectuation is
tion that holds between a person and an event.

a rela-

The relations are

quite distinct and have very few significant characteristics in common.

Nevertheless, the concepts have a common origin; hence the mis-

leading talk.
We may,

I

think, trace the origin of the concept of effectua-

tion at least as far back as to the writings of Aristotle.

Aristotle
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of course distinguishes
various kinds of

caused

But of particular

note Is his discussion
of the concept of an efficient
cause. ^ He
seems to say that an
efficient cause is always a substance;
what it
ses may be the generation
of another substance or a change
in

another substance.

There is at least prima facie evidence,
then,

that Aristotle regards
efficient causation to be a relation
that holds

between substances on the one hand
and events on the other (though
just how events fit into his
ontology is unclear).
Prior to this
century

,

the most forceful advocate of the
concept of effectuation

in modern times is Thomas
Reid.

active power,

Action, he says, is the exertion of

and whatever exerts such power is the cause
of the

changes that such exertion brings about.

according to Reid, is the agent's will.^
he, and not some other agent,

his will.

^

The means of such exertion,

A person is free insofar as

is the cause of the "determination" of

Indeed, Reid does not explicitly discuss the possibility

that causation be a relation that binds an event
to an event.

Immanuel Kant does explicitly discuss this possibility,
however, but
also seeks to distinguish between agent-causation and eventcausation.

g

According to him, a rational agent may himself be the

cause of effects that take place in the phenomenal world.

^

In this

century, C.A. Campbell stands out as a strong supporter of the concept of effectuation.

He insists that, for an agent to act freely,

he must be the sole cause of his act.^*^

According to Campbell, free

action is, in some sense, a matter of "self-determination."^^

Richard

Taylor, with the sort of argument concerning moral responsibility
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given above explicitly In mind, is
just as Insistent that the
concept
of effectuation be accorded its
proper place in the philosophy
of
action.
But Taylor, as we saw In Section
10 of Chapter IV, regards

all action, and not just free action,
as essentially Involving
this
concept.

Finally, as we saw in Chapter III, Roderick
Chisholm's

theory of action is also dependent on
this concept.
The fact that some prominent philosophers
have espoused the

concept of effectuation should not of course
be taken to provide

conclusive evidence that that concept is either
meaningful or applicable

to actual situations.

Indeed, it is not at all clear that it is

the same, univocal concept that is invoked by
each of these philoso-

phers.

Nevertheless, it is from such philosophers’ writings that
the

concept of effectuation that
1

1

invoke is drawn, and the use to which

put this concept is strongly influenced by these writings.

Rather than talk of (agent-)ef f ectuation simpliciter
it will be useful to distinguish two types of effectuation,

direct and indirect effectuation.

the concept

^ directly effectuates

think

to wit,

The unanalyzed concept will be

that of direct effectuation, and the primitive locution that

adopt is:

I

,

''

I

shall

A partial characterization of

of direct effectuation is contained in the following

assumptions
A.Vl.l:

Necessarily, if ^ directly effectuates £ at
(i) ^ is a person and
^ exists at _t, and
(ii) £ is an event and
£ occurs at _t

A. VI. 2:

Necessarily, if ^ directly effectuates £ at £, then ^
directly effectuates
directly effectuates £] at _t

_t,

then
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A. VI. 3;

Necessarily, if S directly
effectuates n at t then
there is no event
which
strictly
£
implies [s’directlv
effectuates £] and which is such
that, for any time t'
^"^^"tical with
there is a sufficiint
causal condition relative to _t' £,
and t of
£.

A. VI. 4:

Necessarily, if S directly effectuates
£ at t and there
IS no event
£ such that £ strictly impl^s [S direct^
f fectuates £]
then there is an event
£ such that p
strictly implies
decides £]
,

.

And we may say

indirectly effectuates
£ relative to t and ~t' =df.
there is an event £ such that:
(i) £ occurs exactly once at t;
(ii) ^ directly effectuates
£ at _t; and
(iii) £ contributes causally relative
to t and t' to £.^^

Ihyizl-

S

All of this calls for some comment.
explanatory.

A.VI.2 and A. VI.

3,

A.VI.l is,

I

think, self-

combined, constitute the essential

weaponry needed in the attack on premise
(2) of the argument given
at the beginning of this chapter.

Roughly put, every direct effec-

tuation is such that it is not event-caused but is
agent-caused;
this, it may be contended, is the source of the
agent's "control" over

his free actions.

A. VI. 4

allows us to say, roughly, that, whenever

an agent directly effectuates an event which is not itself
a direct

effectuation, then that event is a decision by the agent.
should be recalled

— see

T.IV.13

— that

(It

every willing is a decision.)

Finally, D.VI.l, though not of any particular importance here, is of
use to one who attempts to give an account of moral responsibility

based in part on the notion that an agent is morally responsible for
his free actions and certain of the consequences of those actions.

Armed with A.VI.l through A. VI.

analysis of what it is to act freely.

4,

we may proceed to give an

Such analysis must be under-
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taken piecemeal.

First, we need the concept of an
agent’s being free

to will something.

More precisely:

IS free at

_t
to will
at _t' in order that
£ may occur
for any time
earlier than or identical with t:
(i) there is^no sufficient
causal condition relative~to
_t* and _t' of
wills £ in order that q mayj occur!
and
(ii) there is no event r such that
(a) it is physically necessary that,
if r occurs at
_t
then ^ does not will
,
at
_t'
in order that
£
£ may occur, and
(b) there is a sufficient causal
condition relative
to £* and t' of r.

Idt.

•

j

»

Clause (ii) would be simpler if it read "there
is no sufficient causal

condition relative to t* and
may occur]," but

t’

of

does not will

[S

£

does not will

in order that

in order that

£ may

an event, and so this reading would be inadequate.

clause at all?

£

If such a clause were not included,

occur] is not

Why have such a
then it might be

physically Impossible, given the conditions that obtain at
wills

£

in order that

£ may

occur] to occur at

seems inconsistent with ^'s being free at

£ may

that
D. VI

.

3

occur.

^
^

:

^

_t

,

to will

£

t,

for [S

and this certainly

£

at t'

in order

We may also say:

freely wills £ at _t in order that £ may occur =df
directly effectuates
wills £ in order that £ may

occur] at

jt.

This is an important definition; for, to put it roughly, it is whether
or not an action is freely willed that determines whether or not it
is freely performed.

freely wills

£

at ^] and

cur]

.

)

£

at

_t

(Note that, given A.VI.l through A. VI. 3,
in order that

is free at

_t

£

to will

may occur] implies both

£

at

_t

in order that

£ may

[S

wills
oc-

Definitions analogous to D.VI.2 and D.VI.3 may be drawn up
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for the purpose of defining the
phrases "S Is free at
at t'," "S freely decides

t'," "S freely chooses

£

at

£

t," "S is free at

at t," and so on.

t

t

to decide

to choose

£

£

at

(For analyses of the con-

cepts of deciding and choosing, see
D.IV.52 and D.IV.53, respectively-)

But

shall forego giving these definitions here.

I

When in the last chapter we discussed the
conditional com-

patibilist approach to the issue of freedom of
human action, the
following definition was considered:

~

can Immediately at t bring about
£ directly relative
_t
and _t' =df
there are events £ and
£ such that, if
^ were to will £ at £ in order that £ might occur, then
(i) [£ wills £ in order that
£ may occur] would contribute causally relative to
£ and £' to £, and
(ii) £ would constitute
£ at t'.

^

to

.

It was argued that this definition is defective
because it fails to

take into account whether or not

order that

£

may occur.

£

can (or is free to) will

£

in

But this defect is now easily repaired, for

we may say:
D^V££|.:

can immediately at £ bring about £ directly relative
£ and £' =df. there are events £ and £ such that:
(i) £ is free at £ to will
£ at £ in order that £ may
occur; and
(ii) if £ were to will
£ at £ in order that £ might
occur, then
(a) [£ wills £ in order that £ may occur] would
contribute causally relative to £ and £' to £,
and
(b) £ would constitute £ at £'

£

to

Of course, D.VI.4, by virtue of clause (i), is not in keeping with

the original compatibllist enterprise that gave rise to D.V.3, but
it is perfectly in keeping with the current incompatibillst enter-

prise.

18

However, D.V1.4 deals only with a restricted use of "can.”
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How are we to account for its other
relevant uses?
It was claimed in the last chapter,
without argument,

adequate definition of the phrase "S can
immediately at

£ directly relative

to

t

and t*."

bring about

and t'" could serve as a basis of
an adequate

definition of the phrase "S can at
to t'

t

that an

t

bring about

This point may now be explained.

£ directly relative
The distinction

between the two phrases (highlighted by the
presence of "immediately"
in the first and its absence in the second)
concerns the times to

which the bringing about of

£

is said to be relative.

one of these times (that designated by

"_t")

In the first,

is stipulated as being

the same as that at which the "can" is operative;
in the second, no

such stipulation is made.

This distinction between the phrases re-

flects the fact that "cans" may operate on actions not in
the imme-

diate future as well as on actions in the immediate future.
instance,

I

can now stop writing now; but

ing tomorrow.

I

For

can now also start writ-

In fact, some of the "cans" that now apply to me have

no definite limit in the future.

Suppose that someone discovers the

secret of Immortality, harnesses it in a pill, and that

I

take this

pill twenty years from now; if this is possible, it may (for all
know) be true that
7979.

I

can now

read a book not just in 1979 but in

An adequate account of "can" must accommodate this possibility.
Let us take a more mundane example.

writing.
for

I

I

However,

I

I

can immediately stop

cannot immediately drink from a glass of water,

am sitting at my desk in my study and the nearest glass is in

the kitchen; but

I

can now drink from a glass of water in a very short
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while, for the kitchen is just
a few yards away.

I

need not do any-

thing first in order to stop
writing; that is (partly) why

mediately stop writing.
from a glass of water;

I

I

must do something first if

I

I

can im-

am to drink

must stop writing, get up out of my
chair,

walk a few yards, open the door, go into
the kitchen, and so on.
poxnt IS, in a case such as that of my drinking
from
water,

1

The

a glass of

can now perform this action by virtue of the
fact that

I

can

xmmediately perform some action (that of ceasing to
write) and, if

were to perform this action,

I

I

would then be in such a position that

could immediately perform another action, and then
another, and then

I

another, and so on until
water.

Where

—

^

^

could immediately drink from a glass of

By generalizing on this case,

following.
•

I

_t*
.

1 1

I

think we may properly say the

i 5 n:

can at
bring about £ directly relative to t' and
=df.
there are events
^nd times
,
_tj^ such that:
(i) _t is not later than _t^ ^^d
and
is not
later than t
.

.

.

.

.

,

,

.

.

.

;

(11) ^n-1
identical with _t'
(ill)
is identical with _t*;
(Iv)
is identical with £;
(v) ^ can immediately at _t bring about
directly
relative to _t and _t^; and
(vi) if
is distinct from
then for every
and
for every _t^, if ^ were to bring about
directly relative to
and
then ^ could immediately at _tjj^ bring about
directly relative
to
and _t^-|-T*^^
;

Of course, this definition deals only with the direct bringing about
of an event, and not with action in general.

However, given D.VI.5

and keeping D.IV.13 in mind, we may say the following;
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1

about £ indirectly relative to
t' and
there are an event
£ and a time t" such that:
U; £ can at _t bring about £ directly relative to
—t'
and
and
(ii) if S were to bring about
£ directly relative to
_t'
and £”, then
(a) £ would contribute causally
relative to ~
t" and
_t* to £, and
(b) £ would occur exactly once at
t".

T*
_t

df.

And then, keeping D.IV.15 in mind, we may
also say the following:
can at _t bring about £ synthetically relative
to t'
t* =df.
there are events
such

^

that:~
£^
for any event £, if
£ is identical with 3^1 or
or £ is identical with
£^^, then there are times

and

,

(i)

.

_t°

and

_t''

(^)
_t

(b)

"

,

.

.

such that

is not later than £° _t° is not later than
,
and _t” is not later than £* , and

either

can at £ bring about £ directly relative
_t° and _t”
or
bring
( 3 ) ^ can at
about £ indirectly relative
£
to £° and £''
and
(li) if, for some time
£ not earlier than £' and not
later than £*, £ were to bring about
£j either
directly or indirectly relative to £* and
£ and
and if, for some time £ not earlier than £~ and not
later than £*, £ were to bring about
either
£^^
directly or Indirectly relative to £ and £*, then
£ would be composed relative to £* and t* of £^,
(a)

^

to

,

;

.

.

With D.VI.5, D.V1.6 and D.VI.7 given, definitions of the remaining
two relevant phrases follow easily.
D. VI. 8

:

These are, first:

can at £ bring about £ actively relative to £' and £*
=df.
either
(i) £ can at £ bring about £ directly relative to £'
and £* ; or
(ii) £ can at £ bring about
£ indirectly relative to
£' and £*
or
(iil) £ can at £ bring about £ synthetically relative to
£' and £*.

£

;

(Compare D.1V.16.)

And second:

.
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D^V^:

S can at t act relative to
event £ such that ^ can at
relative to _t' and t*.

(Compare D.lV.S.b.)

_t'

and

£

and t* =df.
there is an
bring about p actively

Definitions of such phrases as ”S can at

successfully relative to
relative to

t'

t’

and t*,"

-'S

can at

t

_t

act

act intentionally

and so on, may be given along the lines of

_t*,''

D.V1.4 through D.V1.9 and in accordance with the
definitions of
Chapter IV.

1

shall not give these definitions here.

Consider the following principle:
Necessarily, if £ brings about
£ actively relative to t
then £ can at £ bring about
£
£ actively relative
to £ and £'

(1)

,

.

Is it a theorem of the present theory?

No, it should not.

For

£

No,

may bring about

it is not.

Should it be?

£ actively relative

to t

^^d £' and there may be a sufficient causal condition relative to

some time £* and

for his so doing, in which case, according to the

£

sense of "can" in D.VI.4 through D.VI.9,

actively relative to

£

and £'

,

£

cannot at

since his willing at

£ bring

£

about

£

is not free.

But if we call the sense of "can" given in D.V.3 "can*" and imagine

this sense of "can" to be elaborated by means of definitions analo-

gous to D.VI.5 through D.VI.9, we may note that the following are

theorems of the present theory:
T.VI. 1

:

VI

:

T.

.

£ can at £ bring about £ actively relative to £' and £*, then £ can* at £ bring about £
actively relative to £* and £*.

Necessarily, if

Necessarily, if S brings about £ actively relative to £
and £'
then £ can* at £ bring about £ actively relative
,

to

Given T.VI.

2,

£

and £*

.

we may say that there is indeed a sense of "can" accord-
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ing to which the common philosophical
dictum '"Does'
is true.

implies 'Can'"

How interesting this sense of "can" is,
however, is another

matter.
In connection with our discussion in the
last chapter of Keith

Lehrer's account of "can" the following principles
were mentioned:
do A at
only if, for every event B, if
it is physically necessary that
if S does A at t ,
,
then ^ occurs at _t^, then
occurs
at t^.^^
^

I-

can at _tj^ do A at _t^^ only if, for every event B, if
it is physically necessary that, if
^ does A at T * , then
B does not occur at _t^, then
does
not occur at't^.^l
^

_S

When slightly modified and also restated in the terminology of
the
present chapter, these principles turn out to be theorems of the

present theory.

I

have in mind the following:

T.VI.3:

Necessarily, ^ can at Jt bring about £ actively relative
to £' and _t* only if, for every event £, if it is
physically necessary but not metaphysically necessary
that, if ^ brings about £ actively relative to t' and
_t*, then £ occurs at _t, then
£ occurs at t.

T.VI.4:

Necessarily, ^ can at £ bring about £ actively relative
to _t' and _t* only if, for every event £, if it is
physically necessary but not metaphysically necessary
that, if £ brings about £ actively relative to jt' and
_t *
then £ does not occur at jt, then £ does not occur
,

at £.

That T.VI.3 and T.VI.4 are Indeed theorems may be seen by noting that
they are equivalent, respectively, to:
T.

VI

.

3

.

a

:

Necessarily, ijf there is an event £ such that (i) it is
physically necessary but not metaphysically necessary
that, if £ does not occur at £, then £ does not bring
about £ actively relative to _t' and _t*, and (ii) £ does
not occur at _t then £ cannot at £ bring about £ actively relative to £' and £*;
,

and
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T.VI.4.a:

^

Necessarily,
there is an event
£ such that (i) it is
physically necessary but not metaphysically
necessary
that, if ^ occurs at t, then S does
not bring about p
actively relative to t’ and t*, and (il)
^ occurs at t
_th^ ^ cannot at _t bring about
£ actively relative to
and

^

_t*.

If either of T.VI.3.a or T.VI.4.a
were false,

then the following would

be true:

There are events £ and r_ such that (i)
£ is a sufficient
causal condition relative to _t and _t' of r; (ii)
it Is
not physically possible both that
£ occur~at t* and S
bring about £ actively relative to t' and
£* ;~and (iTi)
^ can at £ bring about £ actively relative~to t' and t*.

(4)

But given that, according to D.VI.4 through D.VI.9,

about

£ actively

relative to £' and £* only if

£

£

can at

is free at t'

will some state of affairs; given that, according to D.VI.2,
at

_t'

_t

S

bring
to
is free

to will some state of affairs only if there is no sufficient

causal condition of some event which is physically incompatible
with
his so doing; and given that clauses (i) and (ii) of
(4) rule this
out, it follows that (4) is necessarily false, and hence that T.VI.3.a

and T.VI.4.a are Indeed true.

With the understanding provided by D.V1.4 through D.VI.9 of
that concept of "can" which

I

believe is crucial to any adequate dis-

cussion of free action, we may now turn to the concept of an agent's
being free to bring about an event actively.

Here we are faced,

I

think, with two main options (on which there are variations that

I

shall not mention).
D.

VI 10
.

:

£

We could say:

is free^^ at

and

_t*

=df.

relative to
Or we could say

t’

_t

to bring about £ actively relative to
£ can at £ bring about £ actively

and t*.
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R

f'T'PP

and

t'

f-

+-

1

®

5^4f.-

!nd444^4"“8
(ii)

relative to

^‘>°«

£

>^<=latlve

to t'

there is an event
^ such that
a) S can at t bring
about ^ actively relative to
1 and _t*, and
(b) S cannot at t
bring about
and
actively^
relative to _t and _t*.
'

Note that definitions of the
phrases "S is freej (or free
2 ) at t to
bring about
£ directly relative to t' and t*," "S is freej (or freej)
at _t to bring about
£ indirectly relative
to

free^ (or free
and

_t'

>

2

at

_t

to bring about

_t'

and _t*," and "S is

£ synthetically relative

could also be given along the same
lines as D.VI.IO and
but

I

shall not give them here.

Just as two main senses of "S is free
to bring about

tively

^

to t'

£

ac-

may be distinguished, so two corresponding
main senses of

freely brings about
£ actively” may be distinguished.

We may say

first of all:

2iVIil2:

freely^^ brings about

£ directly relative to _t and ~t'
there are events £ and
£ such that:
(1) ^ freely wills £ at _t in order that
£ may occur;
(ii)
wills £ in order that
£ may occur] contributes
causally relative to
£ and £' to £; and
(iii) £ constitutes
£ at t'.

^
-df

.

Note that the only feature that distinguishes D.VI.12
from D.IV.12
(where ”£ brings about

£ directly relative

to

£

and £*

"

is the addition of "freely” to clause (i) of the former.

however, an important feature.

is defined)

This is,

An analysis of the concept of freely^^

bringing about an event indirectly can be given along the same lines
as D.1V.13, with D.VI.12 incorporated, and the result is the follow-

ing:
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!-

- /Tf
U) S
^
(ii) ^
•

^ Indirectly relative to t and
a nnd a time t* such'that:
Z'’®”
freely^ brings about
£ directly relative to
and
;

contributes causally relative to t*
~ and

and
occurs exactly once at t*.

(iii)

—t'

to

Note that the only distinguishing feature
is the addition of "freely^^"
to clause

(i).

Finally, an analysis of the concept of freely^^
bring-

ing about an event synthetically can be
given along the lines of

D.1V.15, with D.VI.12 and D.VI.13 incorporated,
and the result is
the following (presented schematically)
freelyj^ brings about
£ synthetically relative to t
t’ =df.
there are events
n
such that:
,
(i) (as clause (i) of D.IV.15); and
(ii) (preamble as in clause (ii) of D.IV.15)

^

and

(a)
(b)

(as subclause (a) of clause (ii) of D.IV.15), and
either
(a) ^ freelyj^ brings about
£ directly relative
to _t* and _t”, or
( 3 ) ^ freely^ brings about
£ indirectly relative
to
and Jt".

Once again, the only distinguishing feature is the addition of

freely

to subclause

of clause

(b)

(ii).

And then we may of course

say
D. VI 15
.

:

freely^ brings about 2_ actively relative to _t and t’
either
(i) _S freely^^ brings about
directly relative to t
and _t
or
(ii) ^ freely^ brings about
£ indirectly relative to
_t and _t
or
(iii) ^ freelyj^ brings about p^ synthetically relative to
_t
and _t

^

=df.

'

;

*

;

'

.

With this definition, and given D.VI.ll, the following definition
follows straightforwardly:
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D.V1.16:

^

freely

=df.
(i)

about

2

p actively relative

to

~t

and —
t'

^

freelyj^ brings about
p actively relative to ~t
and p'
and
(ii) there is an event
p such that
(a) p can at
bring
about p actively relative to
p
and
p'
and
p
(b) p cannot at
p bring about [p and p] actively
relative to t and t'.
;

,

Further definitions, such as definitions of the phrases ”S
is free^^

(or free

(or freely
"p.

2>

2)

at

_t

to act relative to

^^ts relative to

_t

IS a free deed of ^'s at _t^,

course be provided.

But

I

and
.

.

and t*," "S freely^^

"£ is a free doing of S's,"

_t'

.

jt'

,

and so on, could of

shall not provide them here.

D.VI.IO through D.VI.16 themselves require comment.

Rather,

First, the

following theorems should be noted:
T.V1.5:

Necessarily, if p is free at p to bring about p active2
ly relative to p' and p*, then S is freej^ at t to bring
about p actively relative to t* and t*.

T.VI.6:

Necessarily, if p freely 2 brings about p actively relative to t and t’, then S freely^^ brings about p actively
relative to t and t*.

T.VI.

7:

Necessarily, if p freely 2 brings about p actively
relative to t and t', then S is free at t to bring
2
about p actively relative to t and t^.

T.VI.8:

Necessarily, if S freely^ brings about p actively
relative to t and t'
then S is freei at t to bring
about p actively relative to t and t'.
,

These are Important theorems.

Why distinguish two types of freedom?

Well, notice that it follows from T.VI.6 and T.VI.8 that, whether we
are talking of freedom^ or freedom
T.VI. 9:

2

,

the following holds:

Necessarily, if S freely brings about p actively relative to t and t'
then S can at p bring about p actively relative to t and t'.
,
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It is obviously desirable
that „e should be in a position
to assert

T.VI.9.

But notice also that, although T.VI.9
is a theorem of the

present theory and although it makes
implicit use (via its use of
can”) of a subjunctive conditional,
of D.VI.15 and D.VI.16 it is
only
the latter which also makes
(implicit) use of a subjunctive condi-

tional.

That is, D.VI.15 is testimony to the fact
that it is pos-

sible to produce an analysis of the concept
of someone's freely

bringing about an event actively without resorting
to the use, whether
explicit or Implicit, of subjunctive conditionals.

This is,

I

think,

a clearly desirable result, given that
no account of subjunctive con-

ditionals has been provided in this dissertation (and
none is going
to be).

But is D.VI.15 an adequate foundation for the analysis
of the

concept of acting freely?

It will not have escaped the reader's

notice that D.VI.ll is exactly the same definition as D.V.l, except
that the sense of

'free" which is at issue in the latter is now more

fully specified by the former.

It was said in Chapter V.

that D.V.l

constitutes an attempt to express a proposition to which both com-

patibilists and incompatlbillsts are prepared to assent.

And, cer-

tainly, it is D.VI.16, and not D.VI.15, which is that analysis of the

concept of freely bringing about an event actively which more closely

"corresponds" to D.VI.ll.

That is, of D.VI.15 and D.VI.16, it is only

the latter which is such that from it the following theorem (roughly

stated) may be derived:

308

—

Necessarily, if S freely acts relative
to t and t
then ^ can also "act otherwise" relative
to t and t'.

Now, is it desirable that we should
be able to assert T.VI.IO?

If so

(and this was indeed implied in Chapter
V), then I have not suc-

ceeded in giving a satisfactory account of free
human action which is
Itself free of the use of subjunctive conditionals.

For

I

know of

no way to circumvent such use in the analysis
of the concept of "can."
But perhaps it is not the case that an adequate
theory of free human

action requires that T.VI.IO be a theorem.
of Chapter V that it

j^s

Perhaps the implication

desirable that it be a theorem seemed plaus-

ible at the time only because the compatibilist would otherwise
have
no means at all to account for the alternatives that undoubtedly

accompany all free action.
that ^'s volition at

_t

But D.V1.15, simply by virtue of implying

occurs freely, allows for an alternative course

of events to take place (in some sense of "alternative" other than

that specified in D.1V.50), and perhaps this is all that should be

required.
Some may think it unsatisfactory that a theory of free human

action should wind up with two alternative analyses of the concept
of freely bringing about an event actively.
is the "true" analysis?

Which, it may be asked,

On the other hand, some may think it desir-

able that no one analysis of this concept be paraded as the "true"
analysis.

I

am inclined toward the latter position.

of acting freely

23

For the concept

is certainly not univocal and, even within the

narrow confines of the present enterprise, it seems better not to
latch on to one of its senses to the exclusion of all others.

Pre-
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sumably, which analysis is more
Important will depend upon the use
to which the present theory
is put, and the theory should
be adequate
to a variety of uses.
(One important use of the theory
would be to

provide an effective treatment of the
argument given at the beginning
of this section.)
Finally, it is time to redeem two
promissory notes.

concerns the concept of the provision of
opportunity.
was first mentioned in Chapter III,
Section

2

The first

This concept

when discussing Chis-

holm's use of the concept of event-causal
contribution.

It was noted

that Chisholm regards it possible that an
event should contribute

causally to a free action, whereas my use of
the concept of eventcausal contribution (see A. IV.

4

and the assumptions and definitions

of this chapter) rules out this possibility.

that, in such a case,

would rather say

the event in question provides the agent with

the opportunity to act freely.

Chapter III, Section

I

2

(Compare also the remarks made in

concerning A. III. 8.)

It was noted also in

Chapter IV that an analysis of the concept of willing broadly (see
D.IV.2) rests on an analysis of the concept of the provision of opportunity.

Given what has been said in this chapter, this analysis may

now be provided.
D. VI

.

17

;

We may,

I

think, say the following:

provides

relative to _t and j;' with the opportunity
p actively relative to _t* and _t" =df.
occurs at jL; and
contributes causally relative to _t and _t' to
can bring about q actively relative to t* and
,

to bring about
(i)

(ii)

£
£

t"].

We could then say, roughly, that an event

£ provides

for p's occurrence just in case there is a person

^

an opportunity

such that

£
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provides

with the opportunity to bring about

S

could also say that a person

^

provides an opportunity for £*s oc-

currence just in case there is a person

bringing
about

about

£ actively provides

actively.

£

actively; and we

S'

and an event

£

such that

S's

with the opportunity to bring

D.VI.17, moreover, may serve as the basis of the

analysis of such concepts as willing for a purpose,
acting for a purpose, and so on.

I

shall provide no such analysis here, however, for

it is very complicated.

But, roughly,

1

think we can say that a

person wills an event
£ for the purpose of an event £ just in case he

wills

and he intends either that his so willing should contribute

£

causally to

£

(see D.IV.3), or that his so willing should (in some

sense) "just be" £,

or that his so willing should provide the

opportunity for £*s occurrence.

A similar statement may be made con-

cerning acting for a purpose by substituting "brings about actively"
and its cognates for "wills" and its cognates.

From this an analysis

of the concepts of a means, a mere means, an end, an end-in-itself

and so on, could perhaps be generated.
I

But these are matters that

shall not discuss here.
The second promissory note concerns the concept of a person.

In Chapter II

I

did not include this concept in my list of unanalyzed

concepts, but referred the reader to this chapter for its analysis.
Here it is:
D. VI

.

18

:

is a person =df.
(i) ^ is a thing; and
(ii) there are an event £ and times _t, _t' and _t* such
that it is physically possible that ^ can at £
bring about £ actively relative to _t' and Jt*.

^
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At the end of the next section

I

shall address the charge that
this

definition introduces circularity into
the theory that has Just been
25
presented.

2.

Objections to and Comments on the Theory

The most objectionable aspect of the theory
of free human

action proposed in the preceding section is
presumably its reliance
on the unanalyzed concept of effectuation.

Certainly this concept

has received its share of vilification in
the past; but some of the

criticism that this concept has met with has been
strongly argued.
At the outset

I

said that the theory of free human action

proposed here, when coupled with the claim that determinism
is false,

constitutes a certain version of libertarianism.

1

definition of the term "libertarianism," but roughly

shall provide no
1

take a liber-

tarian theory of free human action to be a theory which is incom-

patibilist, Indetermlnist
tion.

,

and dependent upon the concept of effectua-

But some have claimed libertarianism (of whatever form) to be

necessarily false, and their claim has apparently been based either
on the contention that there can be no such relation as effectuation
or on the contention that, if there is such a relation, it can never

be exemplified.

26

In the former case, the reasoning seems, in out-

line, to be as follows: necessarily, any causal relation, when exem-

plified, relates events to events; effectuation is claimed to be an

exemplif iable causal relation that, when exemplified, relates persons
(and not events)

to events;

therefore, there can be no such relation
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as effectuation.

In the latter case,

the reasoning seems to run as

follows: necessarily, any causal relation,
when exemplified, relates

events to events; effectuation is claimed to
be a causal relation
that, if xt were exemplified, would relate
persons (and not events)
to events;

therefore, effectuation cannot be exemplified.

both premises of each argument are quite dubious.

To my mind,

No doubt the argu-

ments that are presented in the literature to prove
libertarianism

necessarily false are more complex than either of the arguments
just
given, but in many cases

I

think the basic structure of these argu-

ments is the same as that of those just given.

If this is correct,

then the proper conclusion would seem to be that any attempt to prove

^

priori that libertarianism is (necessarily) false is ill-advised.
A far more telling charge than the charge that effectuation

cannot be a relation, or at least an exemplif iable relation, is the

charge that the concept of effectuation is simply very obscure.

In-

deed, it seems to some (when confronted, for instance, with liber-

tarian attempts to prove the second premise of the argument cited at
the beginning of this chapter false) that the concept of effectuation
is nothing more than a deus ex machina and that it purchases the im-

munity of libertarianism only at the price of unintelligibility.
Strangely enough, it seems that proponents of libertarianism are themselves more prone to consider this objection (at least in writing)

27

than opponents of libertarianism are to advance it, although at least
two prominent critics of the doctrine have very recently reiterated
it.

Campbell's response to the charge that the concept of
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effectuation is unintelligible is that we are
all aware, from an "introspective" viewpoint, of the phenomenon
of effectuation:
[IJntrospection makes it
clear that I am certain that
It IS ^ who choose; that the act is
not an ’accident ’
but
is genuinely my_ act.^^
.

.

.

'

Hence, according to Campbell, the concept is
not unintelligible, even
if there is no suitable account
of it forthcoming from an "external"

viewpoint.

Taylor's response is similar:

Now this idea [of causation by agents] strikes many
as quite
incomprehensible. And indeed in a way it is.
Yet it
should be noted that it is mysterious or incomprehensible
only in the sense that it is not what a man having
any
familiarity with physical science or the general history
of
speculative thought would be led to expect.
In another
sense it is strange indeed to speak of some perfectly
familiar thing ... as being in any sense mysterious
.

.

.

For his part, Chisholm considers the objection in the guise
of the

question "What is the difference between saying, of an event A, that
A just happened and saying that someone caused A to happen?", and he
responds to the objection in this way:
The only answer, I think, can be this: that the difference
between the man’s causing A, on the one hand, and the event
A just happening, on the other, lies in the fact that, in
the first but not the second, the event A was caused and
was caused by the man.^^

Chisholm acknowledges that this answer "may not entirely satisfy,"

OO

but he claims that there is an analogous problem with the concept of

event-causation.

33

How is one to answer the question "What is the

difference between saying, of two events A and

that

happened and

then A happened, and saying that ^’s happening caused A’s happening?"
The only answer that one can give to this question, he contends, is
that in the second case but not in the first,

^

did cause A.
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According to Chisholm, then, the concept of
agent-causation may not
be clear, but that of event-causation
is no clearer.

Chisholm overstates his point,

I

think.

It is possible to

give a fuller characterization (see A.IV.l through
A. IV. 4) of the concept of event-causal contribution than that which
is provided when one

merely notes that an event
if

£ precedes

is true,

£.

£

contributes causally to an event
£ only

(Indeed, if what

I

say in Section

2

of Chapter IV

then it is in fact not true that such temporal priority
is

a necessary condition of such causation.)

holm's point remains,

I

But the spirit of Chis-

believe, if it is acknowledged that the as-

sumptions given in this chapter (namely, A.VI.l through
accurate.

A. VI. 4)

are

For a partial characterization of the concept of direct

effectuation is given by means of them just as a partial characterization of the concept of (event-)causal contribution is given by

means of A.IV.l through A. IV.

4,

and so there appears little justifi-

cation for claiming the latter concept to be any clearer than the
former.

34

Moreover,

I

believe that Campbell and Taylor are both

right in contending that we are all thoroughly familiar with the

phenomenon of effectuation.

Hence, although

I

would indeed like to

be able to give a fuller account of the concept of effectuation, the

fact that

I

am presently not able to do this seems to me to be a very

poor reason to dismiss this concept.

(If metaphor helps,

then we may

perhaps regard the person who effectuates an event to be the "ground,"
the "source," the "author," the "well-spring," and so on, of the

event

.

315

An objection related to the immediately
foregoing is one

tendered by Donald Davidson,
who says:
One is [in trouble] if one
supposes [as libertarians urge]
at agent-causation does not
introduce an event in addition
to the primitive action.
For then what more have we said
when we say the agent caused the action than
when we say he
was the agent of the action? The concept
of cause seems to
P ay no role.
We may fail to detect the vacuity of this
suggestion because causality does
enter conspicuously
into accounts of agency; but where it does
it is the gardenvariety [j^ e
event-type] of causality, which sheds no
light on the relation between the agent and his
actions
.

.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

This objection may be pertinent to some accounts
of effectuation (it

applies to Taylor's,

I

think), but it is not pertinent to mine.

For

it is based on the understanding that, according
to libertarianism,

_whenever a person acts, he effectuates his action.
I

deny.

It is only when one acts freely that one

This is something
(directly) effec-

tuates one's willing and thereby (Indirectly) effectuates one's deeds.
(The failure to distinguish doings from deeds is a source of confu-

sion in Davidson's objection.)

Hence there is a distinction between

being the agent of an act and "agent-causing" that act.

Another objection to my sort of account of effectuation is
to be found in Taylor's writings.

36

As recorded in Section 10 of

Chapter IV, Taylor regards the doctrine of volitions as "quite fantastic"

37

and indefensible, and one of his arguments for this view

runs roughly in this rhetorical fashion: if the concept of effectua-

tion is found to be indispensable and

I

am to be said to be able to

effectuate my volitions, why not simply say that

I

effectuate my ac-

tions and do away with the concept of volition altogether?

The proper
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response to this is fourfold:
first, without the sort of account
g‘ en in the
first section of this chapter and
presented in terms of
the effectuation of
volitions, it is difficult to see how one
can

distinguish free action from unfree
action; secondly, the sort of
account given in the first
section allows for a related account of
free decision and free choice
even when no action ensues (for a decision may be a decision^ and
a choice a choice^), whereas it is again

difficult to see how such an account
could be given on the basis that
Taylor provides; thirdly, without
such an account as that given in the
first section, it seems that Davidson's
objection, just cited, will in
fact be pertinent; and fourthly, it is
clear that an agent is in no

sense "sufficient" for his deeds (for instance,
if the deed is his
arm

s

rising, his arm must not be paralyzed, it must not
be tied down,

e^c^, etc

)

,

so that Taylor's understanding of the concept of
effec-

tuation must be that it is, in some unexplained way, complex,
whereas
my understanding of the concept is that an agent is indeed
in and of

himself "sufficient" for his free volitions, so that the concept
of

effectuation, on this account, conceals no unexplained complexities.
These considerations would seem to provide strong support for the sort
of theory of

(free) action

that

I

favor and Taylor opposes.

But it should be explicitly noted here that my account of

action is fairly unusual insofar as it invokes both the concept of
^nd that of effectuation.

Traditionally, it seems, there has

been a tendency to think that, if an account invokes one of these concepts, it can and should reject the other.

(Reid's account is an
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exception here.)

Furthermore,

claim that effectuation is
exempli-

I

fied when and only when one acts
freely; when one acts unfreely,
it
is not exemplified.

In this respect my account
opposes the accounts

of Reid, Taylor and Chisholm,
which are less restrictive than
mine

and according to which

M

action is effectuated by the agent.

Only Campbell, amongst the prominent
modern agent-causation theorists,
seems to be in agreement with this aspect
of my account; but Camp-

bell's account is in fact much more restrictive
than mine, in that
he believes that one acts freely (and is
then and only then the

agent-cause of one's actions) only in those comparatively
rare cases
of moral temptation where one acts in accordance
with one's percep-

tion of duty and in opposition to one's strongest
desires.

My

belief is that the domain of free action is much broader
than Campbell allows for, but

I

shall not enter into this here.

There are those who oppose the sort of account of effectuation that

I

have given for yet other reasons.

has been given is that, whereas

I

One objection that

sharply distinguish effectuation

and (event-)causation, no such sharp distinction should in fact be

made.

It has been contended that effectuation

(and, more broadly,

"object-causation," of which effectuation is supposed to be a species)

may be fully accounted for in terms of event-causation.

Foremost

amongst such objectors, in recent times, are Wilfrid Sellars, Alvin
Goldman, and Bruce Aune.

40

These authors claim that, just as a

statement like "The brick caused the window to break" is elliptical
for some such statement as "The impact of the brick caused the window
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to break"

(where the brick is an object, its impact is an
event, and,

of course, the window's breaking is also an event),
so a statement

like "Jones caused his arm to rise

[

i, e.

,

Jones raised his arm]" is

elliptical for some such statement as "Jones's willing caused
his arm
to rise"

(where Jones is an object

— an

agent

—

,

Jones's willing is

an event, and his arm's rising is also an event).
I

It is clear that

go along with such paraphrase to a certain extent; Chapter IV is

testimony to this fact.

Nevertheless,

to the matter of acting freely

,

I

maintain that, when it comes

such paraphrase is inadequate, and

I

do not think that anyone has successfully refuted this contention

Another problem concerns the revered Principle of Sufficient
Reason.

Many appear to be fond of this principle.

theory inconsistent with its truth?
how the principle is interpreted.
be that every event has a cause.

Is the present

That, of course, depends upon

Roughly, the principle seems to
But what type of cause?

Now Reid,

who seems to have thought that every causal chain may be traced to
an agent-cause, claims this principle to be self-evidently true and

asserts that his theory is consistent with its being true.

42

Others

may interpret the principle to concern event-causes only, in which
case it seems to be the same as or similar to determinism, in the

sense of "determinism" that

I

have given in Chapter V.

In this case,

my theory of free human action is still not inconsistent with the

principle's being true; for
terminism false.
it

I

do not claim to have demonstrated de-

What is the case, according to my theory, is that

is impossible that determinism be true and some action be freely
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performed.

Another possible interpretation of the
principle is that,

according to it, every event has either an event-cause
or an agentcause.

My theory is certainly not inconsistent with
this interpre-

tation; indeed, some action may be freely performed
be true, on this interpretation.

I

the principle

sometimes think that people are

inclined to accept that every event has a cause because
they believe
that no event occurs or can occur in a totally "isolated"
manner.
Note, however, even if it were the case that some event
occurs without

being either event-caused or agent-caused, this intuition may yet
be

accounted for.

It may be that the principle that such people are

groping for is that every event has an effect

.

This principle may

of course be true even if indeterminism, as I believe, is also true.

In connection with the issue concerning there being a "suf-

ficient reason" for the occurrence of each event one should discuss
the matter of the predictability of actions, which is often thought
to be a function of their being caused to occur.

It has been claimed

that all actions are in principle predictable, but that undetermined

events would not be predictable; hence no actions can be undetermined.

Campbell's response to this objection is that it is not true that all
actions are in principle predictable; he agrees that very many actions indeed are in principle predictable, but there are a rare few,

namely those freely performed in situations where temptation is overcome, which simply are not predictable even in principle.

43

I

am not

sure how to understand the concept of being predictable in principle,
but,

if I understand it at all,

I

think Campbell is surely right to
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reject the contention that
l^Jhy

M

actions are predictable in principle.

on earth should we think this to be true?

times act on a whim, and freely so?

If so,

action predictable, even "in principle.”

I

Cannot people some-

would hardly think such

But a more telling point is

surely that the causes of an event need not be known in
order for
there to be a basis of predicting its occurrence.

Prediction may be

based on a statistical inference, where events occur, or at least
are taken to occur, randomly

Thus, if prediction of an event's oc-

.

currence is often and properly based independently of any knowledge
of its causes (if it has any)

,

it would seem that whether or not it

has any causes is irrelevant to the prediction.

Moreover, it seems

to me that it is just such prediction that is at issue in the predic-

tion of actions freely performed.
Some have objected to the concept of effectuation in some such

manner as this:
If we say that John moved his hand at time _t, we may indeed
add that he caused his hand to move at that time.
But to
say this is not to say that he was the irreducible cause of
his hand's motion; if he were, then, since he existed yesterday, his hand should have moved the same way yesterday
too.
After all, if A is the irreducible cause of B, then
whenever we have A, we should have ^ as well.^^

The objection seems persuasive.

After all, if a person

^

is

,

as

I

claim to be true in cases of free action, sufficient for his willing
as he does, what is there to stop him always willing in this way?

Why now rather than ten minutes ago?

But

I

would suggest that the

persuasiveness of this objection lies in part in the confusion of
(event-) causation with effectuation (and hence the advisability of
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divorcing the latter concept from that
of causation).
If A is the irreducible
^vent-cause of B,

does B.

It may be that.

then, whenever A occurs, so

(Presumably, by "irreducible event-cause" is
meant something

very close to what
D-IV.l.)

have called a sufficient causal condition—see

I

But what reason is there for believing, and
what grounds for

asserting, that, if

moment that

^

S

exists?

effectuates p, then
None that

reason not to accept this.
IS this:

I

£

should occur at every

can see; indeed, there is good

Perhaps part of the point of the objection

actions, like all events, are open to explanation; yet no

explanation for (free) actions is forthcoming if all that can be
said
is that the agent

(indirectly) effectuates his deeds.

Perhaps, if all

that could be said in the case of free actions is that the
agent (in-

directly) effectuates his deeds, then there would be no explanation

forthcoming; and perhaps, then, the objector would have a point (although

I

see no reason to believe that all actions are open to expla-

nation, even "in principle").

But, in most cases of free action, this

is emphatically not all that can be said.

We need to distinguish two

types of explanation: rational explanation and causal explanation.

I

shall not attempt to give an adequate account of either type of expla-

nation here, but the distinction should be familiar enough.

When

one gives a causal explanation of an event, one cites causes of the

occurrence of that event; when one gives a rational explanation of an
event (typically an action)
that event.
of

Now,

,

one cites reasons for the occurrence of

there are some who maintain that reasons are a type

(event-)cause, and that rational explanation is a species of causal

I
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explanation.

46
I

do not share this view.

Causal explanation is typio

ally "backward-looking" and concerns what has
preceded the event which
IS to be explained; rational explanation is
typically "forward-looking"

and concerns the goals and purposes the agent has in
virtue of which
he decides to act as he does.

Roughly,

1

believe that all decisions

which occur freely but as a result of deliberation (see D.IV.49)
are
in principle open to rational explanation but not to causal
explana.

.

txon;
at

I

47

.

tor those decisions which are Impetuously but freely arrived

believe there is no explanation, rational or causal.

(Of course,

there are a number of terms which, in a fuller treatment of this issue,

ought to be accounted for here, to wit, "as a result of," "explainable
in principle," "rational explanation," and "causal explanation.")

Those decisions which are not freely arrived at, whether deliberate or
impetuous, are presumably open in principle to causal explanation, unless they occur totally spontaneously.
and deliberately brought about are,

I

Those deeds which are freely
believe, in principle open to

both types of explanation; the rational explanation will concern the
reasons for the agent's decision or decisions, the causal explanation

will concern how the decision or decisions contributed causally to the
deed.

Now all of this is certainly rough as it stands, but its state-

ment serves two main purposes: first, it provides further reason to re'

ject the "Why now?" type of argument, just considered, against the concept of effectuation; secondly, it provides a brief introductory ac-

]

I

count of another area in which the present theory of free human action
;

!

,

,

may profitably be employed.

48
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With this
effectuation.

I

am done considering objections to
the concept of

None of them seems conclusive to me.

Some are stronger

than others, but none warrants rejection
of the concept.

concept of effectuation is,

I

Indeed, the

believe, an essential tool in an
ade-

quate analysis of the concept of acting freely.
I

shall complete this chapter by considering
objections to

D.VI.18, in which the concept of a person is
analyzed.

First, it

might be objected that the definition is circular;
for it is given in
terms of other definitions in which the concept
of a person is invoked.

Formally, this is correct.

But the damage could easily be repaired by

substituting "thing” for "person" in all of those previous
definitions.
Such substitution would not adversely affect those
definitions.

Secondly, it might be objected that a person may be born in
this world
and then die before it is even physically possible that
he or she be

able to bring about an event actively.

But it seems to me that, if it

is true that something of this nature concerning a human
being could

happen, it is then simply the case that the human being is not in fact
a person.

This gives rise to the third and final objection, however,

which is that it is possible, given D.VI.18, that no human being be a
person.

For determinism may yet be true; but the concept of "can,"

according to D.VI.4 through D.VI.9, involves an element of indeterminism in its invocation of the concept of an agent's being free to will
an event (see D.VI.2).

This is indeed so.

If some find this objec-

tionable, they may always substitute "can*" (see D.V.3, T.VI.l and
T.VI.2) for "can" in D.VI.18.

But this seems to me an inadvisable
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move.

I

believe that determinism is false.

people often act freely.

Moreover,

I

believe that

D.VI.18, indeed the whole theory
of free

human action provided in the preceding section,
is based on the con-

viction that human beings can indeed sometimes act
freely, that they
can indeed achieve personhood.

In other, more traditional terms:

I

believe that the present incompatlbilist theory of free
human action,
when coupled with the claim that determinism is false,
allows, as no

compatibilist theory does, for the fact that human beings are
blessed
with a certain degree of dignity, the dignity of being, at least
in
part, in control of their own destiny. 49
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See statement (20b) of Chapter

V.

See statement (20c) of Chapter

V.

We may say:

freely^^ (or freely 2 ) acts relative to £ and
t' =df.
there is an event £ such that £ freely^
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^

2

t

and

t

'

.
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See note 22

.

If [S wills £] is caused, then this sense of
"just be" is
the same as that of "constitute" (see D.IV.ll).
if [s
wills
is
~
uncaused, however, some other sense must be given.

25

The theory of free human action presented in this section
has much in common with, though also much not in common
with, Chisholm’s account of free human action in P&O pp. 61-4 an
account
which I shall not go into in detail here. The important common
aspects are: my account is both indeterministic (see D.VI.2) and
"constitutionally iffy" (see D.VI.4 through D.VI.9), as is his.

—

,

26 ^
For example, see C.D. Broad, Ethics and the History of
Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1952),
214-7
pp
(henceforth I shall refer to this book as " EHP ") Robert R. Ehman,
"Causality and Agency," Ratio 9 (1967), pp 141-2; and Duane H.
Whittier, "Causality and the Self," The Monist 49 (1965), p. 300.
.

;

.

,

,

27

See Campbell, IFWPP, pp. 132-4; Taylor, A&P
holm, F&A, pp. 20-1.

,

p.

262; Chis-

28

Alvin I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1970), pp 83-4 (henceforth I shall refer
to this book as " THA ")
Irving Thalberg, "How Does Agent-Causality
Work?" in Myles Brand and Douglas Walton, ed. Action Theory (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976), p.
216 (henceforth I shall refer to this article as "HDACW").
.

;

,

29

Campbell, IFWPP, p. 133.

^^Taylor,
31

32

p.

262.

Chisholm, F&A, p. 21; the underlining of "A" has been added.
F&A, p.

^^F&A, pp.

21.

21-2.

3A

Of course, my argument is a two-edged sword that could be
used against me.
In response to it someone might say "So much the
worse for the concept of event-causal contribution!" rather than
"So much the better for the concept of direct effectuation!"

Donald Davidson, "Agency," in Robert Binkley, Richard
Bronaugh, and Ansonio Marras, ed.. Agent, Action and Reason (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 15.
^^Taylor, A&P

,

p.

113; see also pp.

60-1, 74, 116-7.

328
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A&P

,

p.

49.

referred to the opening paragraphs of
Section
rh
^
Chapter
III, where I argue that the position that
I adopt is the
sort of position that Chisholm should have adopted.
In this connection, see also "The 'Unmoved' Agent and the Ground
of Responsibility "
Th^e Journal of Philosophy
64 (1967) by Nani L. Ranken, in which the
,
author argues that a theory of agent-causation implies
that every action, that is performed, is performed freely.
Whether or not this is
true of other theories involving the concept of
effectuation, it is
clearly not true of mine.
In fact, it is also clearly not true of
Taylor's; for Taylor explicitly addresses himself to this
question and
does not commit himself on the issue of the truth or
falsity of determinism ( A&P , pp. 112-115, 130-3). What is unclear on Taylor's
account
is how determinism might be true.
2
2,

39

See Campbell, IFWPP, pp. 130-1; IDFW, pp. 46-7; OSG, pp.
148-153, 167-8.

Wilfrid Sellars, "Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person,"
The Logical Way of Doing Things (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 242 and 246-7; Goldman, TM,
pp.
81-5; Bruce Aune Reason and Action (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1977), pp. 3-8 (henceforth I shall refer to
this book as " R&A ")
See also Broad,
p. 215.
in Karel Lambert, ed

.

,

,

.

In this connection, see Richard Taylor, "Thought and Purpose," in Myles Brand, ed.. The Nature of Human Action (Glenview,
Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Go., 1970), p. 267, and A&P pp. 21-2,
60-1; also Roderick M. Ghisholm, "The Agent as Cause," in Myles Brand
and Douglas Walton, ed.
Action Theory (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston,
U.S.A.
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 199-200,
,

,

:

^^Reid, E, pp. 31, 267-8.
43

44

EHP

,

p.

Campbell, IFWPP, pp. 130-2; IDFW

,

pp.

46-7.

The quotation is from Aune, R&A, pp. 5-6.

See also Broad,

215.

For a provocative account of the distinction between rational and causal explanation, see Taylor, A&P Chapters 10 and 14;
I
for a comment on this account, see Thalberg, HDACW, pp. 233-5.
mention the concept of rational explanation briefly in Section 6 of
Chapter IV, where I discuss G.E.M. Anscombe's and Bruce Aune's approach to the topic of Intentional action.
,

Recent proponents of this view are Donald Davidson ("AcThe Philosophy of
tions, Reasons, and Causes," in Alan R. White, ed.
Goldman
and
( THA
Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968)
,

,

329

Chapter III, Section 6, and Chapter V). Amongst
the opponents of
thxs view are: Reid (E. p. 283ff., and Essay
III), j.c. Urmson
(Motives and Causes, in Alan R. liliite, ed
The Philosonhv of A._
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968)),i^iam
P. Alston
and Motivation," The Encyclopedia of Philo sophy
( Motives
1967 v
especially p. 408), and Keith Donnellan ("Reasons
and Causes " The*
Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1967, VII, especially
p. 86).

t^

.

,

.

The explanation may have to include an account
of the logic
For a recent treatment of this issue see
Aune, R&A , Chapter IV.
of practical reasoning.

1 have already mentioned that one important
use of the present theory would be an application to problems concerning
the concept of moral responsibility.

Human beings are also cursed with the responsibility of
living up to their potential but why end this dissertation on
a
negative note?

—
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